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Abstract
The need for automation of the identity recognition process for a vast number of applications
resulted in great advancement of biometric systems in the recent years. Yet, many studies
indicate that these systems suffer from vulnerabilities to spooﬁng (presentation) attacks: a
weakness that may compromise their usage in many cases. Face veriﬁcation systems account
for one of the most attractive spooﬁng targets, due to the easy access to face images of users,
as well as the simplicity of the spooﬁng attack manufacturing process.
Many counter-measures to spooﬁng have been proposed in the literature. They are based on
different cues that are used to distinguish between real accesses and spooﬁng attacks. The
task of detecting spooﬁng attacks is most often considered as a binary classiﬁcation problem,
with real accesses being the positive class and spooﬁng attacks being the negative class.
The main objective of this thesis is to put the problem of anti-spooﬁng in a wider context,
with an accent on its cooperation with a biometric veriﬁcation system. In such a context, it
is important to adopt an integrated perspective on biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng.
In this thesis we identify and address three points where integration of the two systems is of
interest.
The ﬁrst integration point is situated at input-level. At this point, we are concerned with
providing a uniﬁed information that both veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems use. The
uniﬁed information includes the samples used to enroll clients in the system, as well as the
identity claims of the client at query time. We design two anti-spooﬁng schemes, one with
a generative and one with a discriminative approach, which we refer to as client-speciﬁc, as
opposed to the traditional client-independent ones.
At the second integration point, situated at output-level, we address the issue of combining
the output of biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems in order to achieve an optimal
combined decision about an input sample. We adopt a multiple expert fusion approach and we
investigate several fusion methods, comparing the veriﬁcation performance and robustness
to spooﬁng of the fused systems.
The third integration point is associated with the evaluation process. The integrated perspec-
tive implies three types of inputs for the biometric system: real accesses, zero-effort impostors
and spooﬁng attacks. We propose an evaluation methodology for biometric veriﬁcation sys-
tems under spooﬁng attacks, called Expected Performance and Spoofability (EPS) framework,
which accounts for all the three types of input and the error rates associated with them. Within
this framework, we propose the EPS Curve (EPSC), which enables unbiased comparison of
systems.
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Abstract
The proposed methods are applied on several case studies for the face mode. Overall, the
experimental results prove the integration to be beneﬁcial for creating trustworthy face veriﬁ-
cation systems. At input-level, the results show the advantage of the client-speciﬁc approaches
over the client-independent ones. At output-level, they present a comparison of the fusion
methods. The case studies are furthermore used to demonstrate the EPS framework and its
potential in evaluation of biometric veriﬁcation systems under spooﬁng attacks.
The source code for the full set of methods is available as free software, as a satellite package to
the free signal processing and machine learning toolbox Bob. It can be used to reproduce the
results of the face mode case studies presented in this thesis, as well as to perform additional
analysis and improve the proposed methods. Furthermore, it can be used to design case
studies applying the proposed methods to other biometric modes.
Key words: Spooﬁng attacks, Counter-measures, Anti-spooﬁng, Liveness Detection, Pre-
sentation Attacks, Presentation Attack Detection, Biometric Veriﬁcation, Face Veriﬁcation,
Biometric Evaluation
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Résumé
Au cours des dernières années, le besoin d’automatisation du processus de reconnaissance
d’identité pour un large nombre d’applications a engendré de grands progrès des systèmes
biométriques. Cependant, plusieurs études ont montré une vulnérabilité de ces systèmes
aux attaques d’usurpation (aussi appelées attaques de présentation ou “spooﬁng”) qui peut
compromettre leur utilisation dans de nombreux cas. Les systèmes de vériﬁcation du visage
sont les plus susceptibles d’être exposés à ces attaques en raison d’un accès aisé aux images
des visages des utilisateurs, ainsi qu’à la simplicité de mise en oeuvre du procédé d’usurpation
d’identité.
De nombreuses contre-mesures aux attaques de présentation ont été proposées dans la
littérature. Elles sont basées sur différents signaux utilisés pour distinguer les vrais accès des
attaques spoofées. La tâche de détection des attaques est le plus souvent considérée comme
un problème de classiﬁcation binaire dans lequel les vrais accès constituent les exemples
positifs, et les attaques les exemples négatifs.
L’objectif principal de cette thèse est de placer le problème de détection des attaques de
présentation au coeur d’un contexte élargi en accentuant sa coopération avec un système de
vériﬁcation biométrique. Dans un tel contexte, il est important d’adopter une perspective
intégrée de la vériﬁcation biométrique et de l’détection des attaques de présentation. Dans
cette thèse, nous identiﬁons et traitons trois éléments pour lesquels l’intégration des deux
systèmes est importante.
Le premier élément d’intégration se situe au niveau des signaux d’entrée. A ce stade, l’objectif
est de fournir une information uniﬁée à la fois aux systèmes de vériﬁcation et à la détection
des attaques de présentation. L’information uniﬁée comprend les échantillons utilisés pour
enregistrer les clients dans le système, ainsi que l’identité proclamée. Nous concevons deux
procédés de détection des attaques de présentation, l’un basé sur une approche générative,
l’autre sur une approche discriminante, mais également spéciﬁque au client, contrairement
aux procédés traditionnels.
Au deuxième niveau d’intégration, situé en sortie, nous traitons le problème de combinaison
entre les sorties des systèmes de vériﬁcation biométrique et de détection des attaques de
présentation pour réaliser une décision combinée optimale. Nous adoptons une approche
de fusion entre plusieurs experts et nous examinons plusieurs méthodes pour celle-ci en
comparant la performance de la vériﬁcation et la robustesse des systèmes fusionnés aux
attaques de présentation.
Le dernier élément d’intégration concerne l’évaluation. La perspective intégrée implique
v
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trois types d’entrée pour le système biométrique: les accès réels, les imposteurs sans ef-
fort, et les attaques de présentation. Nous proposons une méthodologie d’évaluation des
systèmes de vériﬁcation biométrique soumis à des attaques, que nous appelons ’Expected
Performance and Spoofability’ (EPS), et qui prend en compte les trois types d’entrée et leurs
taux d’erreurs associés. Dans ce cadre, nous proposons la courbe ’EPS Curve’ (EPSC) qui
permet une comparaison non biaisée des systèmes.
Les méthodes proposées sont appliquées dans plusieurs cas d’étude concernant le reconnais-
sance de visage. Au niveau de l’entrée, les résultats expérimentaux montrent le bénéﬁce de
l’intégration et l’avantage des approches spéciﬁques aux clients par rapport à celles qui leur
sont indépendantes. Au niveau de la sortie, nous présentons une comparaison des méthodes
de fusion. Les cas d’études sont par ailleurs utilisés pour démontrer l’usage de la méthode EPS
et son potentiel pour évaluer les systèmes de vériﬁcation biométrique soumis à des attaques
de présentation.
Le code source pour la totalité des méthodes est disponible en tant que logiciel libre comme
satellite de la boîte à outils gratuite Bob pour le traitement du signal et l’apprentissage automa-
tique. Il peut être utilisé pour reproduire les résultats des cas d’étude sur le visage présentés
dans cette thèse, ainsi que pour procéder à des analyses complémentaires et améliorer les
méthodes proposées. De plus, il peut être utilisé pour concevoir des cas d’étude en appliquant
les méthodes proposées à d’autres modalités biométriques.
Mots-clés: Attaques de présentation, Contre-mesures, Détection d’attaques de présentation,
Spooﬁng, Anti-spooﬁng, Détection du caractère vivant, Attaques de présentation, Détec-
tion d’attaques de présentation, Vériﬁcation biométrique, Vériﬁcation du visage, Evaluation
biométrique
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1 Introduction
We live in a digital world: an ever increasing amount of things that we possess or that represent
us are stored as sequences of zeros and ones. Our ﬁnances, our personal and professional
data, the services that we use are all partially or fully in an electronic format. As a result, it
has been a long time now since passwords replaced traditional keys to authenticate users and
ensure them a secure access not only to the electronic content that belongs to them, but also
to physical objects they possess and places they are admitted to.
Passwords rely on a "what I know" paradigm, and are thus a knowledge-based authentication
method [O’Gorman, 2003]. They consist of a sequence of characters that a user needs to
remember. While widely used and usually considered secure, passwords are infamous for the
lack of user convenience [Adams and Sasse, 1999]. This is especially the case when users need
to remember multiple passwords, each for a different purpose. Studies like Adams and Sasse
[1999]; Armstrong [2003]; Florencio and Herley [2007] show that users are prone to choose
easily memorable, crackable passwords, and intentionally or unintentionally disclose them.
Advising or forcing the users to use more difﬁcult passwords may increase insecure work
practices, like writing them down. Furthermore, passwords may be stolen via phishing or
logging with a malicious spyware [Coskun and Herley, 2008].
Another form of authentication, relying on a "what I have" paradigm, are tokens in the form of
portable storage devices, like smartcards. As an object-based authentication method, tokens
are prone to theft. Thus, it is advised that they are used as a complementary authentication to
passwords, rather than as a stand-alone security method [O’Gorman, 2003].
An alternative, ID-based form of authentication, is biometrics and it relies on a "what I am"
paradigm. A biometric recognition system establishes the identity of a user by capturing some
of his measurable physical and behavioral traits [Jain et al., 2006]. The biometric traits are
selected so that they reliably distinguish one person from the other [Matyas Jr. and Stapleton,
2000] and are stable throughout the lifespan of an individual [O’Gorman, 2003]. This puts
ﬁngerprint, face, iris and voice among the most popular biometric modes used nowadays.
Inconsistent or irreproducible presentation, imperfect signal acquisition and acquisition
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condition variabilities [Jain et al., 2006] are biometric challenges which have been steadily
addressed in the recent years.
To make a systematic comparison of the above-listed authentication methods, one needs to
evaluate them by different criteria. Bonneau et al. [2012] deﬁnes simplicity of use and cost
of deployment as some of these criteria. In this sense, biometrics has many advantages with
respect to passwords and tokens, because it is memory-effortless, scalable for users, and can
not be forgotten or lost. Yet, considering the value of the resources guarded by the system, the
most important criteria are probably its security assets. Unfortunately, biometrics may be a
subject of different security offenses, like targeted impersonation, theft, leaks and phishing.
This thesis is concerned with a particular security risk of biometric systems, spooﬁng at-
tacks. Also referred to as presentation attacks [ISO-30107-1, 2014], they are performed when
a malicious user claims another user’s identity by forging a copy of their biometric trait and
presenting it in front of the biometric system [Erdogmus and Marcel, 2014b]. Being recog-
nized and acknowledged in many biometric modes, the risk is, to some extent, inhibiting a
large-scale adoption of biometric systems, particularly in cases where human supervision of
the authentication process is not possible.
Aiming at making a step forward towards more secure biometric authentication, in this thesis
we address several issues regarding the integration of counter-measures to spooﬁng attacks
into biometric systems. Before going into details, we give arguments stating the importance
of developing spooﬁng counter-measures and the integration process. Subsequently, we
formalize the objectives of this thesis and summarize its main contributions.
1.1 Background and Motivation
A generic biometric recognition system runs through several stages, like signal acquisition,
feature extraction, template creation and matching. According to Ratha et al. [2001] and as
illustrated at Fig. 1.1, the security of such a system can be compromised at several attack
points. Galbally et al. [2007] group the attacks into two broad categories: indirect and direct.
Indirect attacks are performed at a system level and require hacking skills to intrude into
the system. They may manipulate, for example, the communication channel, the feature
extraction or matching procedure, or tamper the stored templates, as represented by the
vulnerability points 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 on Fig. 1.1. On the other hand, direct attacks are performed
before the signal is received by the system. Hence, direct attacks happen at vulnerability point
1 on Fig. 1.1 and they target the sensor itself.
The basic type of sensor-level attack is zero-effort impostor, and may arise as a result of
a certain degree of similarity between biometric samples from two individuals [Jain et al.,
2006]. The danger of such attacks is related to the level of individuality of the biometric trait.
Robustness to zero-effort impostors is a fundamental property of a biometric recognition
system. Indeed, the biometric community puts fundamental efforts to reduce the successful
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Figure 1.1: Points of vulnerability of generic biometric recognition system [Ratha et al., 2001]
zero-effort impostors by optimizing the recognition algorithms to minimize the similarities
between the representations of different clients.
Unlike zero-effort impostors, spooﬁng attacks are adversary attacks at a sensor level. They
involve presenting a copy of the biometric sample of another user in front of the system.
Spooﬁng attacks are conceivable because biometrics, unlike passwords, does not provide
security by secrecy, but by uniqueness [O’Gorman, 2003]. Not being a secret is an inherent
property of biometrics [Jain et al., 2006], and thus acquiring a copy of a biometric trait of an
individual is an attainable task. Unfortunately, information globalization acts in favor for
adversary users, making access to biometric data as easy as never before. For example, photos
and possibly videos featuring the face of users are available on various Internet websites.
Users’ voice can be easily recorded and examined at distance. Fingerprint molds can be easily
manufactured from latent marks left on cups and door knobs.
Once it is obtained, a copied biometric trait not only allows an attacker to access a biometric
system, but may avert the legitimate user to use the compromised biometric trait in the future
due to security reasons. This is a consequence of what O’Gorman [2003] calls "the paradox of
biometrics": the stability of the biometric trait, which is otherwise a desirable property, leaves
no option for compromise recovery, since biometric traits can not be changed or replaced.
Biometric experts agree that it is impractical to prevent collection of biometric data from
an individual [Matyas Jr. and Stapleton, 2000]. The ANSI standard committee formulated
what is called a security axiom for biometrics: “The security of a biometric system cannot
rely on keeping biometric data secret” [ANSI-X9.84-2010, 2010]. Rather, they recommend
building preventive measurements to defend against fabricated replicas of biometric samples.
O’Gorman [2003] rightfully declares that it is not the secrecy what makes a good authenticator,
but the difﬁculty to counterfeit the original. He argues that copy-resistance goes along with
uniqueness as a fundamental principle a good biometrics should stand upon. This gives the
essence of the motivation to develop counter-measures to spooﬁng attacks in order to foster
3
Chapter 1. Introduction
even wider adoption of biometrics as an authentication method.
It is important to note that the spooﬁng attacks arise as an issue from the practical usage of
biometrics, rather than as a problem inspired by a scientiﬁc curiosity. Ever since Matsumoto
et al. [2002] demonstrated the vulnerability of several commercial ﬁngerprint recognition
devices to spooﬁng attacks with gummy ﬁngers, every new commercial biometric authen-
tication system is being put to similar tests by security enthusiasts. For example, D. and M.
[2009] successfully deceived the face authentication systems of several laptops with fake facial
images at the Black Hat Security conference. The ﬁrst commercial ﬁngerprint authentication
on smartphones has been spoofed with artiﬁcial ﬁngers too [ChaosComputerClub, 2013;
Swanner, 2014]. While the goal of the above-mentioned examples is to draw attention to the
vulnerability of biometric recognition systems, criminal acts involving spooﬁng attacks on
deployed biometric systems have been recorded as well. The case of an illegal immigrant
trying to deceive the airport ﬁngerprint scanner in Japan with a tape with someone else’s
ﬁngerprint is one of the examples [Flink, 2009]. Another one concerns a doctor who falsely
registers her colleagues as present at work by spooﬁng the ﬁngerprint scanner tracking the
employee attendance [Matyszczyk, 2013].
Spooﬁng attacks are less likely to happen in a scenario where the biometric system is attended
by a human supervisor. Yet, this depends on the biometric mode: as shown in an example
above, it is possible to deceive the human control with a ﬁngerprint spooﬁng attack. Further-
more, the rise of the use of biometric systems as an integral part of portable personal devices
or for other unsupervised applications poses an urgent necessity to address the problem.
1.2 Scope of the Thesis and Terminology
Biometric recognition is used to refer to two different tasks: veriﬁcation and identiﬁca-
tion [Mansﬁeld et al., 2002]. In biometric veriﬁcation, as a synonym to biometric authentica-
tion, a user claims a particular identity and the system needs to verify whether this claim is
true based on the biometric trait. In biometric identiﬁcation, the system needs to identify a
biometric sample to belong to one out of many identities.
In biometric veriﬁcation the user makes a positive claim of an identity and the system makes
a one-to-one comparison of the input sample with the stored model of the claimed identity.
In biometric identiﬁcation the user usually makes no claim and the system needs to make a
one-to-many comparison of the input sample with the stored models. Identiﬁcation as a mode
of operation of a biometric system is often used in applications where duplicate enrollment
needs to be avoided, as well as in negative recognition, where an individual needs to be
identiﬁed to belong in a certain group (watch list) of identities [Mansﬁeld et al., 2002]. Because
of the different purposes of veriﬁcation and identiﬁcation systems, adversary attacks at sensor
level usually differ too. In biometric veriﬁcation, the goal of an attack is presenting oneself
as some other person. In biometric identiﬁcation used for one of the purposes stated above,
attack means disguising in order to hide one’s true identity. In such a case, masquerading
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as a particular person is not necessary, because disguise can be achieved by using generic
face mask or other artiﬁcial materials, wearing glasses or make-up, occluding the face with
a scarf, performing extreme facial expressions etc. For the iris mode, it can be achieved
simply by using fashion colored contact lenses. For ﬁngerprint mode, users that want to
disguise themselves may intentionally make cuts or burns on their ﬁngertips. Typically, the
counter-measures to disguise and spooﬁng attacks as a special form of disguise are different.
Furthermore, the different means of operation of veriﬁcation and identiﬁcation systems may
require different approaches for integration of the counter-measures. The scope of this thesis
is thus limited exclusively to spooﬁng attacks to biometric veriﬁcation systems, and excludes
attacks to biometric identiﬁcation systems.
It is interesting to note that among the biometric modes, the face mode is presumably one of
the most attractive to spoof. The reasons are two-fold. Firstly, face images of users are widely
available on the Internet and obtaining them can be a matter of just a few clicks [Li et al.,
2014]. Secondly, producing spooﬁng attacks for the face mode can be as easy as printing a
photograph on a paper, or displaying a photograph on an electronic device. Unlike spooﬁng
attacks for ﬁngerprint or iris mode, no special skills or expensive materials are required to
produce simple face spooﬁng attacks. This thesis is focused on the face mode and the value of
the proposed solutions is demonstrated on case studies with face data. However, the aspects
of spooﬁng detection treated in this thesis are generally valid for other biometric modes and
the proposed solutions can be readily applied to other spooﬁng attacks.
The terms spooﬁng detection, counter-measure and anti-spooﬁng method are interchange-
ably used in this thesis to refer to systems or techniques for detecting spooﬁng attacks. The
term liveness detection is often used in the literature, denoting that spooﬁng attacks do not
demonstrate signs of liveness on the scene, while the other samples do. Indeed, many counter-
measures explicitly measure the amount of liveness of the presented sample, like the per-
spiration of the skin [Schuckers, 2002] for the ﬁngerprint mode, or eye blinking for the face
mode [Pan et al., 2007]. However, not all spooﬁng attacks exhibit absence of liveness, esspe-
cially for the face mode. For example, in an attack where a video of the user’s face is played on
the screen of a device, the liveness signs can be identical as in a real access. Furthermore, many
face spooﬁng counter-measures operate using cues other than liveness. For these reasons, we
avoid the use of the term liveness detection in this thesis.
Finally, in this thesis we will interchangeably use the terms user and client to refer to any
person that is enrolled or uses the veriﬁcation system. We will also interchangeably use real
access and genuine access to denote samples coming from a valid user who is claiming the
correct identity in front of the veriﬁcation system.
1.3 Objectives and Contributions
Thanks to the growing interest of the biometric community towards the problem of spooﬁng,
the number of published works in the domain notes a signiﬁcant growth in the recent years.
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The majority of articles focuses on developing spooﬁng detection methods and relevant
features that can discriminate between real accesses and spooﬁng attacks. Thus, regardless of
the biometric mode, most of the anti-spooﬁng systems are designed as binary classiﬁcation
systems with real accesses as the positive and spooﬁng attacks as the negative class.
There are several aspects of biometric spooﬁng which have received notably less attention.
Among these, an essential issue arises due to the fact that anti-spooﬁng systems are not
designated to work in isolation, but in cooperation with a biometric veriﬁcation system that
needs to be protected. This observation indicates the need to put anti-spooﬁng in a wider
context encompassing a veriﬁcation system. This includes the framework and circumstances
within which the anti-spooﬁng system needs to be situated.
The main objective of this thesis is to highlight the need for an integrated perspective on
biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng. To this end, we identify three points in the biometric
veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng pipeline where integration may play an important role. They
are illustrated in Fig. 1.2. The ﬁrst integration point is at input-level and is concerned with
the information that both biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems use or may have
access to. The second integration point is at output-level and focuses on how to take a uniﬁed
decision about an input sample, based on the output of both biometric veriﬁcation and anti-
spooﬁng systems. The third point addresses evaluation of biometric veriﬁcation systems when
a threat of spooﬁng attacks is anticipated.
????????????
??????
?????????????
??????
???????????
???????????
????????????
???????????
?????????????????????
Figure 1.2: Important points of integration for biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems
With respect to the identiﬁed integration points, we argue that overlooking the cooperation of
biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems has three major consequences:
1. The anti-spooﬁng system is deprived of particular information that biometric veriﬁca-
tion system uses imperatively, and which may be useful for spooﬁng detection;
2. The optimization of the fusion of the two systems towards a uniﬁed decision is neglected
or completely prevented;
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3. Correct evaluation and unbiased comparison of the performance and spooﬁng vulnera-
bility of biometric veriﬁcation systems is unattainable.
An integrated perspective at each of the three points stands behind a strong motivation
which is thoroughly described throughout this thesis. Integration is, nevertheless, inspired by
observations of the operation of biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems in practical
applications.
At input-level, we start from the observation that a typical biometric veriﬁcation system needs
two inputs: a biometric sample and a claim about the identity of the client. Based on this
claim, the system compares the input sample with the stored models for the client. The
system also needs enrollment samples to create these models. On the other hand, a typical
anti-spooﬁng system makes use of neither the client identity, nor the enrollment samples
to take its decision. We argue that by integrating and unifying the information that both
veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems have access to, we can give an additional advantage to
the anti-spooﬁng system.
At output-level, the issue of integration emerges once we want to practically deploy an anti-
spooﬁng system to protect a biometric veriﬁcation system. At this point, the decision whether
a biometric sample is accepted or rejected depends on both of them. The way to fuse their
outputs has a direct impact on both the veriﬁcation performance of the system and its ro-
bustness to spooﬁng. If we consider that biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems are
expert systems, we could optimize the performance of the fused system by exploring different
multiple expert fusion approaches [Kittler et al., 1998].
At evaluation level, we ﬁrst acknowledge that, in addition to genuine samples and zero-effort
impostors, we have spooﬁng attacks as an input to the system. This implies a separate mea-
surement of the errors associated with incorrectly accepted spooﬁng attacks, in addition to
False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR) as error rates associated with
incorrectly accepted zero-effort impostors and incorrectly rejected genuine users, respec-
tively [Jain et al., 2008]. Considering that error rates in biometric classiﬁcation systems are
computed with respect to a decision threshold [Mansﬁeld et al., 2002], we need to deﬁne an
effective way to compute it. In this process, it is important to account on the three types of
errors, as well as the three types of inputs. Based on these considerations, we also need to
deﬁne performance curves that will enable unbiased comparison of biometric veriﬁcation
systems.
In this thesis we propose and compare practical methods to address the integration at all three
levels. With respect to this, the major contributions of this thesis are the following:
1. Input-level integration: design of client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng methods. We examine
the option to unify the information that anti-spooﬁng and veriﬁcation systems have
access to and whether anti-spooﬁng systems can beneﬁt from it. This information
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includes enrollment data which is used to enroll clients in the veriﬁcation system, as well
as information about the claimed client identity which is available at veriﬁcation time.
Abandoning the classical treatment of anti-spooﬁng systems as binary classiﬁcation
systems with models for real accesses as the positive and spooﬁng attacks as the negative
class, we exploit this information to build separate spooﬁng models for each client. We
refer to this approach as client-speciﬁc, as opposed to the traditional client-independent
anti-spooﬁng approaches which disregard the client identity. We develop two client-
speciﬁc methods: one based on a generative and one on a discriminative approach.
Publication related to this contribution: [Chingovska and Anjos, 2015].
2. Output-level integration: comparison of multiple experts fusion methods for bio-
metric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems. We emphasize the need to explore
several ways to fuse the output of biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems, in
order to optimize the systems in terms of veriﬁcation performance and robustness to
spooﬁng attacks. We analyze several fusion schemes operating at decision-level and
score-level.
Publication related to this contribution: [Chingovska et al., 2013a].
3. Integrated evaluation: design of evaluation methodology for biometric veriﬁcation
systems under spooﬁng attacks. We present the drawbacks of existing methodologies
for evaluation of veriﬁcation systems under spooﬁng attacks and we demonstrate the
need for improvement. We propose a new evaluation methodology, called Expected Per-
formance and Spoofability (EPS) framework, which accounts for a variable weight of the
systems error rates and varying expected probability of the inputs. The accompanying
EPS Curve (EPSC) enables unbiased comparison between veriﬁcation systems.
Publication related to this contribution: [Chingovska et al., 2014a].
4. Case studies on the face mode. The integration concepts and methods elaborated
in this thesis are illustrated by case studies on several different state-of-the-art face
veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng methods. The case studies are performed using face
spooﬁng data and include an extensive empirical analysis which serves to compare the
proposed methods.
The results concerned with the input-level integration show that client-speciﬁc methods
have a signiﬁcant advantage over their client-independent counter-parts. The advan-
tage is present both when tested with the same or different type of attacks than the
ones used for training. With respect to the output-level integration, the results show
the beneﬁt of the fusion and a trade-off between systems’ veriﬁcation performance and
robustness to spooﬁng. A large part of the analysis is performed using the EPS frame-
work, demonstrating the usage of EPSC and the value of the methodology in evaluating
biometric veriﬁcation systems under spooﬁng attacks.
5. Provision of fully reproducible experiments and reusable code. The source code of all
the methods described in this thesis is available as free software in the software package
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bob.thesis.ichingo20151, which is a satellite package to the free signal processing
and machine learning toolbox Bob2 [Anjos et al., 2012]. The experiments for the case
studies can be fully reproduced. Furthermore, the code can be used to create additional
case studies based on other veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems or different biometric
modes.
Other publications related to this thesis: [Chingovska et al., 2012], [Chingovska et al., 2013b],
[Chingovska et al., 2014c], [Chingovska et al., 2014b], [Anjos et al., 2014].
1.4 Thesis Outline
The thesis is composed of seven chapters. A brief summary of each of them is given below.
In Chapter 2 we cover the existing literature in biometric spooﬁng and anti-spooﬁng, particu-
larly focusing on the face mode. First, we give examples of face spooﬁng attacks and we cover
the existing face spooﬁng databases. Then, we give an overview of the research efforts for
face anti-spooﬁng, systematically categorizing them into several categories based on the cues
they use to distinguish between real accesses and spooﬁng attacks. The overview is primarily
focused on features for automatic anti-spooﬁng methods.
In Chapter 3 we address input-level integration. We propose client-speciﬁc face anti-spooﬁng
methods as a way to unify the information that both veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems use.
First, we empirically demonstrate the motivation for client-speciﬁc methods. Subsequently,
we present the theoretical background of the proposed generative and discriminative client-
speciﬁc methods.
In Chapter 4 we focus on output-level integration. We state the need of taking a multiple
expert approach and we study several fusion strategies at decision-level and score-level.
In Chapter 5 we focus on integrated evaluation. We point out the weaknesses of the current
evaluation methodologies for biometric veriﬁcation systems under spooﬁng attacks and their
inability to perform unbiased comparison between systems. Then, we present the Expected
Performance and Spoofability (EPS) framework and the corresponding EPS Curve (EPSC)
for an unbiased evaluation, which takes into account the three types of inputs and errors of
biometric veriﬁcation systems.
In Chapter 6 we illustrate the methods proposed in the previous chapters on case studies in
the face mode. The case studies are based on several state-of-the-art face veriﬁcation and
anti-spooﬁng systems and include extensive experiments to assess their performance. In
the ﬁrst part, we show the value of the client-speciﬁc approaches proposed for input-level
integration in Chapter 3. In the second part, we make comparative analysis of the fusion
1 https://pypi.python.org/pypi/bob.thesis.ichingo2015
2 https://www.idiap.ch/software/bob
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methods described in Chapter 4. Throughout the analysis we demonstrate the use of the EPS
framework presented in Chapter 5 to evaluate biometric veriﬁcation systems under spooﬁng
attacks.
In Chapter 7 we conclude the thesis with a summary of its contributions and achievements
and we give an outline of possible directions for future work.
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To understand biometric spooﬁng and come with practically viable anti-spooﬁng systems,
one needs to go through several stages. Deﬁning spooﬁng attacks and studying how they are
created and performed is the ﬁrst stage. Based on this knowledge, one can proceed with the
second stage, which is developing suitable counter-measures. If then there is a need to set the
problem into a context that considers the cooperation with biometric veriﬁcation system, one
needs to create integration mechanisms.
The majority of the work in anti-spooﬁng is focused on the ﬁrst two stages. Topics of integra-
tion of veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems, as well as of evaluation of biometric veriﬁcation
systems under spooﬁng attacks are relatively sparsely covered in the literature. Therefore,
they are omitted in this literature review and will be covered in the corresponding chapters
dedicated to these topics. Instead, we review spooﬁng and anti-spooﬁng for the face mode
as isolated problems. This is important, as the case studies used to illustrate the integration
concepts in this thesis are extensively making use of different face anti-spooﬁng methods and
features. Understanding the advantages of the proposed methods as demonstrated in the
experimental evaluation of the case studies, requires a comprehension of the anti-spooﬁng
methods they are based on.
We commence this chapter by covering practical aspects related to fabrication of spooﬁng
attacks for the face mode in Section 2.1. Then, in Section 2.2, we describe the efforts for
organized collection of face spooﬁng data, which resulted in face spooﬁng databases used
to evaluate anti-spooﬁng systems. We proceed with a systematic overview of face spooﬁng
counter-measures in Section 2.3.
2.1 Face Spooﬁng Attacks
The quality of the spooﬁng attacks for the face mode is inﬂuenced by several factors. Firstly,
there is the quality of the original sample used to produce the attack. For example, the original
sample can be a mugshot image taken with user’s cooperation, or an image in adversary
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conditions taken from distance or downloaded from the Internet. The quality of the recorded
input may also vary and may depend on the circumstances under which the spooﬁng attack is
performed, like the illumination conditions or the presence of supervision at the biometric
system capturing device. Other factors, categorized by Common Criteria as important for
attacks to any kind of information systems are technical expertise, knowledge about the
capturing device, window of opportunity etc. [ISO/IEC 15408].
The attacker usually has direct inﬂuence neither on the quality of the original sample, which
may likely be obtained in an opportunistic manner, nor on the conditions at the side of
the biometric system. However, he is fully responsible for the process of fabricating the
attack, which includes the choice of the spooﬁng media, material, devices and tools needed
to perform the attacks. These choices determine the type of the spooﬁng attack, as a broad
description of its properties. The type of the attack is the basic source of differences between
the spooﬁng attacks, which often serve as cues to detect them.
One of the properties of the spooﬁng attacks that is conditioned on their type is their dynamics.
Based on this, they can be categorized as static or dynamic. The static spooﬁng attacks retain
the face appearance, but present only a face with no signs of vitality. The dynamic spooﬁng
attacks retain both the face appearance and vitality by exhibiting certain movements which are
typical for a human face. Another property is their dimensionality: the face spooﬁng attacks
can be in 2D or 3D.
Up to date, several prominent types of face spooﬁng attacks have been mentioned in the
literature. They have appeared as part of a face spooﬁng database, or have been demonstrated
to successfully spoof an existing face veriﬁcation system. They are given in Table 2.1. Examples
of several different types of attacks are given in Fig. 2.1.
The basic types of attacks can further differ in a number of other aspects, which may or may
not depend on the attacker’s will. An example is the environment where the original sample
is recorded, and it can be controlled or adversary. A ﬁxed support or a hand support can be
used for holding the spooﬁng medium [Anjos and Marcel, 2011]. For the attacks performed
with a hand support, the involuntary movements of the attacker’s hands may give a level of
liveness to the static attacks. Komulainen et al. [2013b] deﬁnes the term scenic spooﬁng attack
referring to attacks where the background content of the original sample used for the spooﬁng
attack is present alongside the face. On the contrary, on a close-up attacks the borders of the
spooﬁng medium are integrally visible. This aspect is primarily inﬂuenced by the size of the
original sample or the spooﬁng media used to display the attacks.
The complexity, cost and level of expertise to produce different types of spooﬁng attacks varies
signiﬁcantly. While producing a digital photo attack may require only an access to Internet
and a consumer’s mobile device, producing 3D masks may require expensive equipment, like
a camera or 3D scanner and a 3D printer [Erdogmus and Marcel, 2013a].
As will be discussed in Section 2.3, the type of the attack, as well as the properties related to its
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Attack dynamics Dimensionality Type Description
Static
2D
print face image printed on a paper
digitalphoto
digital face image displayed on a
screen of a device
sketch face sketched on a paper
3D warped print
print attack, warped to a 3D
head shape
Dynamic
2D
perforated print
print attack with perforated eye
regions
moving print
print attack being moved to
mimic face movements
video
video recording of a face dis-
played on a screen of a device
3D
mask
3D mask of a face with perfo-
rated eye regions
make-up
make-up mask to resemble an-
other user
Table 2.1: Types of face spooﬁng attacks
dynamics, dimensionality or other factors, have an important impact on the choice of features
used by the spooﬁng counter-measures.
2.2 Face Spooﬁng Databases
Depending on the attack types, the process of producing spooﬁng attacks may be time-
consuming, sometimes requiring a lot of resources and certain manufacturing skills. Therefore,
it is not difﬁcult to imagine that collecting attack data for many clients may be very demanding,
and, for certain type of attacks, too expensive [Erdogmus and Marcel, 2013b]. Perhaps this
is one of the main reasons why the number of publicly available face spooﬁng databases is
limited.
To the best of our knowledge, there are 5 publicly available face spooﬁng databases, differing
in the data format, number of clients and samples, protocol, types of attacks, as well as the
quality of the recording devices. In the following, we give a brief description of all of these
databases.
2.2.1 NUAA Photo Impostor Database
The work of Tan et al. [2010] was the ﬁrst one to present a face spooﬁng counter-measure
evaluated on a publicly available database, called NUAA Photo Impostor Database. It provides
12,614 samples (5,105 real accesses and 7,509 attacks) to 15 clients, in a still image format
with resolution of 640x480, recorded in 3 sessions and different illumination conditions. The
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(a) Print attack (b) Warped print (c) Perforated print (d) Video attack
(e) Adverse conditions (f) Controlled conditions (g) 3D mask
Figure 2.1: Different types of face spooﬁng attacks. Fig. (a), (b), (c) and (d) show close-up
attacks with visible spooﬁng media border. Fig. (e) and (f) show scenic attacks. Attacks
examples taken from different face spooﬁng databases [Tan et al., 2010; Zhiwei et al., 2012;
Chingovska et al., 2012; Erdogmus and Marcel, 2013b].
database contains only one print and warped print attacks, with face images printed on a
normal paper, as well as a photographic paper with two different sizes. There are several
attack samples per client, on which the printed paper is presented with different distance
and position with respect to the recording device. The database is collected in an adverse
environment, with visible borders of the spooﬁng medium. The protocol of this database
divides the samples into train and test sets with no overlapping clients between the two sets.
This database has several constraints, like the limited number of clients and the lack of diversity
between the attacks. As will be shown in Section 2.3, the provision of still images instead of
videos prevents certain anti-spooﬁng methods to be evaluated on this database.
Examples of samples from this database are shown in Fig. 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Real access (ﬁrst column) and spooﬁng attack samples from NUAA
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2.2.2 CASIA Face Anti-spooﬁng Database
CASIA Face Anti-spooﬁng Database (CASIA-FASD) [Zhiwei et al., 2012] overcomes some of the
main disadvantages of NUAA database. For example, the number of clients is as many as 50,
and the samples are in a video format. Furthermore, it provides a larger diversity of spooﬁng
attacks, of which there are as many as 3 types: warped print, perforated print and video attacks.
The warped and perforated print attacks are printed on a copper paper, while the video attacks
are played on a tablet. The overall diversity of the database is augmented by using 3 different
recording devices for the samples: an old web-camera recording low-quality samples with
resolution 640x480, a new web-camera recording normal-quality samples with resolution
of 640x680 and a high-resolution camera recording high-quality samples with resolution of
1280x720. The database is recorded in adverse conditions, and the majority of attacks are
close-up. The total number of samples in the database is 600 (150 real accesses and 450
attacks).
Similarly to NUAA database, the protocol of CASIA-FASD divides the samples into train and
test sets with no overlapping clients between the two sets. Depending on the type of attacks
and the sample quality, candidate anti-spooﬁng methods can be evaluated on different sub-
protocols.
Fig. 2.3 shows example samples from CASIA-FASD database.
Figure 2.3: Real access (ﬁrst column) and spooﬁng attack (warped print, perforated print and
video in the last three columns, respectively) samples from CASIA-FASD.
2.2.3 Print-Attack, Photo-Attack and Replay-Attack Databases
Print-Attack [Anjos andMarcel, 2011], Photo-Attack [Anjos et al., 2013] andReplay-Attack [Chin-
govska et al., 2012] are a family of databases recorded for the same set of 50 clients, but with
different types of spooﬁng attacks. While Print-Attack contains only print attacks, Photo-Attack
contains both print and digital photo attacks and Replay-Attack is a super-set of the two of
them, and provides additional video attacks. All samples are in a video format, recorded with
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a built-in laptop camera and with a resolution of 320x240. An additional level of diversity of
the attacks is provided by using two kinds of support for the attacks: hand and ﬁxed. Diversity
on a database-level is ensured by recording in two conditions: controlled and adverse. During
the recording, special care has been taken that all attacks are scenic and no spooﬁng media
borders are visible. The total number of samples in the database is 1200 (200 real accesses and
1000 attacks).
Besides train and test data, the protocol of Replay-Attack family of databases provides a
development set for ﬁne tuning of model parameters. These sets do not have overlapping
clients. An exclusive property of Replay-Attack is the provision of 100 additional real access
samples recorded in a separate session, which are designated for enrollment purposes. Using
this data, one can train a biometric veriﬁcation system using Replay-Attack and evaluate
the effectiveness of its spooﬁng attacks to deceive such a system. Such an evaluation is not
possible for the spooﬁng attacks in NUAA and CASIA-FASD databases. As will be seen in
Chapters 3, 4 and 5, many aspects of anti-spooﬁng can not be addressed without such data.
Fig. 2.4 shows real and spooﬁng attack samples from Replay-Attack database.
Figure 2.4: Real access (ﬁrst column) and spooﬁng attack (print, digital photo, video in the
last three columns, respectively) samples from Replay-Attack. Top row: controlled conditions.
Bottom row: adverse conditions.
2.2.4 MSU Mobile Face Spooﬁng Database
The MSU Mobile Face Spooﬁng Database (MSU-MFSD) appeared recently to provide spooﬁng
attacks targeting exclusively mobile devices [Wen et al., 2015]. It contains 35 clients and
280 video samples (70 real accesses and 210 attacks). The videos are recorded in adverse
conditions using two types of cameras: a built-in laptop camera with resolution of 640x480
and a smartphone with resolution of 640x720. There are 3 types of attacks: print attack and
video attacks with two different qualities, one replayed on a tablet screen, and one on a
smartphone screen. They are all scenic attacks.
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MSU-MFSD provides a protocol which contains train and test set only with non-overlapping
identities and does not provide separate enrollment data.
2.2.5 3D Mask Attack Database
3D Mask Attack Database (3DMAD) [Erdogmus and Marcel, 2013b] is the ﬁrst face spooﬁng
database with 3D mask spooﬁng attacks. The 3D masks for a total of 17 clients are manufac-
tured by a commercial service, using a frontal and a proﬁle image of the face as a source. The
database contains samples in two types of data formats: sequences of color data recorded us-
ing a camera and depth data recorded using a depth sensor, both with a resolution of 640x480.
Using the depth data, unique spooﬁng counter-measures can be evaluated using this database.
The total number of samples is 255 recorded in 3 sessions in a controlled environment.
3DMAD provides a protocol with a train, development and test set, but due to the small
number of samples, the authors recommend using cross-validation for the evaluation of
anti-spooﬁng methods. To train a biometric veriﬁcation system, the database provides an
alternative, modiﬁed protocol, where the samples from the ﬁrst session are used for enrollment
purposes.
Fig. 2.5 shows cropped and preprocessed faces from both color and depth samples from
3DMAD database.
Figure 2.5: Real access (columns 1 and 2) and mask spooﬁng attack (columns 3 and 4) samples
from 3DMAD. Samples in column 1 and 3 are captured using a camera, samples in columns 2
and 4 are captured using depth sensor.
2.3 Face Anti-Spooﬁng Methods
Face anti-spooﬁng methods typically conform to a common ﬂow of operation which is simpli-
ﬁed in Fig. 2.6. The process goes through three main stages. The ﬁrst stage is preprocessing and,
if present, may consist of grey-scale conversion, face detection, face bounding box extraction
and size normalization. The preprocessed sample is then a subject to feature extraction, which
means mapping the input signal into a suitable feature space. The goal of this step is to isolate
the information which is relevant to the task, which in this case is discriminating between real
access and spooﬁng attack samples. In an ideal case, the feature vectors extracted from real
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accesses and spooﬁng attacks will lie in different positions in the feature space. At the ﬁnal,
classiﬁcation stage, the extracted feature vectors are sent to a classiﬁer, which is trained to
make the distinction between real accesses and spooﬁng attacks in the feature space.
????????????? ????????????????? ??????????????
????????
?????????????????
????????????????
Figure 2.6: Typical ﬂow of operation of a face anti-spooﬁng method
Different anti-spooﬁng methods rely on different feature extraction and classiﬁcation proce-
dures. In the following, we will cover the most prominent techniques in feature extraction and
classiﬁcation for face anti-spooﬁng.
2.3.1 Face Anti-Spooﬁng Features
The selection of feature extraction method often depends on the type of attacks that the
anti-spooﬁng method targets. As different types of attacks have different properties, they
relevant information that differentiates them from real accesses may be different and may
need to be extracted in a different way.
A coarse categorization of anti-spooﬁng feature extraction methods is proposed by Erdogmus
and Marcel [2014b], using the type of the input as a criteria. Three categories are listed as:
employing additional hardware, capturing additional data or using the biometric data.
The ﬁrst category consists of methods that employ additional hardware to capture data dif-
ferent than the one which is used by the biometric veriﬁcation system. This data, and not
the one used for veriﬁcation, is then used to detect spooﬁng attacks. Usually, specialized
sensors capture cues about the liveness of the subject in front of the system. Examples of
additional hardware can be thermal sensors [Prokoski, 1983], near-infrared sensors [Pavlidis
and Symosek, 2000; Kim et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2011], multi-spectral ﬁlter [Wang et al.,
2013b], spectrograph [Angelopoulou, 2001], or, more recently, light-ﬁeld camera [Raghavendra
et al., 2015]. Methods based on depth information, like the ones presented in [Kose and Duge-
lay, 2013; Erdogmus and Marcel, 2013b] also fall in this category. 3DMAD database provides
samples suitable for developing such methods. This category of methods are often considered
inconvenient because of the cost associated with the additional hardware. Furthermore, they
may be less convenient from a deployment perspective, because it may be difﬁcult to provide
an additional hardware for certain applications, like, for example, mobile devices.
The second category involves methods which capture additional data using the same capturing
device used for veriﬁcation. An example is the method by Wang et al. [2013a], where several
additional face images are taken from different viewing angles. The method proposed by Kim
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et al. [2013] requires two face images taken with different focus. De Marsico et al. [2012]
propose a method that requires images of the user performing various head movements.
These methods may be less convenient from users’ perspective, as an additional level of
cooperation is required from their side in order to capture the additional information.
In the following sections we will focus exclusively on methods from the third category, which
encompasses methods that automatically extract anti-spooﬁng features directly from the
biometric data used for veriﬁcation. Depending on the cues that are used to infer the presence
of a live subject in front of the system, these methods can be categorized as based on:
• liveness detection;
• motion analysis;
• visual appearance;
• contextual information;
• feature learning.
Usually, the features extracted for anti-spooﬁng are hand-crafted based on prior knowledge
about the task. The sole exception are the feature learning methods, which extract relevant
features in a completely data-driven fashion. In this section we will cover the most notable
methods from all these categories. In addition, we will report on methods which fuse several
approaches together.
Before proceeding, it is important to notice that several researchers have made attempts to
increase the robustness of biometric recognition systems to spooﬁng attacks by using multiple
biometric modes [Ross et al., 2008]. The intuition behind these solutions is that an attacker
may need more effort to spoof the system, because there are more modes to spoof. Within
such multimodal framework, face has been combined with ﬁngerprint and iris [Johnson et al.,
2010; Akhtar et al., 2012; Rodrigues et al., 2009, 2010], or with voice [Chetty and Wagner, 2006b].
However, Johnson et al. [2010]; Akhtar et al. [2012]; Rodrigues et al. [2009, 2010] have proven
that one needs to be careful with the choice of combination rules, which may not be helpful
if poorly designed. Combination rules designed speciﬁcally for the purpose of increased
robustness have been proposed in [Rodrigues et al., 2009, 2010].
Liveness Detection
Liveness detection anti-spooﬁng methods base their decision on the evidence of liveness
present on the scene. Usually, eye-blinking, mouth movements and involuntary subtle head
movements are considered as evidence of liveness. One of the ﬁrst attempts to employ eye-
blinking for anti-spooﬁng is performed by Pan et al. [2007] and uses Conditional Random
Fields (CRF) to model the state of the eye as open or closed and the correlation between its
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state and the observation. With a similar purpose, Wang et al. [2009] use active shape models to
detect the eye contours and difference of images to detect the blinking activity. In [Kollreider
et al., 2008], eye-blinking detection is combined with analysis of the 3D properties of the
subject.
A key, but limiting assumption of the liveness detection methods is that the user will experience
the actions that suggest liveness within a given short time frame. For example, Pan et al.
[2007] assume that eye blinks happen every 2-4 seconds, which may not be true always and
for all the subjects. An attempt to overcome this limitation is done by methods which rely
on more frequent, subtle changes in the face region, including color changes due to blood
ﬂow. To be able to detect these changes, Bharadwaj et al. [2013] perform Eulerian motion
magniﬁcation [Wu et al., 2012] as a pre-processing before applying a technique for analyzing
the texture or the motion patterns.
The majority of liveness detection methods rely on the involuntary movements of the user.
They are mainly targeting static spooﬁng attacks, while may be easily deceived by spooﬁng
attacks where liveness evidence is present. An alternative for these cases may be the special
sub-category of challenge-response methods explicitly asking the user to perform certain
action to verify his liveness. Representatives of this type have been already mentioned as
methods which require cooperation from the user to capture additional data [Wang et al.,
2013a; Kim et al., 2013; De Marsico et al., 2012]. There are various types of challenges that a
user can perform: taking a particular head pose [Frischholz and Werner, 2003] or following a
moving point with a gaze [Ali et al., 2013] are some of them. Finding the static and dynamic
relationship between face and voice information from a speaking face or modeling a speaker
in 3D shape is an option for anti-spooﬁng in a multimodal audio-visual system [Chetty and
Wagner, 2006a]. It is important to note that the last approach can successfully detect not only
visual, but even audio-visual spooﬁng attacks, like video playbacks with recorded utterance or
3D synthetic talking heads.
Some of the liveness detection methods, and especially the challenge-response methods
are considered to be intrusive, non-friendly and uncomfortable from the aspect of a user
experience. In addition, they usually require that the authentication is performed during a
prolonged time span. Finally, they are not transparent for the user. In this way, it is possible
for a malicious user to guess the liveness cue and try to bypass it.
Motion Analysis
The methods based on motion analysis try to ﬁnd properties of the motion patterns of a person
in front of the system, in order to distinguish them from motion patterns in presence of a
spooﬁng attack. A few of these methods base their approach on the assumption that a person’s
head, being a 3D object, moves differently than a 2D spooﬁng attack displayed on a planar
media. For example, Kollreider et al. [2009] use optical ﬂow method to track movements on
different face parts. The authors assume that, in contrast to a face displayed on a 2D surface,
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a 3D face will generate higher amount of motion in central face parts closer to the camera
(like the nose) then in the face parts which are further away from the camera (like the ears).
Furthermore, a 3D face exhibits motion ﬂows which are in opposite directions for central and
peripheral face parts. On the other hand, Bao et al. [2009b] derive a heuristics for the optical
ﬂow ﬁeld for four basic 2D surface motion types: translation, in-plane rotation, panning and
swing. On the contrary, a 3D face and facial expressions generate irregular optical ﬂow ﬁeld.
Making no assumptions about the properties of the motion in the case of real accesses and
spooﬁng attacks, Tirunagari et al. [2015] derive features capturing the visual dynamics of
the samples using a technique emerging from ﬂuid dynamics ﬁeld, called Dynamic Mode
Decomposition (DMD) [SCHMID, 2010].
Another set of motion-based methods assumes a high correlation between the movements
in the face region and the background in the case of a spooﬁng attack. Such a correlation
is unlikely in the case of a real access. Anjos and Marcel [2011] base the computation of the
correlation on 10 quantities extracted from the face region and the background. For the same
purpose, Anjos et al. [2013] rely on quantization of optical ﬂow motion vectors, while Yan et al.
[2012] perform foreground-background consistency analysis.
Similarly to the liveness detection methods, the motion analysis approaches depend on the
subtle involuntary movements of the user. In addition, sometimes they capture the motion
introduced by an attacker who holds the attack media with his hands. If the presumed motion
patterns are absent during the short acquisition process (for example, a very still person who
does not blink), the methods may fail. These methods are effective against static spooﬁng
attacks, but may miss dynamic ones. Furthermore, the methods based on motion correlation
are particularly targeting scenic spooﬁng attack.
Visual Appearance
Anti-spooﬁng methods analyzing the visual appearance stand behind a strong argumentation
about the differences in the visual properties of real accesses and spooﬁng attacks, explained
in a number of publications. Firstly, a real face and the human skin have their own optical
qualities (absorption, reﬂection, scattering, refraction), which other materials that can be used
as spooﬁng media (paper, photographic paper or electronic display) do not possess [Parziale
et al., 2005]. Similar differences can appear as a result of the diffuse reﬂection due to a non-
natural shape of the spooﬁng attacks [Yang et al., 2013]. Limited resolution of the device
used for spooﬁng or the involuntary shaking of the spooﬁng media may cause a blurring in
the case of spooﬁng attacks [Li et al., 2004; Määttä et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2013]. Artifacts
appearing in the spooﬁng production process, like jitter and banding in the case of print
attacks [Määttä et al., 2012; Yan et al., 2012] or ﬂickering and Moiré effect in the case of video
attacks [da Silva Pinto et al., 2012] are yet another sources of differences between the real
accesses and spooﬁng attacks. Many of these visual properties are indistinguishable for the
human eye, but often can be easily extracted using different image processing and computer
vision algorithms.
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The ﬁrst approach leveraging on the argument that spooﬁng attacks are usually of lower
resolution and thus contain less high-frequency components is proposed by Li et al. [2004].
The proposed feature vector is based on analysis of the 2D Fourier spectrum of the input image
and its energy change over time. Instead of comparing the high-frequency content of the
input, Tan et al. [2010] and Zhiwei et al. [2012] base their discrimination on the high-middle
band of the Fourier spectrum, which is extracted using Difference of Gaussians (DoG) method.
Some publications assume that the differences between real accesses and attacks are most
prominent within the reﬂectance component of the input image and estimate it in different
ways: Tan et al. [2010] use the Lambertian reﬂectance model [Oren and Nayar, 1995] and
Variational Retinex-based method, while Bai et al. [2010] use dichromatic reﬂection model.
Then, Tan et al. [2010] classify the obtained features using Sparse Low-rank bilinear discrim-
inative model, while Bai et al. [2010] compare the gradient histograms of the reﬂectance
images.
A feature set inspired by a physics-based model for recaptured images, which reveals differ-
ences in the background contextual information, reﬂection, surface gradient, color, contrast,
chromaticity and blurriness, is created by Gao et al. [2010]. Different sets of visual features
related to texture, color, edges and/or gradient are used by Tronci et al. [2011]; Schwartz et al.
[2011]. Galbally et al. [2014] generalize the appearance differences into quality differences and
uses a feature vector composed of 25 different image quality measures.
Several publications make use of speciﬁc computer vision descriptors for texture analysis.
Local Binary Pattern (LBP) [Ojala et al., 2002] appears to be the most signiﬁcantly exploited
for the purpose of anti-spooﬁng, both in its single resolution [Chingovska et al., 2012] and
multiresolution variants [Määttä et al., 2011, 2012; Yang et al., 2013]. Histogram of Oriented
Gradients (HOG) [Dalal and Triggs, 2005; Schwartz et al., 2011; Määttä et al., 2012; Yang et al.,
2013], Grey-level Co-ocurrence Matrix (GLCM) [Schwartz et al., 2011], Haar wavelets [Yan et al.,
2012] and Gabor wavelets [Määttä et al., 2012] are some of the other alternatives.
More recently, the analysis of the visual appearance has been enhanced into a temporal
domain. In [da Silva Pinto et al., 2012], the authors ﬁrstly extract the noise from each video
frame, and then summarize the relevant components of its 2D Fourier analysis into so-called
Visual Rhythm image. The properties of this image are then captured using GLCM. The method
proposed in [Pereira et al., 2014] utilizes LBP-TOP [Zhao and Pietikäinen, 2007], where instead
of LBP analysis on a single frame, dynamical LBP analysis on a frame and its neighboring
frames is performed.
The methods described before present different rates of success, which can not be easily com-
pared because they are obtained on different types of attacks and usually on databases which
are not released publicly. An interesting property of the majority of the visual appearance
methods is that they can work even if only a single image is available at input. They are usually
applied either on the face bounding box, face parts, or on the full input image. As one of their
advantages, they are user-friendly and non-intrusive and do not depend on the behavior of
22
2.3. Face Anti-Spooﬁng Methods
the user (unlike the liveness detection and motion analysis methods). Furthermore, an attack
which can deceive them a priori has not been presented up to this moment. They may be
expected to successfully detect any of the static or dynamic attacks. Yet, their success may be
put into question if the spooﬁng attacks are printed or displayed on high-resolution media,
thus lacking some of the artifacts that these methods rely on. Their generalization properties
when applied to different acquisition conditions or types of attacks they are not trained for
are also uncertain, since the visual appearance of the samples often depends on the lighting
condition, acquisition devices or display media.
Contextual Information
The context of the scene present as a background information in front of the recognition
system is used as a cue to detect spooﬁng attacks. In [Pan et al., 2011], the authors notice that
in the case of a spooﬁng attack, there will be a change in the contextual information of the
background when the face appears, which is especially true for scenic attacks. To detect such
changes, the authors compare the regions around reference ﬁducial key points in the region
around the face.
The approach presented in [Komulainen et al., 2013a] is targeting close-up attacks and the
analyzed contextual information consists of the border of the spooﬁng medium. The method
relies on HOG features to detect upper body and spooﬁng medium borders.
A drawback of these methods is that they depend on special assumptions about the back-
ground of the spooﬁng attacks and usually target attacks in a concrete context. As different
spooﬁng attacks can present different context, these methods can not be expected to general-
ize well on spooﬁng attacks not considered during training.
Feature Learning
Following a recent trend in computer vision, the anti-spooﬁng community started experiment-
ing with approaches where via deep learning, the anti-spooﬁng features are automatically
learned directly from data. This is in contrast to the previously discussed approaches, where
the features are inspired by some particular characteristics that can be observed as common
either for real accesses or for some or all types of spooﬁng attacks. It is argued, however,
that the features engineered in this way are suitable only for the type of spooﬁng attacks
they are designed for Yang et al. [2014]; Menotti et al. [2015]. Therefore, Yang et al. [2014]
and Menotti et al. [2015] propose to train a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) [Krizhevsky
et al., 2012] to automatically learn features discriminative for anti-spooﬁng. Experiments
with face images in 5 different resolutions are given in [Yang et al., 2014]. On the other hand,
Menotti et al. [2015] combine two approaches. With the ﬁrst, the architecture of the network
is optimized by selecting the best one for the problem at hand, out of a family of CNNs with
different hyper-parameters. With the second one, the weights of the network are learned via
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back-propagation.
2.3.2 Classiﬁcation Methods
With regards to the classiﬁcation step which, as shown in Fig. 2.6, follows the feature extraction,
the systems usually comply to the binary classiﬁcation deﬁnition. In a binary classiﬁcation
problem, there are two classes: a positive and a negative one. In the case of spooﬁng detection,
real accesses play the role of the positive, while spooﬁng attacks play the role of the negative
class. Let’s denote the feature vector of a sample with x. Given x as an input, the binary system
needs to determine the value of its class c =C where C ∈ {R,A} and R stands for the class of real
accesses, while A stands for the class of spooﬁng attacks.
Bishop [2006] gives three approaches to solve classiﬁcation problems, including binary classi-
ﬁcation problems:
• Using a discriminant function. A discriminant function f (x) performs a direct map of
the feature vector points x from the input space to a score determining the class label.
• Using a discriminative model. In a discriminative model, the posterior probability
p(c =C|x) is directly estimated.
• Using a generative model. In a generative model, ﬁrst the class-conditional probability
densities p(x|c = C), as well as the prior probabilities p(c = C) for each class C are
estimated. Then, the posterior probability p(c = C|x) is determined using the Bayes
theorem.
The parameters of the discriminant function, as well as of the discriminative and generative
models are determined in the training process using the training data. To obtain the ﬁnal
decision for binary classiﬁcation problems, a decision threshold needs to be set. All the
samples with scores on one side of the threshold are assigned to the same class. The threshold
is applied on the score obtained by the discriminant function for the ﬁrst approach, or the
ratio of the log-likelihoods of the data given the two classes for the second and third approach.
The majority of anti-spooﬁng systems use methods based either on discriminant functions or
discriminative models, usually ones which have a well established reputation in the machine
learning community. The most popular classiﬁer used for face anti-spooﬁng is Support Vector
Machines (SVM) [Bai et al., 2010; Määttä et al., 2011; Tronci et al., 2011; da Silva Pinto et al.,
2012; Chingovska et al., 2012; Komulainen et al., 2013a; Yang et al., 2013; Kose and Dugelay,
2013; Pereira et al., 2014], both with linear or Radial Basis Function (RBF) kernel. For features
in the form of histograms, like LBP, homogeneous kernels mapping approximating a χ2 kernel
can be used as well [Määttä et al., 2012]. Other methods use Linear Discriminant Analysis
(LDA) [Chingovska et al., 2012; Galbally et al., 2014], Sparse Logistic Regression [Tan et al.,
2010], boosting [Pan et al., 2007], random forests [Wang et al., 2009], Partial Least Squares
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Regression (PLS) [Schwartz et al., 2011; da Silva Pinto et al., 2012] and Multi-Layer Perceptron
(MLP) [Anjos and Marcel, 2011]. Some systems produce scores on which a threshold can be
directly applied [Li et al., 2004; Kollreider et al., 2008, 2009; Bao et al., 2009a; Anjos et al., 2013].
During training of any of the systems mentioned above, the full set of real access and spooﬁng
attack samples available in the training set are taken to form the positive and the negative
class, respectively. These systems can be considered as client-independent, as the information
about the clients that the samples belong to is disregarded.
2.3.3 Fusion of Face Anti-spooﬁng Methods
As discussed in Section 2.3.1, usually face anti-spooﬁng features are inspired from some
particular properties of either real accesses or one or more types of spooﬁng attacks. Therefore,
they are customized to particular attack type and are often not effective if the attack property
assumptions do not hold. Pereira et al. [2013] has made a proof of concept that the anti-
spooﬁng systems may not be able to generalize well on unseen spooﬁng attacks. A way
to mitigate this problem is proposed by the trend of fusing several different anti-spooﬁng
methods to obtain a more general counter-measure effective against a multitude of attack
types. Fusion of anti-spooﬁng method has been done at several levels: feature, score, decision,
frame and video level.
The ﬁrst attempt of fusing has been performed by Kollreider et al. [2008], who detect spooﬁng
attacks based on the decision of two independent methods: one analyzing 3D properties of
the head and one the eye-blinking of the user. In [Tronci et al., 2011], the authors develop
a fusion scheme at a frame and video-level and apply it to a set of visual appearance cues.
In [Schwartz et al., 2011], the fusion of visual appearance cues is done at feature level. Yan
et al. [2012] for the ﬁrst time bring the intuition that the fusion can have a bigger impact if
done with complementary counter-measures, i.e. those that address different spooﬁng attack
cues. In the particular case, although subject to some prerequisites of the videos, a method
based on motion analysis is fused with a method based on visual appearance.
To measure the level of independence of two anti-spooﬁng systems, and thus to get an estima-
tion of their complementarity and effectiveness of their fusion, Pereira et al. [2013] propose
employing a statistical analysis based on [Kuncheva and Whitaker, 2003]. For the same pur-
pose, Komulainen et al. [2013b] propose to count the common errors. They further show that
score-level fusion of several simple anti-spooﬁng methods which do not involve complex
inefﬁcient classiﬁers may be favorable with respect to a single one which is memory and time
requiring.
The trend of fusing multiple complementary anti-spooﬁng methods continued in the 2nd
competition on counter-measures to 2D face spooﬁng attacks [Chingovska et al., 2013b]. While
fusion at score level is the most dominant approach, future efforts should analyze what is the
most effective fusion strategy, both in terms of error rates, as well as ﬂexibility of incorporating
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a newly developed counter-measure into the fused system.
2.4 Discussion
The increased interest for the problem of anti-spooﬁng has resulted in a large set of counter-
measures, most of which follow a typical ﬂow of operation, as depicted in Fig. 2.6. The major
diversity among the counter-measures is provided by the types of features they use, which,
on the other hand, are chosen based on some cues differentiating between real accesses and
one or more types of spooﬁng attacks. The counter-measures further differ in other important
properties, like their intrusiveness for the user and the type of input they require.
Unfortunately, it is not easy to compare the performance of the proposed spooﬁng attacks,
mostly because they not always target the same types of attacks. Therefore, they are usually
tested on different databases, some of which are private. In our opinion, summarizing their
properties and grouping them by category is a task more important than performance com-
parison. Having such a summary, a user can decide which method to use for an application of
interest based on the expected type of spooﬁng attacks, input type that the system provides,
as well as ease of implementation and convenience of use.
However, experiments on different databases have shown that face anti-spooﬁng methods
can quite effectively detect spooﬁng attacks. Best results on Replay-Attack database are as
high as 0% HTER when a multitude of different features are fused together [Chingovska et al.,
2013b]. Spooﬁng attacks in 3DMAD database reach nearly perfect accuracy even with simple
features based on LBP [Erdogmus and Marcel, 2014a]. The HTER on CASIA-FASD has been
reported to be 6.25% using CNN [Yang et al., 2014].
Some of the good results can be attributed to the insufﬁcient complexity and diversity of the
publicly available face spooﬁng databases. The community has recognized the limitations
of the currently existing databases, ranging from small number of identities, to small set of
spooﬁng attacks types, to various types of biases. More challenging databases need to be
created in future. Considering different materials to produce the spooﬁng attacks, using better
quality equipment, creating more diverse illumination conditions or recording more clients
are some of the ways to add to the adversity of the spooﬁng databases.
While the methods covered in this chapter address the problem of anti-spooﬁng respecting
its binary classiﬁcation nature, there is very little attention given to the integration of anti-
spooﬁng systems in a framework cooperating with biometric veriﬁcation systems. In this
thesis we will focus on three aspects of this cooperation, as stated in Chapter 1.3. A short
summary of the treatment of these aspects in the literature will be given in the corresponding
chapters.
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Speciﬁc Approaches to Anti-Spooﬁng
As binary classiﬁcation systems, anti-spooﬁng systems rely on a model trained using samples
from two classes: a positive class consisting of real access samples and a negative class
consisting of spooﬁng attacks. At training time, a typical anti-spooﬁng systems uses solely the
class label and does not have access to any other information about the samples, including
the identity of the client.
At query time, the anti-spooﬁng system receives a single input, a biometric sample, which
needs to be processed and ultimately assigned a label as being accepted (real access) or
rejected (spooﬁng attack). The decision is based upon the feature vectors extracted from the
sample. Again, no other information about the sample is used, including the information
about the identity of the client the sample comes from. Disregarding this information, anti-
spooﬁng systems of this kind could be referred to as client-independent.
Biometric veriﬁcation systems often operate in another way. Typically, they use one or more
enrollment samples for each client to build client models. These samples need to be labeled
with the identity of the client. At veriﬁcation time, the system receives two inputs: the ﬁrst one
is the biometric sample, and the second one is a claim about the client’s identity. Based on the
claim, the system matches the biometric sample with the client’s model and assigns a label as
being accepted (genuine user) or rejected (zero-effort impostor).
In the described setting, the biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems rely on different
data to build their models. The anti-spooﬁng system does not use the enrollment samples for
the clients. This is despite the fact that it could access them in the same way the veriﬁcation
system does. Similarly, and as shown in Fig. 3.1, the biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng
systems have partially different input at query time. Although the two systems work in parallel
and need to take a collaborative decision about whether a sample is accepted or rejected, they
do not make use of the same information. The anti-spooﬁng system neglects the information
about the client identity, although it could have an access to it in the same way the veriﬁcation
system does.
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Figure 3.1: Flow diagram of the operation of biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems:
no input integration
In this chapter, we focus on the integration of biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems
at input-level. The integration refers to uniﬁcation of the information that the two systems use.
We argue that the additional information that the anti-spooﬁng system can use in the same
way biometric veriﬁcation system does already, may bring an improvement of the spooﬁng
detection. At training time, this information refers to the enrollment samples of the clients. At
query time, it refers to the identity information that the client claims to the system. In this
context, the input-level integration of the two systems sums up to adding the green dashed
line in Fig. 3.2, illustrating the client identity as an input to the anti-spooﬁng system.
????????
????????
????????
????????
????????????
???????????
????????????
??????
?????????????
??????
?????????
Figure 3.2: Flow diagram of the operation of biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems:
input-level integration
Having enrollment client samples at disposal, the anti-spooﬁng system could build client-
speciﬁc models for each client enrolled in the veriﬁcation system. At query time, the anti-
spooﬁng system will use the claim about the client identity in order to compare the input
sample with the model of the corresponding client.
In the following, we ﬁrst give a motivation and an empirical justiﬁcation for using client-
speciﬁc approaches for anti-spooﬁng in Section 3.1. Then, we propose two client-speciﬁc
approaches: one based on a generative paradigm in Section 3.2, and one on a discriminative
paradigm in Section 3.3. Throughout this chapter, we will use the following notation:
• c =C where C ∈ {R,A} is a variable referring to the sample class. R stands for the class of
real accesses, while A stands for the class of spooﬁng attacks.
• i = I where I ∈Y and Y is a set of client identities, is a variable referring to the identity
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of the client the sample belongs to.
• X = {xk |k ∈ 1..K } is a variable referring to a single sample and consists of K different
feature vectors extracted from that sample. The feature vectors can be derived from dif-
ferent cues. xk ∈Rdk |k ∈ 1..K are dk-dimensional and we assume that they are mutually
independent.
• χ= {(xk , yk)|k = 1..S} is a set of S samples given with their feature vectors xk ∈ Rd and
class labels yk ∈ {−1,1}. All the feature vectors are derived from a single cue.
3.1 Motivation
The client-independent anti-spooﬁng approaches are based on the assumption that there
is no critical difference between the real access or spooﬁng attack samples from different
clients. This is a reasonable hypothesis as the anti-spooﬁng features, including the face anti-
spooﬁng features described in Section 2.3.1, are speciﬁcally designed to distinguish between
real accesses and spooﬁng attacks, regardless of the client identities. Yet, we argue that many
of the anti-spooﬁng features, even inadvertently, retain information speciﬁc for the clients that
the samples belong to. These information may be related to the intrinsic personal properties
of the clients, like their appearance or behavior. For example, the involuntary movements or
eye-blinking patterns, which are an intrinsic client trait, may be manifested into the features
extracted by analysis of motion or visual appearance in the temporal domain. The physical
properties of the face or the skin tone and surface are likely to have an impact on the features
based on visual appearance, like LBP or Gabor wavelets. This may come at no surprise, if
we consider that LBP and Gabor wavelets, in more complex variants, are common in face
veriﬁcation [Marcel et al., 2007], where they are used to capture client-speciﬁc properties and
differentiate between different clients.
Certainly, the anti-spooﬁng features are not likely to be helpful in face veriﬁcation. However,
the above observations give rise to the following questions: 1. do the anti-spooﬁng features
carry information about the client; and 2. is this information relevant to make a better
discrimination between real access and spooﬁng samples belonging to that client. A positive
answer to these questions would justify client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng systems. Development of
these is possible only if information like enrollment samples for the clients and the client’s
identity claim is available to the anti-spooﬁng system. This information can be provided by
input-level integration of the biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems.
If there is a meaningful correlation between the anti-spooﬁng features and the client identity,
it may be reﬂected in the scores of the anti-spooﬁng system. This, on the other hand, may have
a direct impact on the error rates of the anti-spooﬁng system. This intuition is inspired by an
acclaimed study in speaker veriﬁcation on the dependence of veriﬁcation scores on the identity
of the clients [Doddington et al., 1998]. The study conﬁrms different levels of recognizability
for different speakers, leading to inhomogeneities of the performance of the veriﬁcation
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system across the client population. The result of this study is the popular Doddington’s zoo,
where the clients are categorized in four categories based on their predisposition to inﬂuence
the error rates of the veriﬁcation system, like False Acceptance Rate (FAR), False Rejection Rate
(FRR) and others. In the Doddington’s zoo, typical clients which are veriﬁed with an average
score are referred to as sheep. The clients which are difﬁcult to recognize and tend to increase
the FRR are referred to as goats, while the clients which are easy to be imitated by others and
tend to increase the FAR are referred to as lambs. Finally, wolves are clients which can easily
imitate other clients and also increase the FAR of the system. The study uses statistical tests to
examine whether the veriﬁcation scores across the clients come from the same distribution.
In its original form, the Doddington’s zoo assumes just two types of inputs to the veriﬁcation
system: genuine users and zero-effort impostors. Recently, Rattani et al. [2012] performed a
similar study on a ﬁngerprint veriﬁcation system, demonstrating the existence of the Dod-
dington’s zoo menagerie when a veriﬁcation system is confronted with spooﬁng attacks. In
particular, the study shows that the system’s vulnerability to spooﬁng among a population is
client-speciﬁc as well.
We perform a similar empirical analysis, evaluating the scores of client-independent anti-
spooﬁng systems. The goal is to observe whether the distribution of the scores obtained
by anti-spooﬁng methods is client-speciﬁc. For the empirical results, we choose four of the
state-of-the-art anti-spooﬁng features described in Section 2.3.1 and detailed in Section 6.1.1:
LBP [Chingovska et al., 2012], LBP-TOP [Pereira et al., 2014], MOTION [Anjos and Marcel, 2011]
and HOG [Yang et al., 2013]. They belong to the categories of anti-spooﬁng features based on
analysis of visual appearance, visual appearance in the temporal domain and motion. Using
these features, we train a Support Vector Machine (SVM) classiﬁer in a client-independent way,
as will be explained in Section 3.3.2. We perform the analysis using Replay-Attack database.
Similarly to [Rattani et al., 2012], we use box plots to show the variation of the scores for
the real access and spooﬁng attack samples of each client in the test set of the database.
Note that, unlike [Rattani et al., 2012], which evaluates the veriﬁcation scores, we analyze the
anti-spooﬁng scores per client. For the four studied anti-spooﬁng features, the box-plots are
shown in Fig. 3.3, with the upper and lower plots representing real access and spooﬁng scores,
respectively. The central bar of each box is the median of the client scores, its upper edge
denotes the 75th percentile of the scores, the lower one the 25th percentile, while the whiskers
extend to the most extreme non-outlier score values. The decision threshold determined in
a client-independent way using Equal Error Rate (EER) on the development set is plotted as
well with a green horizontal line.
The high variability of the scores of different clients in Fig. 3.3 demonstrates the existence
of client-speciﬁc score variations for the client-independent baseline, especially in the case
of real access samples. To statistically support this conclusion, we perform Kruskal-Wallis
non-parametric statistical test [Kruskal and Wallis, 1952], designated to test whether samples
originate from the same distribution. The null-hypothesis of the test states that there is no
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Figure 3.3: Box plots of the scores obtained with a client-independent approach (SVM) for
different clients in the test set of Replay-Attack database. Upper plots: scores of real access
samples; lower plots: scores of spooﬁng attacks. The horizontal green line depicts the decision
threshold obtained using the development set.
variation in the scores of the samples of the client population. In our analysis, this hypothesis
was rejected at a 0.01 signiﬁcance level for all four types of features and both for the scores of
the real access and attack samples.
One of the problems that arise when the scores of a system are client-speciﬁc, is that the stan-
dard tuning and evaluation of the system is usually sub-optimal. In particular, a single decision
threshold of the system will not work equally well for all the clients [Poh and Kittler, 2007],
because high client-speciﬁc score variations mean that different clients contribute differently
to the system’s error rates. Client-speciﬁc thresholding, where a different decision threshold is
used for each client [Jonsson et al., 1999] or client-speciﬁc score normalization [Auckenthaler
et al., 2000] are some of the ways to alleviate the issue.
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The score variations across the client population may mirror the overlap of real access and
spooﬁng attack samples of different clients in the feature space. In such a case, the decision
boundary obtained by the client-independent SVM is not equally suitable for all the clients,
leading to low performance for certain clients and overall sub-optimal performance of the
system. This indicates the presence of client-speciﬁc information in the feature space and
suggests that a client-independent approach may not be enough to model the features.
We explore two different directions for creating client-speciﬁc models. The ﬁrst one, details
of which are given in Section 3.2, is based on a generative paradigm, where we model the
real access samples of each client separately and we normalize the scores using generative
models for the attacks. The second one, described in Section 3.3, is a discriminative approach,
with separate SVM classiﬁer trained for each client. We emphasize once again that input-level
integration between biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems is required to create
client-speciﬁc models and classify input samples.
3.2 Generative Client-Speciﬁc Anti-Spooﬁng
In this section, we present Probabilistic Graphical Models (PGM) for development of genera-
tive classiﬁers for anti-spooﬁng and the Bayesian inference theory adapted for the task. We
describe Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) as a tool to model the likelihoods of the hypothe-
ses of the generative classiﬁers, both in a client-independent and client-speciﬁc scenario.
Then, we explain the use of cohort set for the client-speciﬁc case. Finally, we discuss several
implementation issues regarding generative client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng systems.
3.2.1 Probabilistic Graphical Models for Anti-Spooﬁng
We introduce the generative client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng approach through Probabilistic
Graphical Models (PGM) [Bishop, 2006], which enable visualization of the dependency rela-
tionships between variables, and thus facilitate the mathematical derivations of generative
classiﬁcation models. For a client-independent model, the feature vectors xk representing a
sample depend only on the sample class c. For a client-speciﬁc model, the feature vectors xk
depend both on the sample class c , as well as the identity i of the client the sample belongs to.
PGM dependency schemes representing these two models are given in Fig. 3.4.
In a generative model for binary classiﬁcation systems, a decision for the sample X is taken
by comparing the likelihoods of two hypotheses: H0 and H1. Each of these hypotheses
is associated with one of the two classes. Then, a score is generated as a ratio between the
likelihoods of the two hypotheses. For computational reasons, usually the log of the likelihoods
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(a) Client-independent model (b) Client-speciﬁc model
Figure 3.4: PGM illustrating the conditional dependence of variables
is computed, as in Eq. 3.1.
cLLR = log p(X|H0)
p(X|H1)
(3.1)
The decision about which of the two hypotheses is valid depends on both the log-likelihood
ratio score and a threshold τ, as shown in Eq. 3.2. The sample is assigned to the class which is
associated with the valid hypothesis.
valid hypothesis=
⎧⎨
⎩H0, if cLLR > τH1, otherwise (3.2)
The difference between the client-independent and the client-speciﬁc approach is in the
deﬁnition of the hypotheses. In a client-independent scenario, H0 states that X is generated
from a real access sample (H0 : c = R), while H1 states that X is generated from an attack
(H1 : c =A). Having K feature vectors extracted for the sample X= {xk |k ∈ 1..K } and assuming
they are mutually independent, the likelihoods of the two hypotheses are given in Eq. 3.3 and
Eq. 3.4.
p(X|H0)=
K∏
k=1
p(xk |H0)=
K∏
k=1
p(xk |c =R) (3.3)
p(X|H1)=
K∏
k=1
p(xk |H1)=
K∏
k=1
p(xk |c =A) (3.4)
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Estimating the likelihood functions in Eq. 3.3 and 3.4 can be done by building generative
models for each of the hypotheses. For this, it is required that we have a training data consisting
of real access and spooﬁng attacks samples. It is not necessary that this data is labeled with
client identity.
In a client-speciﬁc scenario, H0 states that X is generated from a real access sample from a
particular client I (H0 : c =R, i = I). Hence, its likelihood is computed as in Eq. 3.5.
p(X|H0)=
K∏
k=1
p(xk |H0)=
K∏
k=1
p(xk |c =R, i = I) (3.5)
Estimating the likelihood function in Eq. 3.5 can be done by building models representing the
real access samples for each of the clients separately. This process in turn requires real access
samples labeled with client identity. To avoid biased models, it is necessary that this data is
separate from the data which is used to evaluate the system. A source for such data could be
the enrollment samples which is used to enroll clients into the biometric veriﬁcation system.
This is the point where input-level integration of biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng
system becomes of vital importance.
The alternative hypothesis H1 states that X is generated from a spooﬁng attack sample from
a particular client I. Estimating the likelihood function of this hypothesis can be done by
building models representing the spooﬁng attack samples for each of the clients separately.
Similarly as for H0, this step requires spooﬁng attack samples from each client I ∈Y . Unfor-
tunately, input-level integration with biometric veriﬁcation system is of no use in this case, as
the enrollment data for biometric veriﬁcation system usually do not contain spooﬁng attacks.
An option could be collecting spooﬁng attacks for each client in addition to his enrollment
samples. However, the process of producing spooﬁng attacks may be expensive and time
consuming, often requiring a lot of resources and certain manufacturing skills. Therefore,
it is not difﬁcult to imagine that collecting attack data for all the clients in a system may be
very demanding and complex task. Baseline costs would quickly multiply if the system targets
protection against a large number of diverse spooﬁng attacks.
To overcome this difﬁculty, we propose to model the alternative hypothesis H1 as a function
of the likelihoods of spooﬁng attack models for a ﬁnite set of cohort clients C . Mathematically,
this way of modeling for the cohort clients J ∈C is shown in Eq. 3.6, and the function of cohorts
F (· ) could be a maximum or an average [Reynolds et al., 2000].
p(X|H1)=F
(
p(X|c =A, i = J) | J ∈C ) (3.6)
The idea is inspired by the extensive use of cohorts in biometric veriﬁcation in different setups.
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They are used to model the alternative hypothesis H1, which in biometric veriﬁcation states
that the sample does not come from the client with the claimed identity. In [Reynolds, 1995]
the cohorts are sorted by similarity with the particular client’s model, and only the ﬁrst N are
taken to representH1. In [Auckenthaler et al., 2000] they are used to perform Z-normalization
and T-normalization of the scores. In [Simon-Zorita et al., 2003]H1 is modeled with the model
of the cohort client with the highest likelihood. Similarly, Aggarwal et al. [2006] consider only
the cohort client with the highest likelihood among the cohorts selected after sorting them by
similarity to the particular client’s model.
3.2.2 Likelihood Based on Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM)
When it comes to selecting the probability density function to model the likelihoods of the hy-
potheses, Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) is the dominant approach in biometric veriﬁcation,
especially in speaker [Reynolds and Rose, 1995; Reynolds et al., 2000] and face [Sanderson and
Paliwal, 2003; Lucey and Chen, 2004; Cardinaux et al., 2006; Marcel et al., 2007] veriﬁcation. By
using a weighted linear combination of several Gaussian distributions, GMM have proven to
be able to model any complex arbitrary continuous density distribution [Bishop, 2006]. At the
same time, it offers a good trade-off between computational requirements, robustness and
discrimination capabilities [Reynolds et al., 2000].
A GMM is a weighted sum of M multivariate Gaussian distributions, called components,
each parameterized with their means μm , variances Σm and weights πm . Given a set χ
of data samples xk ∈ Rd , training of GMM model corresponds to ﬁnding the parameters
Θ= {πm ,μm ,Σm},m = 1..M which maximize the likelihood for the observed data. This Max-
imum Likelihood (ML) problem can be solved using Expectation-Maximization (EM) algo-
rithm [Dempster et al., 1977]. Mathematical formulation of GMM and its training procedure is
given in Appendix A.
In biometric veriﬁcation, GMM is used to model client distributions for each of the enrolled
clients which correspond to the hypothesis H0 that a sample comes from the claimed iden-
tity [Reynolds and Rose, 1995]. It is also used to create Universal Background Model (UBM),
which corresponds to the alternative hypothesis H1 that the sample comes from another
identity. The greatest challenge in this approach lies in how to reliably estimate the parameters
of the GMM model for a client using a sparse set of enrollment samples of that client. The issue
is usually overcome by using the enrollment samples only to adapt the client models starting
from an UBM model as a prior. This can be done using Maximum A-Posteriori adaptation
(MAP) [Gauvain and Lee, 1994], the details of which can be found in Appendix A.2.
In this thesis, we use GMM to model the likelihoods of the hypotheses for the generative
anti-spooﬁng approaches. In the case of the client-independent models, GMM can be used to
model the likelihoods p(xk |c =R) and p(xk |c =A). In the case of the client-speciﬁc models, we
base the creation of client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng models on the idea coming from biometric
veriﬁcation [Reynolds and Rose, 1995]. We use GMM to p(xk |c =R, i = I) and p(xk |c =A, i = J)
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for each client I and each cohort J ∈C . We obtain the client-speciﬁc models by ﬁrst training a
UBM for real accesses and spooﬁng attacks and then adapting them with MAP adaptation to
the client I or the cohort client J, respectively. Several researchers note that MAP where only
the means of the UBM are adapted, and not the variances, is effective enough for biometric
veriﬁcation [Reynolds et al., 2000; Lucey and Chen, 2004]. We adopt the same approach of
mean-only MAP adaptation for client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng models as well. Details about
which data was used for each step of the procedure can be found in Sec. 3.2.4.
3.2.3 Cohort Selection
The selection and size of the cohort set C has been thoroughly studied in biometric veriﬁca-
tion [Rosenberg and Parthasarathy, 1996; Auckenthaler et al., 2000; Tulyakov et al., 2008]. In
some applications, the full set of clients that can be used as cohorts is used [Reynolds, 1995].
However, Reynolds et al. [2000] suggests that client-speciﬁc cohort sets usually perform better
and have the advantage of lowering the computational costs.
For modeling H1 in the anti-spooﬁng scenario, we explored the following alternatives for the
cohort selection:
1. Full cohort set. The cohort set C consists of all the clients in the training set of the
database.
2. Static client-speciﬁc cohort set. For each enrolled client I, the cohort models are sorted
prior to query time based on a similarity criteria between the cohorts and the client
model. Then, a client-speciﬁc cohort set CI is created consisting of the ﬁrst N clients in
the sorted cohort list.
3. Dynamic client-speciﬁc cohort set. For each data sample X of client I, the cohort
models are sorted at query time based on a likelihood criteria of the sample given the
cohort model. Then, a client-speciﬁc cohort set CI is created consisting of the ﬁrst N
clients in the sorted cohort list.
When building a static client-speciﬁc cohort set, we sort the cohorts prior to query time
and based on the similarity of the cohort’s attack model and the client’s real access model.
Following the proposition of Reynolds [1995], the distance dI,J between the real access model
of client I and the attack model of the cohort J is computed as in Eq. 3.7, where XI is a set of
real access observations for the client I, while XJ is a set of attack observations for the cohort J.
dI,J = log p(XI|c =R, i = I)
p(XI|c =A, i = J)
+ log p(XJ|c =A, i = J)
p(XJ|c =R, i = I)
(3.7)
The ﬁrst ratio in Eq. 3.7 measures how well a sample matches with the model of its own client
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relative to the model of the cohort. Similar models will result in smaller ratio. Equivalent
interpretation can be given for the second ratio in Eq. 3.7. The ﬁnal distance is a symmetric
combination of ratios comparing the two models.
The sorting of the cohorts for a dynamic client-speciﬁc cohort set is done at query time,
by computing the likelihood of the cohorts’ models for the observed data. The higher the
likelihood, the higher the rank of the particular cohort model. Such an approach is inspired by
the work of Simon-Zorita et al. [2003] and Aggarwal et al. [2006].
Once the cohort set is selected, the likelihood of H1 is a function of the likelihoods of the
cohorts. In particular, we chose an average function, as in Eq. 3.8. To adapt Eq. 3.8 for static or
dynamic client-speciﬁc cohort set, we need to substitute C =CI.
p(X|H1)=F
(
p(X|c =A, i = J) | J ∈C )
=F
(
K∏
k=1
p(xk |c =A, i = J) | J ∈C
)
= 1|C |
∑
J∈C
K∏
k=1
p(xk |c =A, i = J)
(3.8)
Having the likelihoods p(X|H0) and p(X|H1) computed as in Eq. 3.5 and 3.8 respectively,
Eq. 3.1 can be used to compute the log-likelihood ratio score to compare the two hypotheses
for a data sample X.
3.2.4 Implementation Details
For the client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng approach, we ﬁrst create a UBM based on the real accesses
of background clients taken from the training set. Using the enrollment samples of each client,
we adapt the UBM to client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng models. These models are used to compute
the likelihood p(X|H0) in Eq. 3.5.
Similarly, we create a UBM based on the attacks of all the clients from the training set. Using
the attack samples of each of the cohort clients, we adapt this UBM to client-speciﬁc models
for the cohort clients. These models are used to compute the likelihood p(X|H1) in Eq. 3.6.
3.3 Discriminative Client-Speciﬁc Anti-Spooﬁng
In this section, we ﬁrst give a brief overview of Support Vector Machine (SVM) as a popular
binary classiﬁer. Then we examine its use for anti-spooﬁng and we explain how it can be
used in a client-speciﬁc setting. Although formally, SVM belongs to the category of classiﬁ-
cation methods that rely on discriminant function, we conform to its more widely accepted
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nomenclature and refer to it as a discriminative approach.
3.3.1 Support Vector Machine (SVM)
As described in Section 2.3.2, discriminative models and models based on discriminant func-
tion have already a well established reputation in face anti-spooﬁng. One of the most popular
among them is Support Vector Machine (SVM) [Vapnik, 1998; Boser et al., 1992; Cristianini
and Shawe-Taylor, 2000]. SVM is a classiﬁer able to discriminatively learn a hyperplane that
separates the set χ= {(xk , yk)|k = 1..S} of training samples in Rd×{−1,1}, while minimizing its
generalization error on unseen samples. The minimization of the generalization error is
performed via the maximization of a quantity called margin which is related to the minimal
distance of the samples to the hyperplane and which needs to be maximized [Fornoni, 2014].
In this context, SVM is also referred to as maximal margin classiﬁer, while the samples from
the two classes which lie on the margin are called support vectors.
The training of a SVM is realized by estimating the parameters of a real valued linear function
f :Rd →R. At test time, for each input sample xk a score is computed as f (xk ). This function
can be also represented in a dual form, where it is parameterized by the support vectors and
a set of Lagrangian multipliers associated with them. In the dual form, the score of an input
sample xk is computed via its inner products with the support vectors. The mathematical
details of these concepts are covered in Appendix B.
To achieve a high separability of the two classes, sometimes the samples need to be projected
into a space with higher dimensionality, which can be a computationally expensive operation.
The dual form of SVM allows to bypass this complexity through the use of kernel functions.
Kernel functions enable a direct computation of the inner product between samples in a
high-dimensional feature space without explicitly performing the projection. Different kernel
functions exist. Among them, the most notable ones are linear, Radial Basis Function (RBF),
Polynomial, Histogram Intersection andχ2 and they deﬁne the shape of the boundary between
the two classes in the original feature space. Details about the kernels and their parameters
can be found in Appendix B.4.
3.3.2 SVM for anti-spooﬁng
When using SVM for the problem of anti-spooﬁng, the sample labels are deﬁned as yk ∈ {R,A}.
SVM has been extensively used for anti-spooﬁng in a client-independent context, as described
in Section 2.3.2. In this case, a single function f (x) is estimated using all training samples
{(xk , yk)|yk = R} as the positive class and {(xk , yk)|yk = A} as the negative class. The SVM
training is performed regardless of the client identity.
A SVM in a client-speciﬁc context ﬁrst appeared in speaker veriﬁcation [McLaren, 2009].
Several SVM classiﬁers are trained, one for each of the enrolled clients. A single SVM classiﬁer
in this setup discriminates between samples coming from a claimed identity and samples
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coming from a zero-effort impostor. When a new query arrives, it is classiﬁed by the SVM of
the client it is claimed to belong to. Client-speciﬁc SVMs in speaker veriﬁcation are trained
using samples for the particular client as a positive class, and samples from a set of other
clients as a negative class.
Inspired by this design, we build client-speciﬁc SVM for the anti-spooﬁng task in a similar
manner. For each enrolled client I ∈Y , we train a separate SVMclassiﬁer deﬁned by fI :Rd →R,
whose role is to discriminate between real accesses and spooﬁng attacks for that client.
Ideally, each SVM should be trained using samples of the corresponding client: (xI ,k ,R) ∈χ as
the positive and (xI ,k ,A) ∈χ as the negative class. As in the case of the generative client-speciﬁc
approaches, we can use the enrollment samples of each client as the positive class. However,
as explained in Section 3.2.1, obtaining spooﬁng attacks for each client may be a costly task.
As for the generative approach, we select a set of cohort clients C to approximate the spooﬁng
attacks to represent the negative class for the client-speciﬁc SVMs. Therefore, each client-
speciﬁc SVM is trained using (xJ,k ,A)|J ∈C . Since the samples from the cohort usually outnum-
ber the client samples, the selection of the clients in C is of great importance and different
heuristics to fulﬁll this task exist in the literature. One possibility is to consider several different
cohort sets and to choose the one which gives the best performance on the development
set [Kajarekar and Stolcke, 2007]. Instead of cohort clients, McLaren et al. [2010] selects co-
hort samples out of the samples which are most frequently used as support vectors for the
client-speciﬁc SVMs on the development set. Using a large cohorts set may be restricted by
computation limitations, but may provide better discriminative information [McLaren, 2009].
Therefore, we select all clients in the training set as cohort clients and all their spooﬁng attacks
as negative samples to train the client-speciﬁc SVMs.
3.4 Discussion
The observation that biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems need to work in co-
operation inspires the idea for their integration at input-level. It refers to uniﬁcation of the
data that is available to any of the two systems. As a result of the input-level integration, the
anti-spooﬁng system can make use of the samples that the biometric veriﬁcation system uses
to enroll clients in order to create client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng models. Similarly, it can use
the client identity claim to compare a query sample with the corresponding client-speciﬁc
anti-spooﬁng model.
We looked at two approaches to build client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng models. The ﬁrst one relies
on a generative paradigm and compares GMM-based models of the real access samples of a
client and attackmodels of a set of cohort clients. The second one is built upon a discriminative
paradigm and consists of building separate client-speciﬁc SVM models.
Client-speciﬁc methods can not be used to protect the biometric veriﬁcation system from
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spooﬁng attacks at enrollment time, when the models are not yet created. If a protection is
needed at this point, a client-independent anti-spooﬁng system should be used at the cost
of a lower performance. However, when the veriﬁcation system is in operation mode, the
client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng systems can be used as soon as the client claims his identity.
The performance of the client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng systems in particular case studies for the
face mode is analyzed in Section 6.2 with respect to different parameters and compared to
their client-independent counterparts.
40
4 Output-level Integration: Fusion of
Experts
In practice, biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems have a common purpose: to
prevent illegitimate access to a certain resource. When considering security aspects of a
resource protected using biometrics, an anti-spooﬁng system provides an additional level of
security by being able to cope with attacks of a kind a biometric veriﬁcation system can not
detect. Therefore, the decision whether a sample is accepted or rejected depends on both
biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems.
An integration of biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems at output-level is required
to obtain a single, uniﬁed, decision about a sample. The resulting system can be consid-
ered as a biometric veriﬁcation system with increased robustness to spooﬁng. However, the
veriﬁcation performance of the integrated system, as well as its robustness to spooﬁng, are
highly dependent on the way the two composing systems are combined. To optimize the
performance, it is of great importance to explore different strategies to fuse them.
To tackle the output-level integration of biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems, we
take a fusion of multiple experts approach. In biometrics, such approaches have been thor-
oughly investigated and widely deployed to create multibiometric systems, where combining
multiple modes leads to less noise-sensitive and more accurate biometric recognition [Ross
et al., 2008]. Yet, fusion of a biometric veriﬁcation system with an anti-spooﬁng one is a
problem which is addressed much less frequently.
The fusion of biometric systems can happen at several points of the veriﬁcation pipeline.
With respect to this, the fusion techniques can be categorized as: sensor-level, feature-level,
score-level, rank-level and decision-level [Ross et al., 2008]. Without intervening in the internal
logic of biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems, their fusion can be realized only at
score-level and decision-level. At decision-level, the biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng
systems output decisions dv and ds , respectively, based on their own decision threshold, while
the fusion module needs to unify the two decisions into one. At score level, the fusion module
takes raw scores sv and ss produced by the veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems, respectively,
combines them into a single score s f and computes a single decision threshold. The workﬂow
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of the fusion is illustrated in Fig. 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Flow diagram of the output-level integration of biometric veriﬁcation and anti-
spooﬁng systems
An overview of the existing literature on fusion of multiple experts, with an emphasis on the
fusion of biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems, is given in Section 4.1. The fusion
strategies explored in this work are detailed in Section 4.2.
4.1 Summary of Fusion Methods in Biometrics
We commence this section with an overview of the fusion techniques used for the outputs of
biometric veriﬁcation systems, regardless of the source of the input and the purpose of the
fusion. Then, we cover several works where the fusion is targeting biometric veriﬁcation and
anti-spooﬁng systems.
When performing the output-level integration of biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng
systems, we assume that they provide an output in the form of a decision or a score. Therefore,
in this section, we cover decision-level and score-level fusion strategies.
4.1.1 Biometric Veriﬁcation Systems
Decision-level fusion methods operate on the decisions of the different systems. The simplest
strategies are logical AND and OR rules. Logical AND fusion rule results in a positive decision
only if all the systems agree on a positive decision. To obtain a positive decision using logical
OR fusion rule, it is enough that just one of the systems responds positively. Majority voting
and weighted majority voting take the decision based on a linear combination of the decisions
of the separate systems. More complex schemes rely on transforming the discrete decisions
into continuous probability values or degrees of belief [Ross et al., 2008].
The score-level fusion methods operate on the scores of the separate systems, producing a
single score as output of the integrated system. They can be categorized as ﬁxed, density-
based and learning-based rules [Roli et al., 2002]. The ﬁxed fusion rules perform a simple
mathematical operations on the scores of the separate systems, like sum, product, median,
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minimum, maximum etc. These rules require that the scores of the multiple experts are
brought into a common domain by performing normalization. The density-based fusion rules
use Bayesian theory and compute the likelihood of the set of scores from the separate systems
under the hypothesis of the different classes. The class is then determined using likelihood
ratio. A theoretical foundation of the density-based rules is given by Kittler et al. [1998] and
is used as a framework to derive ﬁxed rules. Finally, the learning-based fusion rules use the
scores as an input to a classiﬁer who takes the ﬁnal decision. Examples include Support Vector
Machines (SVM) [Ben-Yacoub et al., 1999; Fierrez-Aguilar et al., 2003], Linear Discriminant
Analysis (LDA) [Ben-Yacoub et al., 1999; Ross and Jain, 2003; Wang et al., 2003], decision
trees [Ben-Yacoub et al., 1999; Ross and Jain, 2003], multi-layer perceptron [Ben-Yacoub et al.,
1999; Wang et al., 2003], Behavior Knowledge Space [Roli et al., 2002; Vatsa et al., 2010] and
many more.
As the biometric systems involved in fusion may be of different quality and may give responses
with different levels of conﬁdence, their scores are sometimes combined in a weighted man-
ner [Jain and Ross, 2002]. Each of the systems participates in the fusion with a certain weight
which is trained or obtained heuristically.
Jain and Ross [2002] were the ﬁrst to explore fusion tailored to each client. They concluded
that the performance of multimodal systems can be improved if client-speciﬁc thresholds are
employed, or client-speciﬁc weights for each of the fused modes are estimated. The trend was
followed by Fierrez-Aguilar et al. [2003] who shifted the approach towards the training step by
creating client-speciﬁc learning-based fusion schemes with SVM. Client-speciﬁc training is
used also by Kumar and Zhang [2009] who, together with the scores to be fused, supply the
client identity to a Feed Forward Neural Network. Toh et al. [2004] introduce the combination
of local learning and local decision, both of which refer to incorporating the client identity
in the process. Finally, Fierrez-Aguilar et al. [2005] propose adapted score fusion, which
combines the scores obtained by separately trained client-independent and client-speciﬁc
fusion rules.
The aforementioned fusion techniques have been extensively used for fusion of systems based
on multiple biometric modes. According to Ross et al. [2008], one of the beneﬁts that such
a fusion brings is increased robustness to spooﬁng attacks of the multimodal system. The
intuition behind this reasoning is that in a multimodal system, an attacker faces the difﬁcult
task of having to spoof more than one mode. However, in many cases spooﬁng only one of the
modes can be enough, as discussed by Rodrigues et al. [2009]; Johnson et al. [2010]; Akhtar
et al. [2012]. This is highly dependent on the used fusion algorithm, which has inspired fusion
schemes speciﬁcally designed to increase the robustness to spooﬁng. Most notable are the
ones presented in [Rodrigues et al., 2009] which explores fuzzy logic, and [Rodrigues et al.,
2010] which extends the likelihood ratio fusion rule by introducing hidden variables denoting
the probability of a spooﬁng attack.
43
Chapter 4. Output-level Integration: Fusion of Experts
4.1.2 Biometric Veriﬁcation and Anti-spooﬁng Systems
Prior work on integration of biometric recognition and anti-spooﬁng systems has not been
as extensive. The ﬁrst publication treating this topic is by Marasco et al. [2011], who employ
anti-spooﬁng mechanism before the veriﬁcation stage on a multibiometric system composed
of three ﬁngerprint and one face modality. If a spooﬁng attack is detected for one modality,
the corresponding unimodal system does not contribute to the ﬁnal fusion of the multimodal
system, which is performed at score-level.
The ﬁrst attempt to fuse biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems on a single mode is
done by Marasco et al. [2012]. It is important to note that the proposed methods are targeting
systems where spooﬁng is possible both in enrollment and veriﬁcation stage. Therefore, the
anti-spooﬁng scores of both the input sample, as well as an enrollment sample that is used for
comparison, are taken into consideration. The authors analyze four different fusion methods
and evaluate them on the ﬁngerprint mode. The ﬁrst two methods operate at decision-level by
sequentially employing a ﬁngerprint veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng system, or the other way
around, which is equivalent to the logical AND fusion rule. The third method targets score-
level fusion and is a learning-based method, performing classiﬁcation on the veriﬁcation and
anti-spooﬁng scores using several different classiﬁers. Finally, the fourth one belongs to the
density-based fusion rules and models the likelihood of the veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng
scores under certain hypotheses. Interestingly, the developed Bayesian model assumes a
dependence of the veriﬁcation scores on the anti-spooﬁng scores.
Using a density-based score fusion and under certain hypotheses, Rattani and Poh [2013]
model the likelihood of three types of scores: veriﬁcation, anti-spooﬁng and image quality
score. All of them are considered in the Bayesian model, which additionally assumes that
anti-spooﬁng and image quality scores inﬂuence the veriﬁcation score as well. The densities in
the Bayesian model are estimated using GMM, Gaussian Copula and Quadratic Discriminant
Analysis (QDA). In an extended version of the approach, the Bayesian model also considers
sensor characteristic, which is assumed to inﬂuence the veriﬁcation, anti-spooﬁng and quality
scores [Rattani et al., 2013].
The assumption that spooﬁng attacks can exist among the enrollment samples, present in the
works of Marasco et al. [2012] Rattani and Poh [2013] and Rattani et al. [2013], is reasonable
in some cases, but is unsuitable for systems where the veriﬁcation matching is done with
respect to a model instead of a single sample. Furthermore, it poses certain limitations, like
the necessity of spooﬁng samples at enrollment time.
4.2 Fusion Strategies for Biometric Veriﬁcation and Anti-Spooﬁng
Systems
When fusing biometric veriﬁcation systems, they share a common reasoning about which
samples need to be rejected and which accepted. All of them are trained to reject zero-
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effort impostors, and accept genuine accesses. However, to address the fusion of biometric
veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems, we have to keep in mind that they are of different
nature and are discordant with respect to the scores they assign to samples and what they
consider as a positive or negative class. As veriﬁcation systems are trained to take their decision
based on the identity present in the sample, they will give low scores to zero-effort impostors
(and hence classify them as negative), but high scores to both genuine accesses and spooﬁng
attacks (and hence classify them as positive). On the other hand, anti-spooﬁng systems are
trained to take their decision based on whether the sample looks genuine or not. Therefore,
they will assign low scores to spooﬁng attacks (and hence classify them as negative), but
high scores to both genuine accesses and zero-effort impostors (and hence classify them as
positive).
The antagonistic nature of the systems to be fused is illustrated in Table 4.1. The ﬁnal, fused
system, needs to join their decision in a way that will consider only genuine users as positive
and both zero-effort impostors and spooﬁng attacks as a negative class. Based on this ob-
servation, we can safely consider both zero-effort impostors and spooﬁng attacks as a single,
enhanced, negative class and use fusion rules that will transform the scores of the two systems
accordingly.
Additionally, weighted fusion schemes, where different weights are given to different systems,
are not suitable for fusion of biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems. When fusing
biometric veriﬁcation systems, the individual systems operate in a competitive manner, giving
responses to a veriﬁcation problem. In this context, weighting is justiﬁed by weaknesses
of some of the systems and the different quality of their responses. On the other hand,
biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems operate in a collaborative manner where
each of them is an expert in a particular domain of the problem and their individual responses
are equally important. Certainly, an exception can be made when one can predeﬁne the
relative importance of the two systems, depending on the application.
4.2.1 Decision-Level Fusion
Table 4.1 may give hints about the fusion schemes that can be used. In the case of the decision-
level fusion approach, the positive class needs to be accepted by both the veriﬁcation and
anti-spooﬁng system, while for the negative class a rejection from one of the systems is enough.
Thus, logical AND fusion rule should be an appropriate choice for decision-level fusion of the
two systems.
4.2.2 Score-Level Fusion
Keeping in mind that the biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems give high scores to
different classes of samples, then many score-level fusion schemes typically used in biometrics
should be applied with care. An example are the density-based score fusion methods [Ross
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Table 4.1: Criteria for positive and negative class of a typical veriﬁcation, anti-spooﬁng and
fused system
Genuine users Impostors Spooﬁng attacks
Veriﬁcation system + - +
Anti-spooﬁng system + + -
Fused system + - -
et al., 2008]. There, the class is determined by computing its a posteriori probability given
the set of scores from multiple classiﬁers. If independence is assumed for the scores of the
biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems, than the a posteriori probability of the
class is proportional to the product of the likelihoods of the separate scores. The a posteriori
probability that a spooﬁng attack is a positive sample may be high for the veriﬁcation classiﬁer,
but very low for the anti-spooﬁng system. On the contrary, the a posteriori probability that a
zero-effort impostor is a positive class may be low for the veriﬁcation classiﬁer, but high for
the anti-spooﬁng system. As a result, even applying ﬁxed fusion rules as derived by Kittler
et al. [1998] may produce fused scores which are not discriminative enough for correct ﬁnal
decisions. In this work, we consider fusion using SUM rule, where the fused score is obtained
by summing the scores of the individual systems.
Using one of the anti-spooﬁng and veriﬁcation systems for the face mode that will be described
in Section 6.1 and applied on Replay-Attack database, a scatter plot of the scores of the two
systems is given in Fig. 4.2. The clear clusters of the samples coming from genuine users,
zero-effort impostors and spooﬁng attacks in the 2D space deﬁned by their veriﬁcation and
anti-spooﬁng scores sv and ss respectively, suggests using a learning-based fusion rule. Hence,
the score pair is considered as a feature vector x=
(
sv ss
)
, which is fed to an appropriate
classiﬁer.
We select Logistic Regression (LR) [David and Stanley, 2000] as the ﬁrst learning-based fusion
rule, which ﬁts a logistic hypothesis function given in Eq. 4.1 by estimating its parametersΘ.
The parametersΘ are in a linear relation with the input variables x.
hΘ(x)= 1
1+e−Θx (4.1)
Considering the non-linear separation between the clusters in Fig. 4.2, we perform experi-
ments with Polynomial Logistic Regression (PLR) as well. In this case, the parametersΘ are in
a polynomial relation with the input variables, i.e. x=
(
sv ss sv ss s2v s
2
s
)
in Eq. 4.1.
Finally, it is possible to use a density-based score fusion method over the score pair x. In this
approach, class-conditional densities are estimated for the positive and the negative class
and the ﬁnal decision is taken using log-likelihood ratio. The class-conditional densities are
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Figure 4.2: Example scatter plot of biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng system scores on
Replay-Attack
modeled using GMM. This approach is similar to [Rattani and Poh, 2013], with the exception
that the quality score of the sample is not taken into account.
Some of the presented score-level fusion techniques require that the scores from the systems
to be fused are on comparable scales [Ross et al., 2008]. Score normalization techniques are
helpful to bring the scores in a common domain. We apply z-normalization to the systems’
scores, as in Eq. 4.2, where μ refers to the mean of a set of training scores, while σ refers to
their standard deviation.
snorm = s−μ
σ
(4.2)
4.2.3 Implementation Details
A signiﬁcant implementation difference emerges when fusing biometric veriﬁcation system
with a client-independent and client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng system, both of which are de-
scribed in Chapter 3. In the case of a client-independent anti-spooﬁng system, the claim of
the client identity is irrelevant for the anti-spooﬁng score. However, this claim plays an essen-
tial role in the case of client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng systems. This observation is particularly
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important when fusing the scores for the zero-effort impostors. In that case, the input sample
needs to be scored against an anti-spooﬁng model of another client, in the same way it is
matched with the model of another client by the veriﬁcation system.
4.3 Discussion
In a biometric veriﬁcation scenario where spooﬁng attacks can be expected, the decision
to accept or reject an input sample is a task that has to be done jointly by the biometric
veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems. The uniﬁcation of the individual outputs of the two
systems is referred to as output-level integration and can involve fusion of the decisions or the
scores of the separate systems.
Very few attempts for output-level integration of biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng
systems have been done in the past. On the contrary, there are numerous methods for fusion
of biometric veriﬁcation systems with a theoretically and empirically grounded reputation.
Keeping in mind the particularities of the fusion of biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng
systems, we select and adapt a subset of them.
The impact of the fusion, as well as the importance of selection of an optimal fusion method
for a particular combination of biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems will be
experimentally demonstrated in case studies for the face mode in Section 6.3.
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5 Integrated Evaluation of Biometric
Veriﬁcation Systems Under Spooﬁng
Attacks
Similarly to other stages of the operation of biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems,
their evaluation is usually performed independently. Typically, the evaluation conventions for
binary classiﬁcation systems are followed for both of them.
An isolated evaluation of anti-spooﬁng systems gives an important insight about the dis-
criminative abilities of certain anti-spooﬁng features and classiﬁcation methods. An isolated
evaluation of biometric veriﬁcation system gives its veriﬁcation performance. However, each
of these assessments gives just a partial understanding of the strength of a system, especially
if high security standards are required. The evaluation of such a system needs to report, in a
uniﬁed way, both the veriﬁcation performance, as well as its spoof-ability, which is equivalent
to its vulnerability to spooﬁng attacks. The existence of three classes instead of two at the
input of the biometric veriﬁcation system, requires a redeﬁnition of the evaluation task.
When devising an evaluation methodology for trustworthy biometric veriﬁcation system, there
are several system design considerations that need to be taken into account. One of them is the
fact that the probability of attacks, or the cost of incorrectly accepted spooﬁng attacks and zero-
effort impostors, as well as incorrectly rejected genuine users, depend on the environment
where the system will be deployed. For example, spooﬁng attacks targeting a portable device
may be more frequent than attacks at border control systems which are supervised by a human.
A suitable evaluation metric needs to provide a mechanism to parameterize with respect to this
variable. As an additional requirement, such a metric needs to provide an a priori evaluation,
where no information from the test set is used during the system design.
In this chapter, we propose a novel evaluation framework for biometric veriﬁcation systems
under spooﬁng attacks, called Expected Performance and Spoofability (EPS) framework and
considering all the criteria imposed by the problem. To do this, we ﬁrst review the standards
for evaluation of biometric systems in their common setup as binary classiﬁers. Then, we
inspect previous efforts to adapt them to the redeﬁned evaluation task, reporting on their
drawbacks for deployment in real world conditions. Finally, we describe the EPS Curve (EPSC)
and demonstrate its suitability for evaluation of biometric veriﬁcation systems under spooﬁng
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attacks. The evaluation methods covered in this chapter, including the newly proposed
evaluation framework, are illustrated on a hypothetical veriﬁcation system whose scores are
generated artiﬁcially.
In Section 5.1, we start by surveying the standard evaluation metric for binary classiﬁcation
problems, as a basis for the widely accepted methodology for evaluation of biometric veri-
ﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems. A deﬁnition of the problem of evaluation of biometric
veriﬁcation systems under spooﬁng attacks, together with the commonly used evaluation
methodologies, is given in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 describes the EPS evaluation framework
and illustrates its usage and interpretation on a hypothetical biometric veriﬁcation system.
Further examples of its usage in some special cases are given in Section 5.4.
5.1 Summary of Evaluation Metrics and Methodologies in Biomet-
rics
As both biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems by themselves are of binary nature,
the overview of the evaluation metrics in biometrics will ﬁrstly cover the standard metrics for
evaluation of binary classiﬁcation systems. Then, the adaptations of the general metrics to the
speciﬁc tasks of biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng will be given.
5.1.1 Evaluation of Binary Classiﬁcation Systems
Binary classiﬁcation systems receive two types of input belonging to two classes, usually
referred to as positive and negative class. They are trained to assign scores to the input
samples. Then, a decision threshold is calculated to separate the scores of the positive and
the negative class and the samples with scores above the threshold are classiﬁed as positives,
while the ones with scores below the threshold as negatives. Fig. 5.1a shows a plot of the score
distributions for the two classes, including the decision threshold.
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Figure 5.1: Evaluation plots for a hypothetical binary veriﬁcation system
Metrics for evaluation of binary classiﬁcation systems are associated to the types of errors
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they commit and how to measure them, as well as to the threshold calculation and evaluation
criterion [Poh and Bengio, 2006]. Binary classiﬁcation systems are subject to two types of
errors: False Positive (FP) and False Negative (FN). Typically, the error rates that are reported
are False Positive Rate (FPR), which corresponds to the ratio between FP and the total number
of negative samples and False Negative Rate (FNR), which corresponds to the ratio between
FN and the total number of positive samples.
An objective and unbiased performance evaluation of the binary classiﬁcation systems re-
quires a database with a speciﬁc design and strictly deﬁned protocols. It is recommended
that the samples in the database are divided into three subsets: training Dtr ain , development
(validation) Ddev and test (evaluation) set Dtest [Hastie et al., 2001]. Even greater objectivity
will be achieved if the identities in separate subsets do not overlap [Lui et al., 2012]. The
training set serves to train the system, while its ﬁne tuning is done using the development
set. Since in a real world scenario the ﬁnal system will be used for data which have not been
seen before, the performance measure is normally reported on the test set [Hastie et al., 2001;
Bailly-Baillire et al., 2003]. An exception from this recommended design may happen if the
number of samples in the database is not big enough. In such a case, the samples can be di-
vided only in training and test set, and tuning of the parameters is done with a cross-validation
procedure [Hastie et al., 2001].
The decision threshold τ is computed to serve as a boundary between the output scores of the
positive and the negative class. By changing this threshold one can balance between FPR and
FNR: increasing FPR reduces FNR and vice-versa. However, it is often desired that an optimal
threshold τ∗ is chosen according to some criterion. One well established criterion is Equal
Error Rate (EER) [Poh and Bengio, 2006], which selects the threshold τ∗EER to ensure that the
difference between FPR and FNR is as small as possible (Eq. 5.1). The optimal threshold, also
referred to as operating point, is a tuning parameter, and it is usually determined using the
development set [Hastie et al., 2001; Bailly-Baillire et al., 2003].
τ∗EER = arg minτ |FPR(τ,Ddev )−FNR(τ,Ddev )| (5.1)
Once the threshold τ∗ is determined, the accuracy of the system can be summarized reporting
different metrics. For example, the Detection Cost Function (DCF), given in Eq. 5.2, has been
proposed by Martin and Przybocki [2000] and is used in the NIST evaluations [Przybocki et al.,
2006]. The DCF accounts for the cost of the error rates (cFPR and cFNR), as well as for the
probability of occurrence of positive and negative samples (ppos and pneg).
DCF(τ∗,Dtest )= cFPR ·pneg ·FPR(τ∗,Dtest )+cFNR ·ppos ·FNR(τ∗,Dtest ) (5.2)
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By giving equal priors to the occurrence of positive and negative samples and normalizing
the cost values, Weighted Error Rate (WER) is proposed by Bailly-Baillire et al. [2003]. In its
computation (Eq.5.3), β ∈ [0,1] is the parameter balancing between the cost of FPR and FNR.
For the special case of β= 0.5, the Half Total Error Rate (HTER) is reached.
WERβ(τ
∗,Dtest )=β ·FPR(τ∗,Dtest )+ (1−β) ·FNR(τ∗,Dtest ) (5.3)
Important tools in evaluation of classiﬁcation systems are the different graphical represen-
tations of the classiﬁcation results. For example, to present the trade-off between FPR and
FNR depending on the threshold, the performance of the binary classiﬁcation systems is often
visualized using Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve. Parameterizing over different
values for the decision threshold, the ROC curve usually plots FPR versus 1-FNR. Sometimes,
when one number is needed to represent the performance of the system in comparison with
other systems, the Area Under ROC curve (AUC) may be reported. The higher the AUC the
better the system.
A normal deviate transformation of the ROC curve yields the Detection-Error Trade-off (DET)
curve [Martin et al., 1997]. Its usage is convenient for comparing systems whose scores follow
a Gaussian distribution, since such a transformation guarantees that the curve will become
a line. It plots FPR versus FNR. Fig. 5.1b illustrates the DET curve for a hypothetical binary
classiﬁcation system.
Although ROC and DET curves may give an idea about the expected performance of a single
system under different thresholds, using them to compare two or more systems can lead to
biased conclusions [Bengio et al., 2005]. Usually, when comparing two systems using ROC or
DET curves, we select a certain value on the abscissa (most often FPR) as a ﬁrst step, and then
we read the values on the ordinate for the two systems (for example FNR) as a second step. In
this way, during the ﬁrst step, we implicitly choose a threshold a posteriori, i.e. on the same
data used to read and compare the error rates in the second step. This threshold may not be
the optimal one for any of the two systems. However, for an objective comparison, the error
rates for the two systems have to be reported at their optimal thresholds, which have to be
chosen a priori, on a separate data. Unfortunately, by plotting only the error rates on a test set
at thresholds not related to the development set, the ROC and DET curves do not give any hint
about the optimal thresholds of the two systems. Hence, the conclusions about which one out
of two systems is better may be misleading if drawn solely from the ROC or DET curves.
To solve this issue, the so-called Expected Performance Curve (EPC) is proposed by Bengio
et al. [2005]. It ﬁlls in for two main disadvantages of the ROC and DET curves: ﬁrstly, it plots the
error rate on the test set depending on a threshold selected a priori on the development set;
and secondly, it accounts for varying relative cost β ∈ [0;1] of FPR and FNR when calculating
the threshold. In the EPC framework, an optimal threshold τ∗
β
depending on β is computed
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based on a certain criteria on the development set. For example, the threshold can be chosen
to minimize WERβ for different values of β, which is the variable parameter plotted on the
abscissa. The performance for the calculated values of τ∗
β
is then computed on the test set.
WERβ or any other measure of importance can be plotted on the ordinate axis. The parameter
β can be interpreted as the cost of the error rates, but also as the prior of having a positive or
a negative sample as an input. One may observe the error rates and compare systems only
in the range of values of βwhich are of interest for a particular application. The EPC curve is
illustrated in Fig. 5.1c for a hypothetical binary classiﬁcation system.
The performance of a binary system can be summarized in one value by computing the area
under the EPC, deﬁned as the expected average of two antagonistic error rates that are being
plotted [Bengio et al., 2005].
5.1.2 Evaluation of biometric veriﬁcation systems
In the domain of biometric veriﬁcation, the positive and the negative class refer to genuine
users and zero-effort impostors, respectively. Accordingly, the number of errors known as FP
and FN refer to the number of zero-effort impostors incorrectly classiﬁed as genuine users and
the number of genuine users incorrectly classiﬁed as zero-effort impostors, respectively. Since
the positives and the negatives are associated with the action of acceptance and rejection by the
veriﬁcation system, a common practice is to replace FPR and FNR with False Acceptance Rate
(FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR), respectively [Jain and Ross, 2008]. Furthermore, due to
the process of matching between the samples and the models, FPR and FNR are often reported
as False Match Rate (FMR) and False Non-Match Rate (FNMR) [Mansﬁeld et al., 2002]. It is
important to note that, in general, the error rates FMR and FNMR are not exactly synonymous
with FAR and FRR. However, they can be considered as equivalent in a technology evaluation,
which is performed on a pre-collected database [Mansﬁeld et al., 2002; Jain et al., 2008].
5.1.3 Evaluation of anti-spooﬁng systems
The role of a positive and a negative class in the domain of anti-spooﬁng is taken by real
accesses and spooﬁng attacks, respectively. The anti-spooﬁng systems work on the principle
of acceptance and rejection as well. Hence, in this scope, FAR and FRR are the most commonly
used terms for FPR and FNR too. FAR stands for the ratio of incorrectly accepted spooﬁng
attacks and FRR for the ratio of incorrectly rejected real accesses. These error rates are often
substituted with different synonyms by different authors. The most common of them are
listed in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Typically used error rates for anti-spooﬁng systems and their synonyms.
Error rate Acronym Synonyms
False Positive Rate FPR False Acceptance Rate (FAR), False Spoof Acceptance
Rate [Marasco et al., 2012], False Living Rate (FLR) [Gal-
bally et al., 2012]
False Negative Rate FNR False Rejection Rate (FRR), False Alarm Rate [Pan et al.,
2007], False Live Rejection Rate [Marasco et al., 2012],
False Fake Rate (FFR) [Galbally et al., 2012]
True Positive Rate TPR True Acceptance Rate
True Negative Rate TNR True Rejection Rate, detection rate [Pan et al., 2007], [Bao
et al., 2009a], Wang et al. [2009], detection accu-
racy [Zhang et al., 2011]
Half Total Error
Rate
HTER Average Classiﬁcation Error (ACE) [Galbally et al., 2012]
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Figure 5.2: Biometric veriﬁcation system under spooﬁng attack
5.2 EvaluationofBiometricVeriﬁcationSystemsUnderSpooﬁngAt-
tacks
When treating biometric veriﬁcation as a binary classiﬁcation system, the designers are in-
terested in determining the capacity of a given system to discriminate between different
identities. Depending on the internal algorithm, these systems may or may not have the
competence to discover if the input sample comes from a live person present in front of the
system, or a spooﬁng attack. Nevertheless, the evaluation of biometric veriﬁcation systems
needs to account for the existence of an additional input type, spooﬁng attacks.
An accurate representation of the operation of a veriﬁcation system acknowledging the spoof-
ing attack samples as a possible input type, is given in Fig. 5.2. It needs to accept only the
samples from the class of genuine users, while both zero-effort impostors and spooﬁng attacks
need to be rejected. Consequently, the system is not necessarily required to be able to discrim-
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inate between three classes and the problem does not need to be treated as ternary. Despite
the comfort of keeping the binary nature of the veriﬁcation system, it is still of importance
to evaluate how vulnerable the system is to spooﬁng attacks. In the following, we describe
the requirements of a database that can be used for evaluation of biometric veriﬁcation sys-
tems under spooﬁng attacks, followed by an overview of the commonly used metrics and
methodologies.
5.2.1 Database considerations
The evaluation the performance of a biometric veriﬁcation system under spooﬁng attacks
includes training and spoofability assessment of the system. Therefore, it entails a database
which satisﬁes certain criteria. To enable training of a biometric veriﬁcation system, the
database needs to provide enrollment samples to enroll clients in the system. To enable
spoofability assessment, it needs to provide spooﬁng attack samples as well.
To formalize the process of training and evaluating a veriﬁcation system using a spooﬁng
database, let’s represent the identity i ∈Y in the database with the tuple (Xri ,Xsi ,Xei ), containing
real access Xri , spooﬁng attack X
s
i and enrollment X
e
i samples. Then, the spooﬁng database,
providing data for the identities in Y , can be denoted as D = {(Xri ,Xsi ,Xei ) : i ∈Y }. The process
of training a veriﬁcation system using the spooﬁng database means creating a set of models
M = {Mi : i ∈ Y }, where Mi = f (Xei ) and f (·) is a function that maps samples to a model.
Then, the veriﬁcation system computes the scores for the classes of real accesses, zero-effort
impostors and spooﬁng attacks. The set of scores for the genuine users may be created
by comparing the real access samples of one identity to the model of the same identity:
Sgenuine = {g (Xri ,Mi ) : i ∈Y }, where g (·, ·) is a matching function. A logical way to assemble
the set of zero-effort impostor scores is by comparing the real access samples of one identity to
the models of the other identities in an exhaustive manner (full cross-comparison [Mansﬁeld
et al., 2002]), which results in Simpostor = {g (Xri ,M j ) : i , j ∈Y , i = j }. Finally, to assemble the
set of spooﬁng attack scores for the veriﬁcation system, one needs to compare the spooﬁng
attack samples from one identity to the model of the same identity, which yields Sspoo f =
{g (Xsi ,Mi ) : i ∈Y }.
5.2.2 Summary of Evaluation Metrics and Methodologies for Biometric Veriﬁca-
tion Systems Under Spooﬁng Attacks
The evaluation methodologies for biometric veriﬁcation systems under spooﬁng attacks need
to address two challenges. The ﬁrst one, observed in Fig. 5.3a, is related to the existence
of three score distribution plots corresponding to the three input classes. The challenging
question is how to determine the decision threshold to discriminate between the samples
to accept and reject. The second challenge refers to the error rates and evaluation metrics
for veriﬁcation systems under spooﬁng attacks. It emerges because the evaluation metrics
presented in Section 5.1.2 are sufﬁcient to describe only the veriﬁcation performance of a
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system. However, the presence of spooﬁng attacks entails a suitable metric to accompany FAR
and FRR and report on the system spoofability.
-4.0 -2.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0
Scores
0.0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
C
ou
nt
Impostors
Genuine Accesses
Spooﬁng Attacks
(a) Score distribution
0.01 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 1 2 5 10 20 40 60 80 90 95 98 99
False Acceptance Rate (%)
0.01
0.02
0.05
0.1
0.2
0.5
1
2
5
10
20
40
60
80
90
95
98
99
Fa
ls
e
R
ej
ec
tio
n
R
at
e
(%
)
FAR @
operating point
SFAR @
operating point
Licit scenario
Spoof scenario
FRR @ EER
(b) DET curve
Figure 5.3: Evaluation plots for a hypothetical biometric veriﬁcation system under spooﬁng
attacks
A widely accepted strategy to address these challenge is to simplify the problem and decom-
pose it into two sub-problems which resemble the original binary classiﬁcation problem in
biometric veriﬁcation. The sub-problems correspond to two scenarios the system can operate
in:
• Licit scenario (also called normal operation mode Galbally et al. [2006]): considers
genuine users as positive and only zero-effort impostors as negative class,
• Spoof scenario: considers genuine users as positive and only spooﬁng attacks as nega-
tive class.
Then, the decision threshold can be determined and evaluation can be performed under the
two scenarios in different ways. Unfortunately, while performance metrics for veriﬁcation
systems are well established and widely used, the metrics for veriﬁcation systems under
spooﬁng attacks are not uniﬁed and is ambiguous in different publications. A detailed overview
of all the error rates utilized by various authors is given in Table 5.2.
The adopted terminology that we will adhere to is as follows:
• FRR - ratio of incorrectly rejected genuine users,
• FAR - ratio of incorrectly accepted zero-effort impostors,
• SFAR - ratio of incorrectly accepted spooﬁng attacks [Johnson et al., 2010].
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Table 5.2: Typically used error rates for biometric veriﬁcation systems under spooﬁng attacks
and their synonyms.
Error rate Acronym Scenario Synonyms
False Negative Rate FNR
Both False Rejection Rate (FRR), False Non-Match
Rate [Galbally et al., 2010], [Marasco et al., 2012],
Pmiss [Villalba and Lleida, 2011])
Both Global False Rejection Rate (GFRR) [Marasco
et al., 2012]
True Positive Rate TPR Both True Acceptance Rate, Genuine Acceptance
Rate [Johnson et al., 2012], [Rodrigues et al.,
2010]
False Positive Rate FPR
Licit False Acceptance Rate (FAR), False Match
Rate [Galbally et al., 2010], [Marasco et al., 2012],
Pfa [Villalba and Lleida, 2011]
Spoof False Acceptance Rate (FAR) [Galbally et al.,
2006], Spoof False Acceptance Rate [John-
son et al., 2010], Liveness False Acceptance
Rate [Adler and Schuckers, 2009], Success
Rate [Ruiz-Albacete et al., 2008], Attack Success
Rate [Galbally et al., 2010]
Both System False Acceptance Rate (SFAR) [Adler and
Schuckers, 2009], Global False Acceptance Rate
(GFAR) [Marasco et al., 2012]
With respect to the decision threshold, researchers generally follow two main evaluation
methodologies to compute it and to report the error rates it produces, and they are discussed
below.
Evaluation Methodology 1. In the ﬁrst evaluation methodology, two decision threshold
calculations are performed separately for the two scenarios [Matsumoto et al., 2002], [Galbally
et al., 2006], [Johnson et al., 2010], [Alegre et al., 2012]. Analysis of the system in the licit
scenario gives values for FRR and FAR, while analysis in the spoof scenario gives values for
FRR and SFAR. Since the analysis produces different threshold in the two scenarios, the two
values of FRR are not the same. A major weak point of this type of evaluation is that it outputs
two decision thresholds for a single veriﬁcation system, while naturally a single system can
have only one operating point corresponding to one decision threshold. Furthermore, the
spoof scenario assumes that all the possible misuses of the system come from spooﬁng attacks,
which in general is not realistic. The threshold calculated in this scenario is not a good
discriminating point for a veriﬁcation system, but rather for an anti-spooﬁng system and the
error rates reported on this way are not a reliable estimate of the system performance under
spooﬁng attacks. The decision threshold and the reported error rates in the spoof scenario
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are irrelevant in a real-world scenario. Therefore, this type of evaluation is not compliant to a
real-world requirements for operation of a veriﬁcation system.
Evaluation Methodology 2. The second evaluation methodology is adapted for more realis-
tic performance evaluation. The threshold is calculated using various criteria, for example
EER, but almost always using the licit scenario, as it is regarded as a normal operation mode for
a veriﬁcation system. Taking advantage of the fact that the licit and spoof scenario share the
same positive class, many publications choose a threshold to achieve a particular desired value
of FRR [Galbally et al., 2010; Villalba and Lleida, 2011; Ruiz-Albacete et al., 2008; Rodrigues
et al., 2009; Akhtar et al., 2011; Marasco et al., 2011]. Then, using the obtained threshold, FAR
for the licit and SFAR in the spoof scenario are reported and compared.
On the hypothetical veriﬁcation system whose score distribution is plotted in Fig. 5.3a, the
threshold is chosen using the EER criteria for the licit scenario. The plotted threshold gives
an intuition about how well the system discriminates between genuine users and zero-effort
impostors, but also between genuine users and spooﬁng attacks. Fig. 5.3b draws two DET
curves corresponding to the two scenarios. The horizontal line shows the FRR for the chosen
threshold. The points where it cuts the DET curves for the two scenarios are the reported error
rates.
As an alternative ﬁgure delivering similar information as DET for the second evaluation
methodology, Rodrigues et al. [2009] suggests to plot FAR vs. SFAR. Thresholds are ﬁxed in
order to obtain all the possible values of FAR for the licit scenario and SFAR is computed in the
spoof scenario and plotted on the ordinate axis. By plotting the curves for different veriﬁcation
systems, the plot enables to compare which one of them is less prone to spooﬁng given a
particular veriﬁcation performance.
The issue that the second methodology overlooks is that a system whose decision threshold is
optimized for one negative class (usually, the zero-effort impostors), can not be evaluated in a
fair manner for another negative class (spooﬁng attacks). Expectedly, such a threshold will be
biased towards the single negative class used for its determination, causing unnecessary larger
error rates for the other negative class. If the system is expected to be exposed to two classes
of negatives in the test or deployment stage, it would be fair that both of them play a role in
the decision of the threshold in the development stage. A novel evaluation methodology to
tackle this issue is the subject of Section 5.3.
5.3 Expected Performance and Spoofability (EPS) Framework
Determining the decision threshold for biometric veriﬁcation systems under spooﬁng attacks
seems to be one of the major issues in the evaluation process. Neither the ﬁrst, nor the second
of the evaluation methodologies explained in Section 5.2.2 offer a method that determines
an unbiased threshold applicable in a realistic veriﬁcation scenario. A fair evaluation of a
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system which needs to reject samples of two different classes is possible only if both of them
are considered in the development stage. By neglecting the class of spooﬁng attacks when
deciding on the threshold of the veriﬁcation system, one deliberately exhibits blindness to the
danger of spooﬁng attacks, thus potentially creating a system more vulnerable to spooﬁng.
Moreover, in some cases a necessity may arise to add a cost to the error rates associated
with the positive and the negative class, and this cost has to be considered in the process of
computing a decision threshold as well.
The most straight-forward way to involve both negative classes (zero-effort impostors and
spooﬁng attacks) in the threshold decision process, is simply to merge them together into
a single negative super-class. However, the number of zero-effort impostors and spooﬁng
attacks is highly dependent on the database and follows the database protocol. Hence, the
ratio of the two classes into the super-class is different for different databases and can not
be controlled. Furthermore, the super-class tends to be biased towards the component with
more samples. For example, in a typical biometric veriﬁcation database with N identities and
M samples per identity, the number of zero-effort impostors will be N × (N −1)×M . On the
other hand, if there is a single spooﬁng attack for any genuine sample in the database, the
number of spooﬁng attacks will be N ×M . The above observations lead to the question of
what the correct ratio of zero-effort impostors and spooﬁng attacks into the super-class of
negatives is.
As amatter of fact, theremay not be a single answer to that. Any ratio of the twonegative classes
may be valid depending on the deployment conditions. For example, in highly supervised
conditions, like airport control gates, spooﬁng attacks are more difﬁcult to perform, and hence
unlikely. On the other hand, unsupervised veriﬁcation systems of portable devices are much
more exposed to spooﬁng attacks. Thus, tuning the operating point of any system depends on
its expected usage scenario.
The message that the metrics DCF, WERβ and EPC convey sounds with the above reasoning
for a biometric veriﬁcation system. EPC obtains a decision threshold based on a parameter
β which balances between FAR and FRR and reports the expected performance for a wide
range of values for that parameter. The parameter β can be interpreted as the relative cost or
importance of FAR and FRR, or the prior of the negative or the positive class. Using EPC, it is
possible to compare algorithms depending on the importance of FAR and FRR in a certain
usage scenario.
For evaluating biometric veriﬁcation systems under spooﬁng attacks, we develop a method
inspired by EPC. Being aware that the prior of zero-effort impostors and spooﬁng attacks can
not be known in advance while developing an algorithm, we design an evaluation framework
which measures the expected performance of the system for a range of values of a parameter
which balances between FAR and SFAR. Moreover, analogously to EPC, we introduce another
parameter which considers the cost of the error rates associated with the positive and the
negative classes. As it measures both the veriﬁcation performance and the vulnerability to
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spooﬁng of a system and uniﬁes them into a single value, the adapted evaluation scheme is
called Expected Performance and Spoofability (EPS) framework.
The goal of the EPS framework is to analyze and plot error rates regarding the performance
and spoofability of a veriﬁcation system on a test set, with respect to a decision threshold
taken on a separate development set. We deﬁne two parameters: ω ∈ [0,1], which denotes the
relative cost of spooﬁng attacks with respect to zero-effort impostors; and β ∈ [0,1], which
denotes the relative cost of the negative classes (zero-effort impostors and spooﬁng attacks)
with respect to the positive class. Using these, we introduce a measurement called FARω,
which is a weighted error rate for the two negative classes (zero-effort impostors and spooﬁng
attacks). It is calculated as in Eq. 5.4.
FARω =ω ·SFAR+ (1−ω) ·FAR (5.4)
The optimal classiﬁcation threshold τ∗
ω,β depends on both parameters. It is chosen tominimize
the weighted difference between FARω and FRR on the development set, as in Eq. 5.5.
τ∗ω,β = arg minτ |β ·FARω(τ,Ddev )− (1−β) ·FRR(τ,Ddev )| (5.5)
Once an optimal threshold τ∗
ω,β is calculated for certain values of ω and β, different error
rates can be computed on the test set. Probably the most important is WERω,β, which can
be accounted as a measurement summarizing both the veriﬁcation performance and the
spoofability of the system and which is calculated as in Eq. 5.6.
WERω,β(τ
∗
ω,β,Dtest )=β ·FARω(τ∗ω,β,Dtest )+ (1−β) ·FRR(τ∗ω,β,Dtest ) (5.6)
A special case of WERω,β, obtained by assigning equal cost β= 0.5 to FARw and FRR can be
deﬁned as HTERω and computed as in Eq. 5.7. In such a case, the criteria for optimal decision
threshold is analogous to the EER criteria given in Section 5.1.1.
HTERω(τ
∗
ω,Dtest )=
FARω(τ∗ω,Dtest )+FRR(τ∗ω,Dtest )
2
(5.7)
The parameter ω could be interpreted as relative cost of the error rate related to spooﬁng
attacks. Alternatively, it could be connected to the expected relative number of spooﬁng
attacks among all the negative samples presented to the system. In other words, it could be
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Figure 5.4: 3D plot of WERω,β and SFAR of a hypothetical biometric veriﬁcation system
computed using EPS framework
understood as the prior probability of the system being under a spooﬁng attack when it is
misused. If it is expected that there is no danger of spooﬁng attacks for some particular setup,
it can be set to 0. In this case, WERω,β corresponds to WERβ in the traditional evaluation
scheme for biometric veriﬁcation systems. When it is expected that some portion of the
illegitimate accesses to the system will be spooﬁng attacks,ωwill reﬂect their prior and ensure
they are not neglected in the process of determining the decision threshold.
As in the computation of WERβ in Section 5.1.1, the parameter β could be interpreted as
the relative cost of the error rate related to the negative class consisting of both zero-effort
impostors and spooﬁng attacks. This parameter can be controlled according to the needs
or to the deployment scenario of the system. For example, if we want to reduce the wrong
acceptance of samples to the minimum, while allowing increased number of rejected genuine
users, we need to penalize FARω by setting β as close as possible to 1.
The EPS framework computes error rates for a range of decision thresholds obtained by
varying the parameters ω and β. The visualization of the error rates parameterized over two
parameters will result in a 3D surface, which, for a hypothetical system is given in Fig. 5.4.
Using this plot, we can clearly infer on the expected error rates depending on the parameters’
values or range of values which are of interest.
However, a 3D plot may not be convenient for evaluation and analysis when one needs to
compare two or more systems. Instead, we suggest plotting the Expected Performance and
Spoofability Curve (EPSC), showing WERω,β with respect to one of the parameters, while the
other parameter is ﬁxed to a predeﬁned value. For example, we can ﬁx the parameter β=β0
and draw a 2D curve which plots WERω,β on the ordinate with respect to the varying parameter
ω on the abscissa. Having in mind that the relative cost given to FARω and FRR depends mostly
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for β ∈ [0,1] do
for ω ∈ [0,1] do
deﬁne FARω =ω ·SFAR+ (1−ω) ·FAR
τ∗ω,β = arg minτ |β ·FARω(τ,Ddev )− (1−β) ·FRR(τ,Ddev )|
compute WERω,β(τ∗ω,β,Dtest );
plot WERω,β(τ∗ω,β,Dtest ) w.r.t. ω,β
end for
end for
Figure 5.5: Pseudo code for computing WERω,β
on the security preferences for the system, it is not difﬁcult to imagine that particular values
for β can be selected by an expert. Similarly, if the cost of SFAR and FAR or the prior of spooﬁng
attacks with regards to the zero-effort impostors can be precisely estimated for a particular
application, one can set ω=ω0 and draw a 2D curve plotting WERω,β on the ordinate, with
respect to the varying parameter β on the abscissa.
The algorithm on Fig. 5.5 gives the step-by-step procedure to compute and plot WERω,β with
regards to ω and β for a given veriﬁcation system. By ﬁxing one of the parameters ω or β, one
can plot EPSC for WERω,β with regards to the other parameter.
Besides WERω,β, EPSC can present other error rates which are of interest. For example,
plotting SFAR can show how the system’s robustness to spooﬁng changes with regards to ω or
β. Alternatively, to report on all the incorrectly accepted samples, FARω can be plotted using
EPSC.
Fig. 5.6 and Fig. 5.7 give an illustration of the EPSC plotting the error rates WERω,β and SFAR as
function of the parameters ω and β, respectively. The plots are generated for the hypothetical
veriﬁcation system whose score distribution is given in Fig. 5.3a.
Fig. 5.6a and Fig. 5.6b show WERω,β and SFAR with respect to ω for three predeﬁned values
of β. The blue curve on Fig. 5.6a, corresponding to β = 0.5, is equivalent to HTERω. The
left-most points of the curves correspond to ω = 0, meaning that the decision threshold is
obtained disregarding the spooﬁng attacks as possible input. Hence, the threshold at this point
corresponds to the threshold plotted in Fig. 5.3a, calculated for the system when operating in
the licit scenario. For the particular hypothetical system and all the three considered values
of β, this point corresponds to low WERω,β, which indicates a system with good veriﬁcation
capabilities, but very high SFAR due to the high overlap of the scores of spooﬁng attacks and
genuine users.
As we increaseω, we give weight to the spooﬁng attacks so that they have a role in the threshold
decision process. In the particular example, this results in a shift of the decision threshold
to the right of the score distribution plot in Fig. 5.3a. This decreases the number of spooﬁng
attacks that pass the system, which explains why SFAR decreases with increasing ω. However,
the additional caution for the danger of spooﬁng attacks unavoidably comes with the price
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Figure 5.6: EPSC of a hypothetical biometric veriﬁcation system under spooﬁng attacks,
parameterized over ω
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Figure 5.7: EPSC of a hypothetical biometric veriﬁcation system under spooﬁng attacks,
parameterized over ω
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of more rejected genuine users and thus higher WERω,β. A system with high robustness to
spooﬁng attacks will show as mild increase of WERω,β as possible, with as steep decrease of
SFAR as possible.
Fig. 5.7a and Fig. 5.7b show EPSC parameterized over the varying parameter β, for three
predeﬁned values of ω. For the extreme cases where β= 0 and β= 1, WERω,β is 0 because the
threshold is determined to minimize the error rate solely associated with the positive or the
negative class, respectively. In the case of β= 0, this results in a successful passing through of
all the spooﬁng attacks.
Considering the spooﬁng attacks when calculating the decision threshold means taking ad-
ditional precautions against them. As a result of this, the threshold obtained using EPS
framework is better adapted to the input that is expected, contributing to systems with better
performance and lower spooﬁng vulnerability, than systems whose decision threshold has
been determined in different way.
The EPSC inherits the advantage of unbiased system comparison from the EPC, because it
reports the error rates a priori. Since the threshold is always determined using the develop-
ment set, and the error rates are reported using the test set, one can estimate the expected
error rates and spoofability of the system in an unbiased way, on data which has not been seen
before. The expected error rates can be reported for a particular value or range of values of the
parameters ω and βwhich are of interest in a particular application. Moreover, EPSC allows
for easy and unbiased comparison of veriﬁcation systems with regards to their performance
and robustness to spooﬁng, simply by comparing the EPSC for the two systems on the same
plot. Even more, one can compare veriﬁcation systems range-wise: which one performs better
for a range of values of ω or β.
EPS requires an access to a single score output of the system to be evaluated. Therefore, it is
suitable for systems where the veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng outputs are fused at score level.
Systems where the veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng outputs are fused in a different way can not
beneﬁt from EPSC, which displays its greatest limitation.
Finally, if a single number is needed to describe the performance of a system, we deﬁne
the Area Under EPSC (AUE) metric, which can be computed for a ﬁxed β or ω, as in Eq. 5.8.
For example, for a ﬁxed β, it represents the average expected WERω,β for all values of ω and
is computed using Eq. 5.8. The formula to compute AUE for ﬁxed ω and varying β follows
accordingly. Between two systems, better is the one which achieves smaller AUE.
AUE=
∫
ω∈[0,1]
WERω,β(τ
∗
ω,β,Dtest )dω (5.8)
The AUE can be computed in between certain bounds a,b ∈ [0,1];a < b, enabling to compare
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two systems depending on the required range of the varying parameter.
5.4 EPSC Showcase
In this section, we illustrate the usage, appearance and interpretation of EPSC for several
typical cases of biometric veriﬁcation systems which behave differently with respect to the
spooﬁng attacks. For this purpose, we categorize the biometric veriﬁcation systems into
four categories, which can be best described by their score distribution plots. As the goal is
to illustrate EPSC when the system is under spooﬁng attacks, for this showcase we assume
biometric veriﬁcation system with good separability between real access and zero-effort
impostors, which means good veriﬁcation performance. The categories, for which score
distributions for hypothetical data are given in Fig. 5.8, are as follows:
• Robust (Fig. 5.8a). The score distribution of the spooﬁng attacks is to the left and not
overlapping with the score distribution of the real accesses.
• Susceptible (Fig. 5.8b). The score distribution of the spooﬁng attacks is to the left and
somewhat overlapping with the score distribution of the real accesses.
• Vulnerable (Fig. 5.8c). The score distribution of the spooﬁng attacks is overlapping with
the score distribution of the real accesses.
• Super-vulnerable (Fig. 5.8d). The score distribution of the spooﬁng attacks is to the right
and somewhat overlapping and not overlapping with the score distribution of the real
accesses.
The system shown in Fig. 5.8a shows nearly ideal situation, with a great separability between
the samples that need to be accepted (real accesses) and the samples that need to be rejected
(zero-effort impostors and spooﬁng attacks). Such systems rarely exist in practice. The system
shown in Fig. 5.8b corresponds to a more realistic situation and may be achieved by fusing
biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng system. The system shown in Fig. 5.8c can represent
a typical biometric veriﬁcation system with no explicit anti-spooﬁng mechanism. Finally,
a super-vulnerable system as in Fig. 5.8d is less realistic, as it requires producing spooﬁng
attacks with inconceivable quality.
Fig. 5.9 illustrates the appearance of EPSC for the four categories of biometric veriﬁcation
systems with hypothetical data. The parameter β= 0.5 is ﬁxed, while the parameter ω varies.
It is important to note that forω= 0, the points on the curves represent the error rates that will
be obtained using Evaluation Methodology 2 described in Section 5.2.2.
The general trend for the cases of susceptible, vulnerable and super vulnerable systems is
increasing HTERω and decreasing SFAR as ω increases. This demonstrates the presence of a
trade-off between the robustness to spooﬁng and overall performance. Exception are highly
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Figure 5.8: Score distribution plots for different categories of biometric veriﬁcation systems
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Figure 5.9: EPSC for different categories of hypothetical biometric veriﬁcation systems
robust systems where using EPSC to determine the decision threshold does not make a big
difference with respect to their already very good performance.
In the case of susceptible, vulnerable and super-vulnerable systems, EPSC plays an important
role when the probability of spooﬁng attack, reﬂected in the parameterω, is high. If Evaluation
Methodology 2 is used as described in Section 5.2.2, then these systems are completely inoper-
ative in cases where spooﬁng attacks can be expected. However, if EPSC is used, the decision
threshold for each ω is optimized for the corresponding probability of spooﬁng attacks. In
this way, the SFAR can be signiﬁcantly reduced. This comes at the cost of decreased overall
performance, in this case represented by HTERω. However, this cost depends on the system.
For a susceptible system like in Fig. 5.8b, the cost is irrelevant, as the increase of HTERω is
mild, while the decrease of SFAR is sharp. For the vulnerable and super-vulnerable systems,
the cost is very high, as SFAR is reduced at a slower rate, while HTERω notes a signiﬁcant
increase. This observation reminds that EPSC does not aim at replacing protection with
spooﬁng counter-measures that can bring vulnerable or super-vulnerable systems to the level
of susceptible or robust ones. Yet, for any system, it can optimize the decision threshold for
the present circumstances.
5.5 Discussion
In the traditional setup, veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems are evaluated independently,
using the well-established metrics for binary classiﬁcation systems. The observation that they
need to work in cooperation resulting in a system with a single decision, inevitably brings the
necessity for an adjusted evaluation methodology.
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We discussed several ways to evaluate veriﬁcation systems under spooﬁng attacks. Two of the
methodologies that are widely used possess disadvantages that make them either impractical
or sub-optimal for deployment.
We proposed a novel evaluation methodology, EPS, which objectively assumes that all the
three system inputs, real accesses, zero-effort impostors and spooﬁng attacks, need to be
considered in the threshold decision process. They are taken into account with respect to their
prior probability, or the application-dependent cost of the error rates associated with them.
In this way, EPS allows for a selection of a decision threshold which is optimal for a given
application. Furthermore, EPS is designed to enable unbiased comparison of systems, by
setting the decision threshold a priori, with no knowledge on the test set in the development
phase.
A prerequisite for using EPS framework to optimize the operation of a system is that the system
acknowledges three types of inputs: genuine accesses, zero-effort impostors and spooﬁng
attacks. If no such notion is present, the system can still be evaluated using EPS framework, but
it can not beneﬁt from it in terms of optimization of the threshold relative to the importance of
the different types of inputs. An example of such system is a client-independent anti-spooﬁng
system, which has no notion of zero-effort impostors. Subsequently, decision-level fusion of
biometric veriﬁcation and client-independent anti-spooﬁng system results in a system with
similar problem: the decision of the anti-spooﬁng system is ﬁxed and can not be optimized
using EPS framework, and so is the decision of the fused system. This problem does not exist
when fusing biometric veriﬁcation and client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng system at decision-level:
the decision threshold of each of the two systems can be optimized separately using EPS
framework before the fusion takes place.
The usage of EPS and EPSC was brieﬂy illustrated on hypothetical veriﬁcation systems. In
Chapter 6, it will be used to evaluate and compare realistic veriﬁcation systems in case studies
on the face mode.
It is important to note that a complete API for using EPS framework for evaluation of bio-
metric veriﬁcation systems under spooﬁng attacks is available in the open source package
antispoofing.evaluation1. The code assumes no prior information of the biometric mode,
internal operation of the system or evaluation database.
1 https://pypi.python.org/pypi/antispooﬁng.evaluation
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Biometric veriﬁcation systems for the face mode appear to be one of the most attractive targets
of spooﬁng attacks. There are two main factors that contribute to this. The ﬁrst one has its
roots in the wide adoption of online social networks by ever increasing number of users. In
recent times, the social networks serve as a main platform where users disclose their personal
images, many of which are face images, in large scale. An analysis conducted by Li et al. [2014]
shows that the majority of face images shared on the social networks can be readily used to
spoof a face veriﬁcation system simply by displaying them on the screen of a device. This leads
us to the second factor which makes spooﬁng the face mode attractive: the convenience of
producing spooﬁng attacks cheaply and without any expert skills.
In this chapter, we develop several case studies to employ the concepts introduced through-
out this thesis on the face biometrics. The case studies are based on several prominent
face veriﬁcation systems and state-of-the-art face anti-spooﬁng features. The objective is to
demonstrate the beneﬁts of the integration of the veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems in
creating more trustworthy face biometrics.
With respect to input-level integration, we perform experiments to show the advantages
of client-speciﬁc over client-independent approaches. For this purpose, we create four
case studies based on a subset of the state-of-the-art anti-spooﬁng features presented in
Section 2.3.1. Then, we apply the proposed client-speciﬁc modeling approaches and their
client-independent counterparts, comparing the results using the evaluation methodology for
anti-spooﬁng systems presented in Section 5.1.
To examine output-level integration, we create case studies where we combine different face
veriﬁcation systems with different anti-spooﬁng methods. We explore anti-spooﬁng systems
based upon both client-independent and client-speciﬁc paradigm. The resulting systems
are face veriﬁcation systems with increased robustness to spooﬁng attacks. To compare their
performance before and after integration, as well as to compare the impact of the different
fusion strategies presented in Chapter 4, we use the EPS framework proposed in Section 5.3.
Simultaneously, we demonstrate the usage of the EPS framework in practice, indicating its
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values for evaluation of biometric veriﬁcation systems under spooﬁng attacks.
We emphasize that the code for the methods presented in this thesis is developed and released
as free software. The results of the case studies shown in this chapter are fully reproducible
using the free software package bob.thesis.ichingo20151 which accompanies this thesis
and which is based on the free signal processing and machine learning toolbox Bob2 [Anjos
et al., 2012].
Detailed description of the anti-spooﬁng and face veriﬁcation features and systems, as well
as the database used in the case studies is given in Section 6.1. The results regarding the
input-level integration are given in Section 6.2, while the results regarding the output-level
integration are given in Section 6.3.
6.1 Systems and Database Description
The case studies examined in this chapter are built upon several state-of-the-art face anti-
spooﬁng features and face veriﬁcation systems. In this section we give a description and
justiﬁcation for their usage. Furthermore, we discuss the choice of a database suitable to apply
the case studies on.
6.1.1 Face Anti-spooﬁng Features
In Section 2.3.1 we gave a review of state-of-the-art features that have been designed to
discriminate between real accesses and spooﬁng attacks. To build the case studies and perform
our experiments, we limit ourselves to a subset consisting of four different anti-spooﬁng
features, that we will refer to as LBP, LBP-TOP, MOTION and HOG. The selection of features
takes into account several factors, like their discrimination capabilities, implementation
details and availability of source code to reproduce their results. Furthermore, the selected
features are representatives of different categories, as described in Section 2.3.1.
While the selected face anti-spooﬁng features have a well-acknowledged value in face anti-
spooﬁng, we are aware that there are methods which achieve better face spooﬁng detection.
Primarily, these methods owe their success to the fusion of several different anti-spooﬁng
methods [Chingovska et al., 2013b] or augmentation of the input [Bharadwaj et al., 2013]. How-
ever, the objective of the case studies presented in this chapter is not to outperform superior
face anti-spooﬁng detectors. Instead, they aim at demonstrating the beneﬁts of the concepts
proposed in this thesis. In particular, the empirical results show that the advantages of the
proposed methods can be achieved using simple features with their basic parameterization.
An extensive evaluation of the applicability of other anti-spooﬁng features in the context of the
proposed methods is possible using the free software package bob.thesis.ichingo2015.
1 https://pypi.python.org/pypi/bob.thesis.ichingo2015
2 http://www.idiap.ch/software/bob
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LBP LBP anti-spooﬁng features belong to the category of features that use visual appearance
cues. They are based on the acclaimed Local Binary Pattern (LBP) descriptor, originally
proposed for texture classiﬁcation by Ojala et al. [2002]. It consists of computing a binary
pattern over each pixel by comparing its value to the values of pixels in a rectangular or
circular neighborhood region with a predeﬁned radius. The obtained binary patterns are
then summarized into a histogram over the full image. LBPt ypex,y is the usual notation for these
features, where x stands for the number of neighboring pixels that are considered, while y is
the radius of the circular neighborhood. Depending on the grouping of the binary patterns
when creating the histogram, type can be regular (r ), rotation-invariant (r i ) and uniform (u2).
As face anti-spooﬁng feature, LBP was ﬁrst proposed by Määttä et al. [2011] in a multi-scale
version, where several neighborhood regions with different radii are considered. In this work,
we use a feature vector created as a histogram of simple LBPu28,1[Chingovska et al., 2012]. The
features are extracted only from the face region of the input sample, geometrically normalized
to 64x64 pixels. The dimension of the ﬁnal feature vector obtained in this way is 59.
LBP-TOP LBP from Three Orthogonal Planes (LBP-TOP) is a dynamic texture descriptor
which extends the computation of LBP features in a temporal dimension [Zhao and Pietikäi-
nen, 2007]. Having video inputs, the binary patterns of a pixel are computed not only in
its neighborhoods within its frame, but also within its circular or elliptical neighborhood
spanning the preceding and following frames.
LBP-TOP has been used for face spooﬁng detection by Pereira et al. [2014] and has shown
better discrimination capabilities than LBP. In this work, we use LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,1, which
is extracted over three-dimensional circular neighborhoods with radii 1 and considering 8
neighboring pixels. Similarly to the LBP features, LBP-TOP features are extracted from the
face region of the input sample, after a geometric normalization to 64x64 pixels. The obtained
feature vector has a dimension of 177.
MOTION The MOTION face anti-spooﬁng features used in this work are proposed by Anjos
and Marcel [2011]. They detect spooﬁng attacks by estimating the correlation of the move-
ments of the face with regards to the background and rely on the assumption that spooﬁng
attacks may have higher correlation. The algorithm computes a motion coefﬁcient capturing
the motion difference between two consecutive frames in a video. The motion coefﬁcient is
computed both for the face region, as well as the background. Then, a total of 5 statistical
and other measures of the motion coefﬁcient over a window of several consecutive frames
are computed: minimum, maximum, mean, standard deviation and the ratio between high
and low frequency components. For each frame, the computed measures for the face and
background regions are concatenated to create the feature vector, which has a dimension of
10. In this work, we use MOTION features with window size of 20 frames.
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HOG Histogram of Oriented Gradients (HOG) has been originally proposed by Dalal and
Triggs [2005] as a descriptor for human detection. It requires a computation of the gradient
of the pixels in an image. The orientations of the gradients are binned into histograms over
overlapping or non-overlapping cells that the image is divided into. Optionally, the cells are
grouped into blocks and the cell histograms are normalized withing each block.
HOG has been used for anti-spooﬁng by Määttä et al. [2012] and Yang et al. [2013]. The
HOG features used in this thesis are computed on the face region of the image, geometrically
normalized to 64x64. A total of 8 gradient orientations are considered between 0 and 180
degrees. The size of the cells is set to 16 pixels with an overlap of 8 pixels and no block
normalization is used. The ﬁnal feature vector is obtained by concatenating the histograms
from the cells and has a dimension of 392.
6.1.2 Face Veriﬁcation Systems
We base the case studies on four baseline face veriﬁcation systems which have proven to
be state-of-the-art on several face veriﬁcation databases. To generate the face veriﬁcation
scores, we used their implementation in the free open-source face recognition library Facere-
clib3 [Günther et al., 2012].
UBMGMM The ﬁrst face veriﬁcation system uses Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) features
extracted from the geometrically normalized faces. The features are extracted over overlapping
blocks of 12x12 pixels and after a preprocessing procedure to reduce the impact of illumination
variations [Tan and Triggs, 2010]. Face models for the enrolled clients [Cardinaux et al.,
2003] are created over the features using a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM). First, Universal
Background Model (UBM) based on a GMM with 512 components is created for a set of
background clients. Then, this model is adapted to the face samples of all the enrolled clients
using Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) adaptation, creating models for a particular identity. At
veriﬁcation time, an input sample is compared with the model of the identity claimed by the
client, as well as the UBM. The ﬁnal veriﬁcation score is the log-likelihood ratio between the
scores obtained during the two comparisons.
LGBPHS The second face veriﬁcation system, called Local Gabor Binary Pattern Histogram
Sequences (LGBPHS) [Zhang et al., 2005], calculates LBPu28,2 histograms over input image blocks
of size 8x8 and convoluted with 40 Gabor wavelets with 8 orientation and 5 scales [Wiskott
et al., 1997]. The concatenated LBP histograms of an input image are compared with the
histogram model of the client with the claimed identity using χ2 measure.
3 https://pypi.python.org/pypi/facereclib
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GJet The third face veriﬁcation system, referred to as GJet is based on [Wiskott et al., 1997]
and extracts Gabor jets from different positions of the image. The Gabor jets are then assem-
bled into a single rectangular grid graph [Günther et al., 2012]. In total, 40 Gabor wavelets
with 8 orientation and 5 scales are used. The veriﬁcation score is generated by comparing the
Gabor graphs using the average similarity of the corresponding Gabor jets.
ISV DCT features are used once again in the fourth face veriﬁcation system, which is based
on an Inter-Session Variability Modeling [Wallace et al., 2011]. Similarly to the GMM face
veriﬁcation system, ISV is based on a UBM with 512 components. ISV additionally estimates a
160-dimensional linear subspace of within-class variability. Enrollment of clients is performed
by adaptation of the UBM to a speciﬁc identity and depending on the within-class variability
subspace. The veriﬁcation scores are obtained as log-likelihood ratio between the scores
obtained using the client identity model and the UBM.
6.1.3 Database
The majority of face-spooﬁng databases provide only real access and spooﬁng attack samples
for the clients and usually lack enrollment data. However, as repeatedly stated in Chapters 3,
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, this is of vital importance at all levels of integration of veriﬁcation and
anti-spooﬁng systems. To the best of our knowledge, Replay-Attack, together with its subsets
Print-Attack and Photo-Attack, is the only face spooﬁng database that provides enrollment
samples. Therefore, all of the case studies were evaluated using Replay-Attack database. The
majority of the experiments are performed considering the Grandtest protocol of Replay-
Attack, which includes all the types of spooﬁng attacks. However, certain experiments are
performed using subprotocols of Replay-Attack, like Print, Digital-Photo and Video, which
include only the corresponding types of attacks.
Although the other databases, like NUAA, CASIA-FASD and MSU-MFSD do not provide sep-
arate enrollment samples, one can change their protocol and dedicate certain samples for
enrollment. However, such a protocol violation will make comparison with previous ap-
proaches using the original protocol biased. Furthermore, even if we allow such a violation,
for many of the clients it is not possible to select enrollment samples out of the real access
data. For NUAA, the samples for the majority of clients come from a single session. Hence,
any selection of real access data for enrollment will make the samples for enrollment and
evaluation highly correlated. For CASIA-FASD, there are only 3 real access videos per client.
Due to their different qualities, selection of any of them for enrollment will bias any method
towards a single quality. On the other hand, selecting a part of a video for enrollment will lead
to a similar correlation problem as for NUAA database. Containing only 2 real access videos
per client with different qualities, MSU-MFSD exhibits similar problems as CASIA-FASD.
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6.2 Input-level Integration
In this section, we state our ﬁndings with respect to the input-level integration of face veriﬁca-
tion and anti-spooﬁng systems. We look at three different case studies, each of which covers
one of the face anti-spooﬁng features described in Section 6.1.1: LBP, LBP-TOP, MOTION and
HOG. For each case study, we observe and report the performance of a face anti-spooﬁng
system built with the following approaches: generative client-independent, generative client-
speciﬁc, discriminative client-independent and discriminative client-speciﬁc. The evaluation
is done using the evaluation methodologies for anti-spooﬁng systems, described in Section 5.1.
We would like to emphasize that the evaluation of the input-level integration is to compare
client-speciﬁc with respect to client-independent approaches only. The comparison has a
meaning only if the methods are applied on the same kind of features. Comparison between
different features has been done in the studies of Pereira et al. [2014]; Anjos and Marcel [2011];
Yang et al. [2013] and is out of the scope of this work.
The experiments are performed on Replay-Attack database, using its Grandtest, Print, Digital-
Photo and Video protocols. For certain experiments, we deﬁne two modes of evaluation with
respect to the used protocols:
• Intra-protocol evaluation. In this evaluation mode, the system is trained and evaluated
using the same protocol (or set of protocols).
• Cross-protocol evaluation. In this evaluation mode, the system is trained using one pro-
tocol (or set of protocols) and is evaluated using another protocol (or set of protocols).
We use intra-protocol evaluation to evaluate the system performance on Grandtest, Print,
Digital-Photo and Video protocols, as well as on sets created by pairing the three latter proto-
cols.
Cross-protocol evaluation is important in assessing the capability of an anti-spooﬁng system
to generalize in detecting spooﬁng attacks which have not been considered during training.
As noted by Pereira et al. [2013] and having in mind that the possibilities for inventing novel
spooﬁng attacks are unlimited, robustness to unseen spooﬁng attacks is a major security asset
of anti-spooﬁng systems. We investigate three cross-protocol evaluation scenarios. In each
one of them, the systems are trained using two out of the three considered subprotocols of
Replay-Attack, while the third one serves for testing. The scenarios’ descriptions are as follows:
• Scenario 1: train with Digital-Photo and Video, test on Print;
• Scenario 2: train with Print and Video, test on Digital-Photo;
• Scenario 3: train with Print and Digital-Photo, test on Video.
74
6.2. Input-level Integration
According to this, the three scenarios reveal the generalization capabilities of the algorithms
when tested on printed photographs, digital photographs and videos, respectively.
We analyze the generative client-speciﬁc approach in Section 6.2.1 and the discriminative
one in Section 6.2.2. The analysis is performed with respect to different parameters and
in comparison with the client-independent approaches, both in intra-protocol and cross-
protocol evaluations. Details about the exact parameterization for each of the methods and
protocols in our evaluation are given together with the freely available source code in the
software package bob.thesis.ichingo2015, making the reported results fully reproducible.
6.2.1 Generative Client-Speciﬁc Approach
We start the analysis of the generative client-speciﬁc approaches by describing the parameter
selection. We furthermore examine the effect of the cohort set on the results. Finally, we
compare the best setup of client-speciﬁc and client-independent approaches on different
protocols in intra-protocol and cross-protocol evaluations.
Parameter selection. The described generative client-speciﬁc approaches depend on few
hyper-parameters, like the number of Gaussian components that comprise the GMM, both
for the real access and the spooﬁng attack model. Another hyper-parameter is the relevance
factor which plays a key role in MAP adaptation. All of these parameters have been optimized
by a grid parameter search on the development set.
To select the best values for the number of Gaussian components as well as the relevance factor
for each of the features, the HTER on the development set was used. The value of HTER for
different number of components for the real and attack models is shown in Fig. 6.1a, Fig. 6.2a,
Fig. 6.3a and Fig. 6.4a for LBP, LBP-TOP, MOTION and HOG features, respectively. The ﬁgures
refer to the grandtest protocol only. The dark blue values on the plots correspond to number
of components for which grid search results are not available.
We found that LBP, LBP-TOP and HOG features require relatively high number of components
for the real access GMMs, ranging between 240 - 290 depending on the protocol. In particular,
for the grandtest protocol, the optimal number of Gaussian components for the LBP, LBP-TOP
and HOG features is 275, 295 and 295, respectively. The MOTION features, on the other hand,
can successfully model the client-speciﬁc real accesses with only 10-50 components. For
the grandtest protocol, the number of components is 10. The spooﬁng attack GMMs consist
of smaller number of components: below 100 for the majority of protocols for each of the
features. For the grandtest protocol, the optimal number of components is 25, 100, 45 and 55
for LBP, LBP-TOP, MOTION and HOG features, respectively.
Fig. 6.1b, Fig. 6.2b, Fig. 6.3b and Fig. 6.4b show the optimal value of the relevance factor for
each combinantion of number of components of the real and the attack model. The ﬁgures
exemplify the grandtest protocol only. For most of the protocols and features best results
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are achieved with low values of the relevance factor (1< r < 5), which means that the MAP
adaptation of the GMMs gives more importance to the client-speciﬁc data than to the prior.
Among those, values close to 1 are more suitable for LBP-TOP features, as well asfor LBP and
HOG features when the number of components of the attack model is in the middle of the
high range. For the MOTION features, values close to 5 are more suitable. This is an indicator
that the LBP-TOP, LBP and HOG features contain higher amount of client-speciﬁc information,
compared to the MOTION features.
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Figure 6.1: LBP features: Values of HTER (%) and relevance factor depending on the number
of components for the real and attack GMM models
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Figure 6.2: LBP-TOP features: Values of HTER (%) and relevance factor depending on the
number of components for the real and attack GMM models
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Figure 6.3: MOTION features: Values of HTER (%) and relevance factor depending on the
number of components for the real and attack GMM models
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Figure 6.4: HOG features: Values of HTER (%) and relevance factor depending on the number
of components for the real and attack GMM models
Effect of the cohort set. The analysis of the cohort set selection is performedon theGrandtest
protocol of Replay-Attack. A full cohort set to model the hypothesis H1 as explained in Sec-
tion 3.2.3, consists of 15 cohorts, which is the maximum number of clients in the training set
of Replay-Attack.
Fig. 6.5 presents the dependence on the performance on the number of cohort models that
are considered in the static or dynamic client-speciﬁc cohort set. The performance is given in
terms of HTER as a mean between the error rates related to misclassiﬁed real accesses and
spooﬁng attacks. For the static client-speciﬁc cohort set, the general trend suggests that, larger
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number of cohorts yields better performance for the majority of the considered features. For
example, considering only the closest cohort in the cohort set gives a relativly high HTER for
LBP, LBP-TOP and MOTION features. As the number of cohorts increases, HTER decreases.
In particular cases, HTER for large enough cohort set (9-13 cohorts) is smaller then HTER
considering the full cohort set.
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Figure 6.5: Dependence on the selection of the cohort models. : full cohort set,•: static
client-speciﬁc cohort set,•: dynamic client-speciﬁc cohort set
On the other hand, the number of cohorts in the dynamic client-speciﬁc cohort set appears to
make very little difference, as HTER stays relatively stable for all considered features. Further-
more, the dynamic client-speciﬁc cohort set yields better performance than the static one for
LBP, LBP-TOP and MOTION features and with small number of cohorts . This suggest that the
dynamic selection of the cohort sets achieves better sorting of the cohort models in terms of
relevance for the client-speciﬁc models. HOG features are an exception to this rule, and static
client-speciﬁc cohort set performs better even than a full cohort set and for smaller number of
cohorts.
78
6.2. Input-level Integration
It is important to note that although HTER varies depending on the cohort set, in absolute
terms the variations are minor and within a range of 2%. For example, for LBP features, the
minimum HTER is 9.94%, while the maximum is 11%. The HTER when using full cohort set is
10.01%. Therefore, in the subsequent experiments, we will adhere to using the full cohort set.
Intra-protocol evaluation. Using intra-protocol evaluation, we compare generative client-
independent and client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng methods. Similarly to the client-speciﬁc ap-
proach, the parameters for the client-independent one have been optimized using grid pa-
rameter search.
The results for the Grandtest protocol are given in Table 6.1. The generative client-speciﬁc
approach consistently outperforms the the client-independent one for all the types of features,
both on the development and test set. The advantage of the client-speciﬁc features is signiﬁ-
cant in almost all the cases: the relative improvement of HTER is above 50% for all features,
except MOTION.
Table 6.1: Performance of generative client-independent and client-speciﬁc approaches on
Grandtest protocol (error rates in %)
Client-independent Client-speciﬁc
dev test dev test
Features EER FAR FRR HTER EER FAR FRR HTER
LBP 21.33 17.93 25.45 21.69 9.97 8.6 11.42 10.01
LBP-TOP 9.32 8.38 16.92 12.65 5.08 5.07 7.51 6.29
MOTION 12.49 13.91 11.14 12.52 10.25 10.81 9.51 10.16
HOG 16.22 17.79 17.10 17.44 6.59 7.04 10.20 8.62
To understand the improvement of anti-spooﬁng performance when client-speciﬁc approach
is used, we compare the box plots of the client scores for the client-speciﬁc and client-
independent approaches. For different features, they are given in Fig. 6.6, Fig. 6.7, Fig. 6.8
and Fig. 6.9, where real access scores are shown in the upper plots and spooﬁng attacks in the
lower ones. As explained in Section 3.1, the central bar of each box is the median of the client
scores. Its upper and lower edges represent the 75th and the 25th percentile of the scores,
respectively, while the whiskers extend to the most extreme non-outlier score values. The
plots also include the decision threshold determined using EER criteria on the development
set. On each of the ﬁgures, the upper plots show the scores of real access samples while the
lower plots show the scores of spooﬁng attacks.
The box plots for the client-independent approaches demonstrate a high variability of the
scores of different clients, as already shown in Section 3.1 and Fig. 3.3. Certain clients exhibit a
score distribution which are signiﬁcantly misaligned compared to the score distributions of
the majority of clients, especially for the real access scores for the LBP and HOG features. This
suggests the existence of client-speciﬁc score variations for the client-independent baseline,
which makes a single decision threshold for all clients and samples a suboptimal choice. While
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Figure 6.6: Box plots of the scores obtained with generative anti-spooﬁng methods: LBP
features. Upper plots: scores of real access samples; lower plots: scores of spooﬁng attacks.
The horizontal green line depicts the decision threshold on the development set.
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Figure 6.7: Box plots of the scores obtained with generative anti-spooﬁng methods: LBP-TOP
features. Upper plots: scores of real access samples; lower plots: scores of spooﬁng attacks.
The horizontal green line depicts the decision threshold on the development set.
the misalignment of the score distributions are not that prominent for the LBP-TOP features,
the separability between the real access and spooﬁng attack scores is poor.
On the contrary, the client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng methods show a much better alignment of
the score distributions both for the real access and spooﬁng attack samples. Besides having
similar values across all the clients, the medians of box plots are often further away from the
decision threshold, like for example, for the LBP-TOP features. This justiﬁes the employment
of a single decision threshold for all clients in client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng methods.
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Figure 6.8: Box plots of the scores obtained with generative anti-spooﬁng methods: MOTION
features. Upper plots: scores of real access samples; lower plots: scores of spooﬁng attacks.
The horizontal green line depicts the decision threshold on the development set.
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Client identity
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
(a) Client-independent
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Client identity
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
(b) Client-speciﬁc
Figure 6.9: Box plots of the scores obtained with generative anti-spooﬁng methods: HOG
features. Upper plots: scores of real access samples; lower plots: scores of spooﬁng attacks.
The horizontal green line depicts the decision threshold on the development set.
We extend the intra-protocol evaluation by performing experiments using Print, Digital-Photo
and Video protocols, as well as pairwise combinations of these protocols. The results of the
comparison of the client-independent and client-speciﬁc approaches under these protocols
are given in terms of HTER on the test set on Fig. 6.10. For all the types of features, they are
in favor of the client-speciﬁc approach in all the protocols. Furthermore, the client-speciﬁc
approach achieves a relative advantage of over 50% on several protocols with LBP, LBP-TOP
and HOG features.
81
Chapter 6. Application to Face Veriﬁcation
Print Digital-Photo Video Print +
DPhoto
Print +
Video
DPhoto +
Video
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
H
TE
R
(%
)
(a) LBP features
Print Digital-Photo Video Print +
DPhoto
Print +
Video
DPhoto +
Video
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
16.0
H
TE
R
(%
)
(b) LBP-TOP features
Print Digital-Photo Video Print +
DPhoto
Print +
Video
DPhoto +
Video
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
16.0
H
TE
R
(%
)
(c) MOTION features
Print Digital-Photo Video Print +
DPhoto
Print +
Video
DPhoto +
Video
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
H
TE
R
(%
)
(d) HOG features
Figure 6.10: Intra-protocol evaluation of generative anti-spooﬁng systems. : client-
independent approach,: client-speciﬁc approach.
Cross-protocol evaluation. The results of the cross-protocol evaluation of the generative
client-independent and client-speciﬁc systems are given in Fig. 6.11. They are given in terms
of HTER on the test set on the protocol which has not been used during training. The bin labels
correspond to the protocol used for evaluation. For example, the ﬁrst two bins on each plot
present the results of a system trained with Digital-Photo and Video protocol and evaluated
on the Print protocol.
Similarly to the results of the intra-protocol evaluation, the client-speciﬁc approach outper-
form the client-independent one by a large margin. A relative advantage of ∼50% is common
for LBP, LBP-TOP and HOG features. However, the MOTION features behave differently and
the client-speciﬁc approach performs only moderately better than the client-independent
one. This may suggest that MOTION features capture less client-speciﬁc information than the
other features.
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Figure 6.11: Cross-protocol evaluation of generative anti-spooﬁng systems. : client-
independent approach,: client-speciﬁc approach.
6.2.2 Discriminative Client-Speciﬁc Approach
For the analysis of the discriminative client-speciﬁc approaches, we ﬁrst discuss the parameter
selection, as well as the choice of the SVM kernel. Then, we perform a comparison of client-
speciﬁc and client-independent approaches in their best setup, on different protocols in intra-
and cross-protocol evaluations.
Parameter and SVM kernel selection. The key hyper-parameter for any SVM is the constant
C regularizing the boundary between the two classes. The results of the performed grid
parameter search show that for the client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng systems, this parameter
does not play a signiﬁcant role and the results change only marginally with the change of
C . Therefore, in all of the experiments,C = 1. An exception are the HOG features, where for
certain protocols, best results are achieved with larger values ofC (C = 100).
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We examined SVM with different kernels: RBF, polynomial, χ2 and histogram intersection
kernel. For the RBF kernel, the parameter γ has the biggest impact and values which are the
inverse of the number of samples give the best results. Yet, other values of γ give similar results.
For the polynomial kernel, the most important parameter is the degree d . Best results are
achieved with d = 3 for LBP, d = 5 for LBP-TOP and d = 4 for MOTION and HOG. Table 6.2
gives the results of the discriminative client-speciﬁc approach using different types of kernels
and their optimal parameters.
Table 6.2: Comparison of different SVM kernels for discriminative client-speciﬁc approach on
Grandtest protocol (HTER in %)
RBF Polynomial Chi-2 Intersection
Features dev test dev test dev test dev test
LBP 10.02 9.87 14.22 13.79 16.75 14.96 12.39 11.44
LBP-TOP 3.71 3.95 4.88 5.05 3.61 3.60 2.83 2.85
MOTION 10.18 11.27 9.29 9.27 9.16 9.99 10.24 10.35
HOG 5.99 6.83 14.83 23.19 25.93 30.03 11.4 10.6
Several of the existing implementation of SVM process χ2 and histogram intersection kernels
by prior computing of the full kernel matrix K 4. Depending on the number of training samples,
this operation can require an extensive amount of memory. This limitation can be overcome
using kernel approximations, like the Nyström method [Williams and Seeger, 2001]. Instead
of computing inner products in high-dimensional space, the kernel approximations learn
an explicit feature map to project the features in that space. The projected features can
then be trained using linear SVM. The Nyström method enables to compute the feature map
using just a random subset of the available training samples. It is important to note that the
results in Table 6.2 are obtained using a subset of 1000 training samples for χ2 and histogram
intersection kernel. Better results may be expected if more samples are used.
According to Table 6.2, the best results for LBP and HOG features are obtained using RBF kernel.
Although both of these features have a histogram form, the kernels designated for histogram
feature spaces, like χ2 and histogram intersection kernel, exhibit inferior performance. We
emphasize once again that this might be due to the random sub-sampling of the training set.
On the other hand, the approximated χ2 and histogram intersection kernels perform better
for LBP-TOP features, despite the reduced training set. Among them, histogram intersection
kernel performs better. Finally, for MOTION features, polynomial kernel performs the best on
the test set, but if we consider the development set to select the best performing method, we
should choose χ2 kernel.
Intra-protocol evaluation. A comparison between discriminative client-independent and
client-speciﬁc methods is ﬁrst done in an intra-protocol evaluation. The given results are
4In particular, the software package scikit-learn (https://scikit-learn.org) was used for this purpose [Pe-
dregosa et al., 2011]
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obtained using RBF kernel for LBP and HOG features, histogram intersection kernel for LBP-
TOP features and χ2 kernel for MOTION features. The optimal parameters for each of the
kernels are found with grid parameter search.
Table 6.3 shows the results for the Grandtest protocol. The results conﬁrm that, in the dis-
criminative case, the client-speciﬁc method signiﬁcantly outperforms the client-independent
one, both on the development and test set. For LBP, LBP-TOP and HOG features, the relative
improvement is particularly high: 36%, 49% and 29%, respectively. Although to a lesser extent,
the client-speciﬁc method performs better also for MOTION features.
Table 6.3: Performance of discriminative client-independent and client-speciﬁc approaches
on Grandtest protocol (error rates in %)
Client-independent Client-speciﬁc
dev test dev test
Features EER FAR FRR HTER EER FAR FRR HTER
LBP 14.56 9.56 21.29 15.42 10.02 8.18 11.53 9.86
LBP-TOP 5.55 4.01 7.28 5.64 2.83 1.76 3.94 2.85
MOTION 9.8 12.08 8.67 10.38 9.16 10.11 9.87 9.99
HOG 7.69 8.11 11.29 9.7 5.99 5.52 8.14 6.83
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Figure 6.12: Box plots of the scores obtained with discriminative anti-spooﬁng methods: LBP
features. The horizontal green line depicts the decision threshold on the development set.
The box plots comparing the client scores of the discriminative approaches are given in
Fig. 6.12, Fig. 6.13, Fig. 6.14 and Fig. 6.15. Similar values of the medians and uniform box sizes
for all clients on Fig. 6.12b, Fig. 6.13b and Fig. 6.15b justify the advantage of the client-speciﬁc
approach for LBP, LBP-TOP and HOG features. This is especially true for the real access scores.
Greater separability of the two classes and less extended whiskers can be observed as well.
Fig. 6.14 reveals no signiﬁcant improvement of the box plot layout for the client-speciﬁc
approaches for the MOTION features.
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Figure 6.13: Box plots of the scores obtained with discriminative anti-spooﬁng methods: LBP-
TOP features. The horizontal green line depicts the decision threshold on the development
set.
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Figure 6.14: Box plots of the scores obtained with discriminative anti-spooﬁng methods: MO-
TION features. The horizontal green line depicts the decision threshold on the development
set.
The advantage of the client-speciﬁc discriminative approach is further indicated on Fig. 6.16,
illustrating the results of the intra-protocol experiments on the Print, Digital-Photo and Video
protocols, as well as on their pairwise combinations. It is notably signiﬁcant for LBP, LBP-
TOP and HOG features, where the relative improvement is ∼ 50% for many of the protocols,
and reaches up to 83% and 88% for the Print protocol for LBP and LBP-TOP, respectively.
Interestingly, the MOTION features present the only case where the client-independent and
client-speciﬁc approaches perform on similar scale on few of the protocols, with the client-
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Figure 6.15: Box plots of the scores obtained with discriminative anti-spooﬁng methods: HOG
features. The horizontal green line depicts the decision threshold on the development set.
independent one being better for the Video protocol. It is important to emphasize that
MOTION features behave similarly in the case of the generative approaches as well, indicating
less client-speciﬁc information retained in these features.
Cross-protocol evaluation. The results of the cross-protocol evaluation of the discrimina-
tive anti-spooﬁng systems is given in Fig. 6.17. Similarly as for the intra-protocol evaluation,
RBF kernel is used for LBP and HOG features, while histogram intersection and χ2 kernels is
used for the LBP-TOP and MOTION features, respectively.
Consistently to what is shown by Pereira et al. [2013], for most of the protocols the discrimi-
native client-independent approach exhibits unacceptable spooﬁng vulnerability when con-
fronted with spooﬁng attacks that has not been seen during training. For example, when the
system is trained with Digital-Photo and Video protocol, it misses the detection of over 35%
of the spooﬁng attacks of the Print protocol for all the features. Although slightly better, the
performance is still unsatisfactory for other cross-protocol evaluation scenarios.
The client-speciﬁc discriminative anti-spooﬁng method overcomes these problems. HTER
of the attacks that have not been used during training is reduced to 5-10% on LBP, ∼ 5% on
LBP-TOP features and 5-17% on HOG features. Signiﬁcant improvement is noted for the
MOTION protocol as well, except for the scenario where the system is trained using Print and
Digital-Photo protocols and tested using Video protocol. This might be due to the fact that
from the point of view of the MOTION features, there is practically no difference between the
motion patterns of a live client and a re-captured video of the same client.
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Figure 6.16: Intra-protocol evaluation of discriminative anti-spooﬁng systems. : client-
independent approach,: client-speciﬁc approach.
6.2.3 Summary
The experimental evaluation shows that the client-speciﬁc approaches greatly improve the
performance of their client-independent counterparts, both for the generative and discrimina-
tive approaches. Depending on the features and the protocol, the relative improvement goes
to more than 50%. More importantly, the client-speciﬁc approaches signiﬁcantly outperform
the client-independent ones in cross-protocol evaluation too. A explanation may be the fact
that, as the box plots show, the client-speciﬁc approaches generate real access scores per client
which are more aligned and better separated from the spooﬁng attacks.
The client-speciﬁc approaches bring bigger improvement for features which are based on
visual appearance, like LBP, LBP-TOP and HOG. The MOTION features appear to be more
client-independent.
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Figure 6.17: Cross-protocol evaluation of discriminative anti-spooﬁng systems. : client-
independent approach,: client-speciﬁc approach.
To observe whether generative or discriminative client-speciﬁc approach performs better, we
compare their HTER on the test set of the Grandtest protocol in Table 6.4. For all the studied
features, the discriminative approach appears to be more powerful. The advantage is more
prominent for LBP-TOP and HOG features.
Table 6.4: Comparison of client-speciﬁc generative and discriminative approaches (HTER in
%)
Features Generative Discriminative
LBP 10.01 9.86
LGB-TOP 6.29 2.85
MOTION 10.16 9.99
HOG 8.62 6.83
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6.3 Output-level Integration
In this section, we present the results of the output-level integration of face veriﬁcation and
anti-spooﬁng systems, using the decision-level and score-level fusion methods described
in Section 4.2. The case studies used to evaluate the output-level integration include com-
binations of four face veriﬁcation systems (UBMGMM, LGBPHS, GJet and ISV) described
in Section 6.1.2 and four face anti-spooﬁng features (LBP, LBP-TOP, MOTION and HOG) de-
scribed in Section 6.1.1. The case studies are applied on Replay-Attack database, using its
Grandtest protocol.
The presented evaluation has two major objectives. The ﬁrst one is to show how output-level
integration with an anti-spooﬁng system affects the performance of a biometric veriﬁcation
system. The second one is to compare different strategies for fusion of biometric veriﬁcation
and anti-spooﬁng systems, both in terms of veriﬁcation performance and vulnerability to
spooﬁng of the ﬁnal fused system. In addition, the experiments include comparison of fused
systems with respect to whether the anti-spooﬁng system is client-independent or client-
speciﬁc.
The evaluation is performed using evaluation methodologies described in Section 5.2 and
Section 5.3, in particular Evaluation Methodology 2 and EPS framework. Using the two evalua-
tion methodologies side by side, we aim to demonstrate the advantage of EPS and emphasize
its ﬁtness for evaluation of biometric veriﬁcation systems under spooﬁng attacks. Therefore,
throughout some of the experiments, the comparison of the two evaluation methodologies
will be stated and intermixed with the evaluation results.
We commence the analysis by stating the performance of the baseline face veriﬁcation systems
in Section 6.3.1 prior to fusion with an anti-spooﬁng system. Fused systems are compared
in 6.3.2. We would like to emphasize that, due to the large number of case studies that are
possible to create by combining four face veriﬁcation systems, four anti-spooﬁng systems
and ﬁve fusion methods, only partial analysis covering a subset of the case studies is given.
However, by using the freely available software package bob.thesis.ichingo2015, one can
reproduce all the results given in this section and extend the analysis to other case studies.
6.3.1 Performance of Baseline Face Veriﬁcation Systems
Before analyzing the effect of fusion of face veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng, we give the per-
formance of four baseline face veriﬁcation systems, using both Evaluation Methodology 2
described in Section 5.2 and EPS framework proposed in Section 5.3. As part of the analysis,
we compare the conclusions delivered by the two evaluation methodologies.
The score distributions of the four systems are given in Fig. 6.18. The plots given in Fig. 6.19
represent the DET curves for the licit and the spoof scenario for each of the systems. When
using the licit scenario, we obtain a DET curve showing the trade-off between FAR and FRR
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when no spooﬁng attacks are present. On the other hand, when using the spoof scenario, we
can plot an additional DET curve showing the trade-off between SFAR and FRR and ignoring
the existence of zero-effort impostors.
-1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0
Veriﬁcation scores
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
C
ou
nt
0
20
40
60
80
100
S
FA
R
(%
)
91.5%
(a) UBMGMM
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
Veriﬁcation scores
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
C
ou
nt
0
20
40
60
80
100
S
FA
R
(%
)
88.5%
(b) LGBPHS
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Veriﬁcation scores
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
C
ou
nt
0
20
40
60
80
100
S
FA
R
(%
)
95.0%
(c) GJet
-1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0
Veriﬁcation scores
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
C
ou
nt
0
20
40
60
80
100
S
FA
R
(%
)
92.6%
(d) ISV
Figure 6.18: Score distribution plots for baseline face veriﬁcation systems using Evaluation
Methodology 2.
To assess the veriﬁcation performance of a system using Evaluation Methodology 2, we de-
termine a decision threshold using the EER criteria and considering only the licit scenario.
The vertical lines in Fig. 6.18 correspond to the thresholds for the various systems. Using this
decision threshold, we can compute and report FRR, FAR and SFAR. These values for the four
baseline systems are given in Table 6.5.
The results show that all the four systems perform well in the veriﬁcation task. Fig. 6.18 justiﬁes
the results: the score distributions for the genuine users and impostors are almost perfectly
separated. However, if we keep the decision threshold selected at EER on the development
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Figure 6.19: Performance of baseline face veriﬁcation systemsusingDET curves andEvaluation
Methodology 2
Table 6.5: Performance of baseline face veriﬁcation systems using Evaluation Methodology 2
(in %)
system FAR FRR HTER SFAR
UBMGMM 0.05 0.24 0.14 91.54
LGBPHS 1.47 2.13 1.8 88.52
GJet 0.28 0.24 0.26 94.98
ISV 0.00 0.17 0.08 92.58
set for the licit protocol, the systems exhibit a great vulnerability to spooﬁng of around 90%.
The results come with no surprise: as suggested by Fig. 6.18, the baseline face veriﬁcation
systems appear to belong to the categories susceptible or vulnerable to spooﬁng attacks.
Using Evaluation Methodology 2, ISV, with 0.08% of HTER seems to perform the best in
the veriﬁcation task. At the same time, GJet, with 94.98% of SFAR, appears to be the most
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vulnerable to spooﬁng among all the systems. These values are obtained only for a threshold
which does not assume any spooﬁng attacks to be possible.
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Figure 6.20: EPSC to compare baseline face veriﬁcation systems
We now proceed with EPS evaluation of the systems. The EPSC given in Fig. 6.20, report
HTERω and SFAR for a threshold which considers the relative probability of spooﬁng attacks,
encoded in the parameter ω. Analyzing the EPSC for the four baseline systems, we come to
different conclusions. Comparing the HTERω values in Fig. 6.20a, we observe that ISV is best
performing only as long as the spooﬁng attacks appear with a very small probability. After a
certain value of ω, GJet shows the best performance. The same applies to the vulnerability to
spooﬁng (Fig. 6.20b): while being the most vulnerable when ω≈ 0, GJet displays the smallest
values of SFAR for larger values of ω.
Keeping in mind the conclusions from above, we can discuss two advantages of EPSC over
Evaluation Methodology 2. Firstly, it overcomes the exclusiveness in analyzing only zero-effort
impostors or spooﬁng attacks at a time, which is a feature of Evaluation Methodology 2. The
HTERω summarizes all the three error rates (FRR, FAR and SFAR) into a single value, combining
them based on their cost or the prior of the input classes. Secondly, it rectiﬁes the bias that
Evaluation Methodology 2 demonstrates by neglecting the spooﬁng attacks that may appear.
Although this may increase the value of HTERω (EPSC is usually ascending for HTERω), it is
going to greatly improve the systems vulnerability to spooﬁng (EPSC is descending for SFAR),
especially in conditions where spooﬁng attacks are highly probable. Finally, by selecting an a
priori threshold, EPSC allows to objectively compare several systems on the same ﬁgure.
The superiority of GJet system which can be visually observed on Fig. 6.20a, can be further
conﬁrmed by the value AUE = 0.117. In comparison, AUE = 0.1581 for ISV, which appears to be
the second best system.
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6.3.2 Performance of Fused Systems
We continue the analysis by comparing the performance of fused face veriﬁcation and anti-
spooﬁng systems. The comparison is done with respect to the fusion method and whether
client-independent or client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng system was used. Due to space constraints,
for many of the experiments we give the ﬁgures only for speciﬁc case studies involving a
preselected face veriﬁcation algorithm, which is GJet, as the best performing system from the
experiment in Section 6.3.1. From this point onward, all the results will be evaluated using
only EPS framework.
Comparison of Fusion Methods
To compare the fusion methods, we rely on case studies with the following speciﬁcations:
• GJet for face veriﬁcation;
• client-speciﬁc discriminative system for anti-spooﬁng;
• LBP, LBP-TOP, MOTION and HOG anti-spooﬁng features.
Table 6.6 gives the AUE values for the fusion methods. Comparing these values with AUE
value of the baseline GJet system, which is 0.117, we can notice that all the score-level fusion
methods yield a signiﬁcant improvement. For example, the AUE value dropped to 0.0191 for
the system fused with LBP-TOP counter-measure and GMM fusion rule. The decision-level
fusion method, with AUE value similar to the one of the baseline, is a notable exception,
Therefore, we will treat the case of decision-level fusion method separately.
The improvement of the performance after score-level fusion is further reﬂected on the EPSC
for the fused systems, shown in Fig. 6.21, Fig. 6.22, Fig. 6.23 and Fig. 6.24 for different features. It
is important to note the considerable drop of HTERω and SFAR with respect to the baseline. As
ω increases, meaning that spooﬁng attacks are given greater role in determining the decision
threshold, HTERω increases, but not as steep as in the case of the baseline system.
To compare systems using their vulnerability to spooﬁng as a criteria, we look at the SFAR plots
shown in Fig. 6.21b, Fig. 6.22b, Fig. 6.23b, and Fig. 6.24b. We notice that, with respect to this
criteria, ω has a big impact on the score-level fusion strategies. The vulnerability to spooﬁng
for all systems fused at score-level is very high when ω ≈ 0, as the spooﬁng attacks have a
very small contribution in determining the decision threshold. As ω increases, mirroring
the consideration of SFAR in the computation of the decision threshold, the vulnerability to
spooﬁng of the systems decreases very quickly. For large values of ω, the score-level fusion
methods have very low vulnerability to spooﬁng. In fact, when comparing SFAR using EPSC,
and considering thatωmay be associated with the probability of spooﬁng attacks, is important
that SFAR is small for large values of ω. Due to the same reason, large vulnerability to spooﬁng
attacks for small values of ω can be considered as less harmful.
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Table 6.6: AUE values for fused systems: GJet face veriﬁcation and discriminative client-
speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng method (in %). AUE = 0.117 for the baseline GJet system
SUM LR PLR GMM AND
LBP 0.0531 0.0526 0.0542 0.0513 0.1024
LBP-TOP 0.0215 0.0223 0.022 0.0191 0.1143
MOTION 0.0569 0.0511 0.0498 0.0411 0.1786
HOG 0.0564 0.0518 0.1259 0.0501 0.0957
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Figure 6.21: Comparison of score-level fusion methods using EPSC: LBP features
In general, the GMM fusion rule yields the smallest AUE value for any of the anti-spooﬁng
features. This can be also observed in Fig. 6.21a, Fig. 6.22a, Fig. 6.23a and Fig. 6.24a, comparing
the EPSC for HTERω. GMM fusion rule yields superior results over the full range ofω. However,
EPSC for SFAR shows that in particular cases other fusion methods may yield fused systems
with better robustness to spooﬁng attacks. This is the case, for example, for LBP-TOP features,
where better robustness to spooﬁng can be achieved by using SUM and LR fusion methods
for small values of ω. Similar is the case of MOTION features, where SUM fusion method
performs the best in terms of SFAR when ω< 0.4.
The presented analysis reveals that the conclusions emerging from EPSC depend on different
factors. First, they depend on the the selected criteria to be analyzed, like HTERω or SFAR.
Furthermore, the error rates vary over the range of ω, and different methods may prevail for
different values of ω. Thanks to this property, EPSC enables one to select the method which
performs the best for the preferred value of ω.
We continue the analysis by comparing the best performing score-level fusion method in
terms of AUE, GMM, with the decision-level fusion method based on logical AND. Due to
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Figure 6.22: Comparison of score-level fusion methods using EPSC: LBP-TOP features
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Figure 6.23: Comparison of score-level fusion methods using EPSC: MOTION features
space constraints, we adhere just to LBP-TOP anti-spooﬁng features. The EPSC comparing the
fused systems is shown in Fig. 6.25.
Fig. 6.25a showing the EPSC for HTERω conﬁrms the conclusion derived from the comparison
of AUE values in Table 6.6: AND fusion rule performs on similar scale as the baseline system.
However, Fig. 6.25b reveals that the system fused with AND fusion rule exhibits impressively
low vulnerability to spooﬁng, compared to both the baseline system, aswell as the system fused
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Figure 6.24: Comparison of score-level fusion methods using EPSC: HOG features
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Figure 6.25: Comparison of score-level and decision-level fusion methods using EPSC: LBP-
TOP features
with GMM fusion method. The reason becomes evident if we analyze the score distribution
plots of the face veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems, given in Fig. 6.26a and Fig. 6.26b,
respectively. The ﬁgures show what was clariﬁed in Section 4.2 and Table 4.1: the veriﬁcation
system is trained to reject zero-effort impostors, while the anti-spooﬁng system is trained to
reject spooﬁng attacks. Hence the large overlap of genuine users and spooﬁng attacks for the
veriﬁcation system in Fig. 6.26a, and of the zero-effort impostors and spooﬁng attacks for the
97
Chapter 6. Application to Face Veriﬁcation
anti-spooﬁng system in Fig. 6.26b. As ω increases, the increased importance of the spooﬁng
attacks for the face veriﬁcation system causes a threshold that results in increased FRR. At
the same time, the increase of ω does not affect the FRR for the anti-spooﬁng system, but
contributes to low SFAR. In total, after fusion with logical AND, the FRR, and hence HTERω
remains similar to the one for the baseline face veriﬁcation system, while SFAR becomes low.
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Figure 6.26: Score distributions of face veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems
Fusion with Client-Independent and Client-Speciﬁc Anti-spooﬁng Systems
In Section 6.2, we showed that the client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng methods undoubtedly out-
perform the client-independent ones in most of the cases. In the following experiment, we
compare client-independent and client-speciﬁc systems in a context of a face veriﬁcation
system they are fused with. The comparison is done on case studies with the following
speciﬁcations:
• GJet for face veriﬁcation;
• LBP, LBP-TOP, MOTION and HOG anti-spooﬁng features;
• discriminative anti-spooﬁng systems;
• best performing fusion method in terms of AUE (LR for client-independent systems
based on HOG, GMM for all the rest).
The best performing fusion methods for the systems based on client-independent counter-
measure were found in a separate experiment, the detailed results of which are not reported.
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Figure 6.27: Comparison of systems fusedwith client-independent and client-speciﬁcmethods
using EPSC: LBP features
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Figure 6.28: Comparison of systems fusedwith client-independent and client-speciﬁcmethods
using EPSC: LBP-TOP features
Fig. 6.27, Fig. 6.28, Fig. 6.29 and Fig. 6.30 show the EPSC plots for the four anti-spooﬁng
features. The EPSC for HTERω shown in Fig. 6.27a, Fig. 6.28a, Fig. 6.29a and Fig. 6.30a support
the superiority of the client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng methods. This time, it is conﬁrmed for a
wide range of decision thresholds which depend on the parameter ω.
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Figure 6.29: Comparison of systems fusedwith client-independent and client-speciﬁcmethods
using EPSC: MOTION features
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Figure 6.30: Comparison of systems fusedwith client-independent and client-speciﬁcmethods
using EPSC: HOG features
The advantage of the systems fused with client-speciﬁc counter-measure can be explained
by the scatter plots of the face veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng scores, shown in Fig. 6.31. The
ﬁgure compares the scatter plots when using client-independent and client-speciﬁc counter-
measure based on LBP-TOP.
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(a) client-independent anti-spooﬁng system (b) client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng system
Figure 6.31: Scatter plots of face veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng system scores
We draw the attention to zero-effort impostor scores on Fig. 6.31b, which visually appear to
be displaced lower with respect to the zero-effort impostor scores on Fig. 6.31a. Although
particularly trained to assign low scores to spooﬁng attacks, the client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng
system assigns low scores also to the zero-effort impostors. Having a wrong identity claim
at input, the client-speciﬁc system compares the zero-effort impostor samples to the anti-
spooﬁng model of another client, which results in a low anti-spooﬁng score. In this sense, the
anti-spooﬁng system partially performs a veriﬁcation task as well, which appears to be highly
beneﬁcial to the overall performance of the fused system.
With respect to the vulnerability to spooﬁng shown in Fig. 6.27b, Fig. 6.28b, Fig. 6.29b and
Fig. 6.30b the systems fused with client-independent counter-measure perform better than
the client-speciﬁc ones for LBP and HOG features. This applies also to LBP-TOP and MOTION
features, but only for ω < 0.1. The client-speciﬁc approaches regain their advantage when
more importance is given to SFAR. We emphasize that better robustness to spooﬁng is more
important for large values of ω.
Comparison of Fused and Baseline Systems
We ﬁnalize the experiments by comparing the performance of the baseline face veriﬁcation
systems before and after they are fused with a spooﬁng counter-measure. We consider case
studies with the following conﬁguration:
• UBMGMM, LGBPHS, GJet and ISV for face veriﬁcation;
• LBP-TOP anti-spooﬁng features;
101
Chapter 6. Application to Face Veriﬁcation
• client-speciﬁc discriminative system for anti-spooﬁng;
• GMM for fusion.
According to the experiments previously presented in this section, GMM performs the best
as a fusion strategy for GJet face veriﬁcation and LBP-TOP client-speciﬁc discriminative anti-
spooﬁng system. In a similar analysis, the results of which are omitted, we found GMM to
be the best performing fusion strategy also for UBMGMM, LGBPHS and ISV face veriﬁcation
systems. This is the reason why it is the fusion strategy of choice for this experiment. The AUE
values of the baseline and fused methods are given in Table 6.7.
Table 6.7: AUE values for face veriﬁcation systems before and after fusion with anti-spooﬁng
system
system AUE of baseline AUE of GMM fused system
UBMGMM 0.1615 0.0196
LGBPHS 0.1622 0.0328
GJet 0.117 0.0191
ISV 0.1581 0.0183
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Figure 6.32: Comparison of baseline (dashed line) and fused (full line) systems
Fig. 6.32 presents the EPSC plots comparing the fused and the baseline systems. The plots
convey a similar message as the AUE values: fusion brings a considerable improvement over
the baseline systems. As shown in Fig. 6.32a, the baseline and the fused systems behave
similarly for small values of ω. It appears that, in some cases, the baseline system even
performs better in terms of HTERω when ω≈ 0. As the prior of spooﬁng attacks is small at this
point, fusion with spooﬁng counter-measure only undesirably increases HTERω. However,
with the increase of ω, the baseline systems note a drastic rise of HTERω. Contrary to the
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expectations and as can be concluded from the descending curves in Fig. 6.32b, this is not due
to increased vulnerability to spooﬁng. Rather, it is a result of FRR which increases with ω due
to the highly overlapping score distributions for genuine users and spooﬁng attacks for the
baselines, as shown in Fig. 6.18.
Being secured with anti-spooﬁng methods, the rise of HTERω for the fused systems is mild
across the full range of ω. This can be explained by their score distribution plots shown in
Fig. 6.33. Compared to the plots for the baseline systems given in Fig. 6.18, the fused systems
have a spooﬁng attack score distribution which is shifted towards the zero-effort impostor
score distribution, which is a desirable property of trustworthy veriﬁcation system. Fusion
is thus bringing systems which are otherwise categorized as vulnerable or susceptible to
spooﬁng attacks, towards the category of systems robust to spooﬁng attacks.
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Figure 6.33: Score distribution plots for fused systems
As shown in Fig. 6.32b, the vulnerability to spooﬁng goes up to unacceptable levels of ≈ 90%
for baseline systems. In comparison, the vulnerability to spooﬁng is up to 10 times lower, even
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when ω is small and there is little impact of the spooﬁng attacks on the decision threshold.
More importantly, with the increase of ω, the vulnerability to spooﬁng attacks drops even
further to below 5% for all the systems. As was emphasized several times throughout this
thesis, lower SFAR is particularly important for high values of ω.
Finally, Fig. 6.34 gives a closer look at the fused systems only. According to the AUE values given
in Table 6.7, the system based on ISV performs the best. However, Fig. 6.34a shows that the
systems based on ISV and GJet face veriﬁcation are interchangeably better for different values
of ω. Similarly to other example before, this example illustrates how EPSC enables to select
the best system based on the expected prior or cost of spooﬁng attacks for a given application.
In this case, the system based on ISV will be the recommended choice for applications where
ω< 0.8, and GJet otherwise. As shown in Fig. 6.34b, the system based on GJet also exhibits
higher robustness to spooﬁng than ISV for ω> 0.1
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Figure 6.34: Comparison of fused systems
6.3.3 Summary
The presented evaluations show the vulnerability of several state-of-the-art face veriﬁcation
systems to spooﬁng attacks. More importantly, they demonstrate how these vulnerabilities
can be diminished by fusing face veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng system at output-level. The
performance of the fused systems depends on several factors, like the face veriﬁcation and
anti-spooﬁng systems which are tested, as well as the fusion mechanism.
Integral and fair comparison of biometric veriﬁcation systems under spooﬁng attacks can be
achieved using EPS framework. Using this framework, we show the beneﬁts of considering
different levels of relative importance of the spooﬁng attacks, coded into the parameter ω.
Two systems may be interchangeably better in terms of performance for two different ranges
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of the values of ω. This is the case, for example, for the fused systems based on ISV and GJet.
The EPS framework enables comparison of systems based on different criteria, like HTERω or
SFAR.
Using EPSC, we can verify that the increased robustness to spooﬁng attacks obtained by fusion
does not compromise the system’s veriﬁcation performance. Indeed, for the majority of fused
systems, the overall performance of the system represented by HTERω is signiﬁcantly better
than that of the baselines. For some systems, exceptions happen for very small values of ω,
signifying very low importance of spooﬁng attacks. In such cases, anti-spooﬁng systems are
not necessary and unprotected baseline veriﬁcation systems should be used instead.
6.4 Discussion
The integration concepts for biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems at input and
output-level were illustrated using case studies for the face mode. They involve state-of-the-
art face veriﬁcation systems and anti-spooﬁng features. To perform the evaluation, we used
widely accepted evaluation methodologies, as well as the novel EPS framework developed
speciﬁcally for integrated evaluation of veriﬁcation systems under spooﬁng attacks.
We would like to emphasize that performing experiments for all the possible case studies
that could be built upon the considered face veriﬁcation, anti-spooﬁng and fusion methods
is not an easily feasible task. Therefore, in this chapter we presented the results only of a
subset of the case studies. The presented case studies were selected so that they effectively
demonstrate the advantages of input-level integration and the importance of output-level
integration. Furthermore, they are designed to appropriately illustrate the convenience of
use of EPS framework for evaluation of biometric veriﬁcation systems under spooﬁng attacks.
More extensive analysis covering a broader set of case studies can be done using the freely
available software package bob.thesis.ichingo2015.
One of the objectives of the experiments presented in this chapter is to demonstrate the
necessity for integrated evaluation of biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems. The
results point out that the performance of the fused system depends on all the three involved
methods: the biometric veriﬁcation, anti-spooﬁng and fusion. It is difﬁcult to anticipate the
performance of an integrated system by evaluating them independently. For example, while
one face-veriﬁcation system may perform better than the other when operating independently,
the situation might change once they are fused with an anti-spooﬁng system.
Some of the experiments presented in this chapter are focused on comparing the EPS frame-
work with other evaluation methodologies. They reveal that using other evaluation method-
ologies may lead to suboptimal decision thresholds and biased conclusions. Evaluation per-
formed with the EPS framework enables to consider different aspects related to the integrated
operation of biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems, like its overall performance or
vulnerability to spooﬁng attacks. More importantly, by accounting for the probability or the
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cost of different inputs, it enables putting the system into the context where it is going to be
deployed and take versatile decisions about the best method to use.
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At the present degree of maturity, many veriﬁcation systems are highly vulnerable to spooﬁng
attacks. Effective counter-measures are thus of essential importance for the development of
trustworthy biometric veriﬁcation systems. The topic has been gaining increasing popularity,
resulting in a plethora of anti-spooﬁng methods appointed for different biometric modes and
targeting different types of spooﬁng attacks.
The objective of this thesis is to address the integration of biometric veriﬁcation and anti-
spooﬁng systems. The ﬁrst step in the process is to recognize and highlight the necessity
of cooperation between the two types of systems as a fundamental issue to the process of
deploying them in realistic conditions. We identify three points of integration situated along
the biometric veriﬁcation pipeline. With respect to these points, the integration can be
performed at input-level, output-level and at evaluation.
At input-level, the integration is concerned with sharing the information that the biometric
veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems use. In particular, we refer to the enrollment samples
which biometric veriﬁcation systems use to create client models, as well as the identity claim
which they use at query time. We investigate how making this information accessible by the
anti-spooﬁng system affects its performance.
Output-level integration is important for consolidating the results of the biometric veriﬁcation
and anti-spooﬁng systems into a single decision. Analyzing several multiple expert fusion
approaches, we study what is the impact of the fusion methods on the performance of the
ﬁnal system.
At evaluation level, we investigate whether independent evaluation of biometric veriﬁcation
and anti-spooﬁng systems is sufﬁcient and we argue that integrated evaluation is of major
importance for selecting the most adequate system for certain application. Highlighting the
limitations of current evaluation methodologies, we propose a novel framework for evaluating
biometric veriﬁcation systems under spooﬁng attacks, referred to as EPS.
The achievements of this thesis and the conclusions drawn from the experimental results are
107
Chapter 7. Conclusions
summarized in Section 7.1. The limitations of the proposed methods and the prospects for
future work are discussed in Section 7.3.
7.1 Experimental Findings and Achievements
Experimental evaluation of the integration concepts covered in this thesis was performed at
input-level and output-level, using the newly proposed framework for integrated evaluation.
All the experiments were performed on case studies involving veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng
methods for the face mode, as one of the most vulnerable biometric modes. In this setup, the
experimental results and the accompanying analysis conﬁrm that integration of biometric
veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems is beneﬁcial at all three levels and is of great importance
for creating trustworthy biometric systems.
Input-level integration. By unifying the information that biometric veriﬁcation and anti-
spooﬁng systems use at input, we are able to create client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng systems
which take the decision based not only on the input sample, but also on the client identity. We
built two types of client-speciﬁc systems. The ﬁrst one is based on a generative paradigm and
uses GMM to model real accesses for each client and spooﬁng attacks for a set of cohort clients.
The second one follows a discriminative principle and uses SVM to draw decision boundaries
between real accesses of each client and spooﬁng attacks from a set of cohort clients.
The evaluation of client-speciﬁc systems was performed with the objective to assess whether
input-level integration can bring improved performance on particular anti-spooﬁng features.
Comparison of anti-spooﬁng features, as well as attempts to outperform state-of-the-art
results which are obtained by combining different anti-spooﬁng features, is out of the scope
of this thesis.
The experimental results on Replay-Attack database lead to the following conclusions:
(a) Client-speciﬁc variations in the scores of client-independent anti-spooﬁng systems exist
for all tested anti-spooﬁng features. Client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng systems exhibit less
score variations between different clients.
(b) The performance of the client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng systems depend on several factors.
For the generative systems, most important factors are the number of Gaussian compo-
nents, as well as the selection of the cohort set. For the discriminative ones based on SVM,
the most important factor is the choice of kernel.
(c) Depending on the features and the database protocol, client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng sys-
tems can relatively improve the performance by more than 50%. In general, features based
on visual appearance seem to be better suited for client-speciﬁc systems than the ones
based on motion.
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(d) Client-speciﬁc systems exhibit signiﬁcantly better generalization in detecting types of
attacks which have not been seen during training time. Even in this case, the relative
improvement can be more than 50% for the visual appearance features. While client-
independent systems have unsatisfactory results on unseen types of attacks, the client-
speciﬁc ones can bring the HTER to less than 10% in some cases.
These conclusions are taken based on the four state-of-the-art features considered in this
thesis. More features need to be analyzed to be able to generalize the claims towhole categories
of anti-spooﬁng features.
Output-level integration. Biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems can be consid-
ered as experts in different domains: the former for recognizing identities, and the latter for
detecting counterfeit input samples. A veriﬁcation system robust to spooﬁng attacks can be
realized by output-level integration of the two systems and taking a multiple expert fusion
approach.
We performed experiments considering several fusion methods working on score-level and
decision-level. They lead to the following conclusions:
(a) Fusion generally helps to accomplish systems with greater robustness to spooﬁng without
compromising the veriﬁcation performance, regardless of the fusion strategy. However,
in our experiments, fusion based on GMM appears to be superior over the other fusion
strategies.
(b) The systems fused with client-speciﬁc counter-measure perform signiﬁcantly better than
the ones fused with client-independent one. Certainly, the most important reason is better
spooﬁng detection capabilities for the client-speciﬁc counter-measures. Another reason
is the fact that a client-speciﬁc counter-measure partially behaves as a veriﬁcation system,
giving low scores not only to spooﬁng attacks, but to zero-effort impostors as well.
(c) While unsatisfactory for baseline face veriﬁcation systems, the vulnerability to spooﬁng
attacks drops to below 5% after fusion with a spooﬁng counter-measure. At the same time,
the overall performance of the system, which is reported by accounting all the three types
of error rates, is signiﬁcantly improved as well. The improved results are likely to be a
consequence of the distribution of spooﬁng attack scores, which after fusion is shifted
towards the distribution of zero-effort impostors.
Once again, these conclusions emerge from the experiments conducted on the case studies
considered in this thesis. Fusion strategies other than GMM may perform better on case
studies with different veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng features.
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Integrated evaluation. Independent evaluation of anti-spooﬁng systems is important to
realize their power to discriminate between genuine accesses and spooﬁng attacks. However,
it gives no insight on the reliability of a joint decision with a veriﬁcation systems in the general
goal to accept genuine users and reject both zero-effort impostors and spooﬁng attacks.
The objective of integrated evaluation is not only to assess the performance of systems under
spooﬁng attacks, but also to account for all the possible inputs to the system: genuine users,
zero-effort impostors and spooﬁng attacks. In the evaluation framework proposed in this
thesis, EPS, this is taken in consideration by parameters which can be interpreted as the prior
probabilities of the different inputs or the relative costs of the error rates associated with them.
The EPS framework is extensively used to evaluate the results of the experiments in this thesis.
Based on the experience of their usage in these practical examples, we came to the following
conclusions:
(a) The most important advantage of EPS framework over other evaluation methodologies is
that it computes a decision threshold which is optimized given all the three types of inputs.
In this way, SFAR of the system is not unnecessarily augmented just because spooﬁng
attacks are not considered.
(b) Using the EPSC, one can report unbiased comparison of systems, as the decision threshold
is computed a priori on a separate data.
(c) The EPS framework allows for comparison of systems based on different criteria and
for different values of the cost parameters. In this way, it enables selection of the best
performing method for a given application.
Reproducible results. The code for the experiments performed in this thesis is available as
free software in the package bob.thesis.ichingo20151 and can be used to reproduce all the
presented results. Furthermore, it can be used to extend the analysis to additional case studies
for the face mode that can be created by combining other veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng
systems. In addition, a complete API for using the EPS framework is provided in the package
antispoofing.evaluation2. It can be used for evaluation of biometric veriﬁcation systems
under spooﬁng attacks regardless of the biometric mode, internal operation of the system and
evaluation database.
7.2 Related Publications
During the course of the work on the individual methods proposed in this thesis, we have
published the following publications:
1 https://pypi.python.org/pypi/bob.thesis.ichingo2015
2 https://pypi.python.org/pypi/antispooﬁng.evaluation
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7.2. Related Publications
Journals
• I. Chingovska, A. Anjos; On the use of client-speciﬁc information for face anti-spooﬁng;
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security; Special Issue on Biometric
Anti-spooﬁng; 10(4):787-796, 2015
• I. Chingovska, A. Anjos, S. Marcel; Biometric evaluation under spooﬁng attacks; IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 9(12):2264-2276, 2014
Conference proceedings
• I. Chingovska, A. Anjos, S. Marcel; Anti-spooﬁng in action: joint operation with ver-
iﬁcation system; Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern
Recognition, Workshop on Biometrics; Portland, Oregon, 2013
• I. Chingovska, et al.; The 2nd competition on counter measures to 2D facial spooﬁng
attacks; Proceedings of International Conference on Biometrics (ICB); Madrid, Spain,
2013
• I. Chingovska, A. Anjos, S. Marcel; On the Effectiveness of Local Binary Patterns in
Face Anti-spooﬁng; Proceedings of the 11th International Conference of the Biometrics
Special Interes Group; Darmstadt, Germany 2012
Book chapters
• I. Chingovska, N. Erdogmus, A, Anjos, S. Marcel. Face Recognition Systems Under
Spooﬁng Attacks, Face Recognition Across the Electromagnetic Spectrum (to appear)
• I. Chingovska, A. Anjos, S. Marcel; Evaluation Methodologies; Handbook of Biometric
Anti-spooﬁng; Springer London, pp.185-2014, 2014
• I. Chingovska, A. Anjos, S. Marcel; Anti-spooﬁng: Evaluation Methodologies; Encyclope-
dia of Biometrics; Springer US, 2014
• I. Chingovska, A. Anjos, S. Marcel; Anti-spooﬁng: Face Databases; Encyclopedia of
Biometrics; Springer US, 2014
During the course of the work on the individual methods proposed in this thesis, we have
developed the following free software packages:
• antispoofing.lbp3
3 https://pypi.python.org/pypi/antispooﬁng.lbp
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• antispoofing.utils4
• antispoofing.fusion_faceverif5
• antispoofing.clientspec6
• antispoofing.evaluation7
• antispoofing.competition_icb20138
7.3 Perspectives for Future Work
The integration of biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng systems is a subject which has
received little attention from the community. The work presented in this thesis is a step
forward towards ﬁlling the gap in this ﬁeld. However, there are several possibilities of how this
work can be extended and a numerous directions that can be explored in the future.
Overcoming the limitations of the integration concepts presented in this thesis is one of these
directions. One limitation is the fact that client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng methods resulting
from input-level integration can be applied only at query time, but not at enrollment time. A
limitation of the output-level integration methods is that they are classical multiple expert
fusion methods and are not optimized for the task of fusion of two systems with discordant
criteria about the positive and the negative class. Furthermore, they assume no mutual
dependence of the veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng scores, or dependence of the scores on the
identity of the client. If such a dependence is found, it may be helpful to better model the
score input space and produce better fused scores. The work on output-level integration can
also be extended to include client-speciﬁc fusion strategies.
The methods proposed in this thesis assume that the biometric veriﬁcation and anti-spooﬁng
systems have been developed independently, and their integration is performed at a later
stage. Digressing from this approach, the two systems could be developed in a joint manner,
either at the feature extraction or the modeling step. These are concepts for integration at the
intermediate-level, which is a challenging, but important direction for future work.
An issue that needs to be urgently addressed is the insufﬁcient number of spooﬁng databases
that provide separate samples for enrollment of clients. The lack of such databases not
only hinders the development of methods for integration of biometric veriﬁcation and anti-
spooﬁng systems, but also prevents training a biometric veriﬁcation system and assessing its
vulnerability to spooﬁng. Unfortunately, Replay-Attack is the sole example of a database with
these properties for the face mode. It is essential that databases developed in the future provide
4 https://pypi.python.org/pypi/antispooﬁng.utils
5 https://pypi.python.org/pypi/antispooﬁng.fusion_faceverif
6 https://pypi.python.org/pypi/antispooﬁng.clientspec
7 https://pypi.python.org/pypi/antispooﬁng.evaluation
8 https://pypi.python.org/pypi/antispooﬁng.competition_icb2013
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as many clients and as many types of spooﬁng attacks as possible. Having such databases will
enable, for example, to more reliably measure the impact of the cohort set selection for the
client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng methods, as well as their generalization capabilities on spooﬁng
attacks not seen during training.
The proposed integration concepts were applied and evaluated only on a subset of case studies
for the face mode, which involve a limited set of veriﬁcation systems and anti-spooﬁng features.
While the presented analysis serves well as a proof of concept, it is important to extend it to
other systems and assess the applicability of the methods in a wider context. Such a study,
for example, can reveal to what extent we can generalize the assumption of client-speciﬁc
information within different categories of anti-spooﬁng features. As part of the future work,
such analysis should include case studies in other biometric modes.
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A Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM)
Let N (x|μ,Σ) be a multivariate Gaussian distribution over the data with mean μ and covari-
ance matrix Σ. If x is d-dimensional variable, then Σ has a dimensionality of dxd and the
Gaussian distribution has the form as in Eq. A.1.
N (x|μ,Σ)= 1
(2π)n/2
1
|Σ|1/2 exp
{
−1
2
(x−μ)TΣ−1(x−μ)
}
(A.1)
A GMM is a weighted sum of M multivariate Gaussian distributions, called components, each
parameterized with Θ = {πm ,μm ,Σm},m = 1..M , where πm is its weight. The weights of the
components are parameters of a discrete distribution p(π1, ...,πm) and thus must comply to
the constraints: 0 ≤ πm ≤ 1 and ∑Mm=1πm = 1. Mathematically, a GMM is formalized as in
Eq. A.2.
p(x)=
M∑
m=1
πmN (x|μm ,Σm) (A.2)
GMM models a generative process in which samples can be generated using ancestral sam-
pling [Bishop, 2006]. In this process, ﬁrst a single component from the GMM is randomly
selected from the distribution p(π1, ...,πm). Then, the sample is generated from the Gaussian
distribution associated with that component. From a probabilistic perspective, the choice
of the component is represented by an M-dimensional random variable z which satisﬁes
∀m = 1..M ,zm ∈ {0,1} and ∑Mm=1 zm = 1. In other words, z is a vector populated with zeros,
with a single element with a value 1 at the index representing the chosen component. The
value of z is never explicitly known. Therefore, it is an unobserved, latent variable, as opposed
to the sample, which is an observed variable. The distribution over z is interpreted through
the component weight parameters, so that ∀m = 1..M ,p(zm = 1)=πm [Bishop, 2006].
115
Appendix A. Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM)
An important issue for GMM is the choice of the covariance matrix Σ. Most often, a separate
covariance matrix is trained for each GMM component [Reynolds and Rose, 1995]. With re-
gards to the properties of the covariance matrix, the most general case supports full covariance
matrices. However, this option is computationally expensive, as the GMM training requires
repeated inversions of the matrix. An alternative is to use GMM with diagonal covariance
matrices, which, subject to the number of components M [Reynolds et al., 2000], can model
the distribution equally well as a GMM with full covariance matrices.
A.1 GMM Training
The training of a GMM model is a Maximum Likelihood (ML) problem and consists of ﬁnd-
ing the parameters Θ = {πm ,μm ,Σm},m = 1..M that maximize the likelihood of all the data
X = {xi |i = 1..N }, where N is the number of samples. Due to the presence of latent variables,
theMLproblem is typically solved using the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm [Demp-
ster et al., 1977]. EM is an iterative algorithm which, starting from an initial choice for the
parametersΘ, alternates between two steps, expectation (E) and maximization (M). During
the process, it adaptsΘ to monotonically increase the likelihood of the given data. Therefore,
for each iteration t of the algorithm, it is valid that p(x|Θt )< p(x|Θt+1).
At initialization ofΘ, the means of the GMM μm ,m = 1..M are usually learned in an unsuper-
vised manner, for example using k-means algorithm [Macqueen, 1967; Lloyd, 1982]. Given the
current value ofΘ, at each iteration t the two steps proceed as follows:
1. E step: The posterior probability distribution p(z|X,Θ) of latent variables is estimated
using Bayes theorem, given the data X and the current value ofΘ.
2. M step: Θ is updated in order to maximize the expectation of the data log-likelihood
computed under the posterior probability distribution found in the E step, as in Eq. A.3.
Θupdated ← arg max
Θ
∑
z
p(z|X ,Θ) logp(X ,z|Θ) (A.3)
The process continues to iterate over E and M steps until convergence criteria is met. N.
and Hinton [1993] give a proof that EM algorithm indeed converges toΘ that maximizes the
likelihood of the data.
A.2 Maximum A-Posteriori Adaptation (MAP)
A signiﬁcant amount of data is required to correctly estimate GMM parameters using ML
parameter estimators. Unfortunately, the enrollment data which is available for creating
client-speciﬁc anti-spooﬁng models is rarely more than a few samples and is not enough to
train a GMM model for each client separately.
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A similar problem in biometric veriﬁcation is solved by using a form of Bayesian adaptation,
called Maximum A-Posteriori (MAP) [Gauvain and Lee, 1994]. In MAP, ﬁrst a prior distribution
over the parameters that need to be estimated is set. Then, the parameters are updated so that
their posterior given their prior and the data is maximized.
First, for each client-speciﬁc GMM, a prior distribution g (Θ) over its parameters is set. A Uni-
versal Background Model (UBM), which is a GMM trained via ML on a large set of background
identities, is created as well. The parameters of this GMM are denoted as ΘUBM. For each
client I with data XI, the likelihood p(XI|ΘUBM) is computed. Then, the parameters for each
client-speciﬁc GMM are updated as given in Eq. A.4.
ΘMAP ← arg max
Θ
p(Xi |ΘUBM)g (Θ) (A.4)
Depending on the choice of the prior distribution, MAP adaptation for GMM can have a
closed form solution and includes a ﬁxed parameter r called a relevance factor. The value
of the relevance factor is important because it controls the impact of the client data in the
adaptation of the UBM parameters to the client-speciﬁc GMM parameters. During MAP, the
GMM components which are close to the client-speciﬁc data are adapted more then the
components which lie further in the feature space.
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B Support Vector Machines (SVM)
A Support Vector Machine (SVM) [Vapnik, 1998; Boser et al., 1992; Cristianini and Shawe-
Taylor, 2000; Fornoni, 2014] is a classiﬁer which discriminatively learns a hyperplane that
separates the set X = {(xi , yi )|i = 1..S} of training samples in Rd×{−1,1}, while minimizing its
generalization error on unseen samples. In its most simple form, it relies on a real valued
linear function f :Rd →R. The function f (xi ) is parameterized by a vector w ∈Rd and a scalar
b ∈R, called a bias.
f (xi )=w ·xi +b (B.1)
The class label yi can have two values: {−1,1}, corresponding to the positive and the negative
class. Geometrically, w ·xi +b = 0 is the hyperplane which separates the two classes, where w
is its normal and b its distance from the origin. All the points whose projection on w is greater
or equal to −b will be classiﬁed positively, while those whose projection on w is smaller than
−b will be classiﬁed negatively. In this sense, the value −b can be interpreted as the threshold
of the classiﬁer. This decision rule is formalized as in Eq. B.2.
yˆi =
⎧⎨
⎩1, if w ·xi ≥−b−1, otherwise (B.2)
B.1 Maximal Margin Classiﬁer
The geometric margin of a sample x is deﬁned as the Eucledian distance between the sample
and the hyperplane [Cristianini and Shawe-Taylor, 2000]. Assuming that X is linearly separable,
the minimal geometric margin given in Eq. B.3 refers to the shortest among the Eucledian
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distances between all the samples in one class and the hyperplane.
g ( f ))=min
xi∈X
1
‖w‖ yi (w ·xi +b) (B.3)
The goal of a SVM is to maximize the minimal geometric margin by ﬁnding optimal values of w
and b. This objective function is deﬁned in Eq. B.4 and it aims at maximizing the generalization
capabilities of the classiﬁer. It will ensure positioning of the hyperplane so that it optimally
separates the two classes.
w,b ← arg max
w,b
min
xi∈X
1
‖w‖ yi (w ·xi +b) (B.4)
The objective function in Eq. B.4, is non-linear and non-convex, and thus difﬁcult to optimize.
It is therefore solved by transforming it to an equivalent formulation, where ‖w‖2 is minimized
subject to a constraint, as shown in Eq. B.5. The classiﬁer obtained in this way is called hard-
margin classiﬁer, as it requires linear separability of the training data and imposes them to
have a margin of 1.
w,b ← arg min
w,b
‖w‖2
subject to yi (w ·xi +b)≥ 1
(B.5)
The objective function given above is usually optimized using convex optimization theory
and Lagrangian multipliers [Cristianini and Shawe-Taylor, 2000]. In this context, a Lagrangian
L(α) of the SVM objective function is derived subject to Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality
conditions, where α is the vector of Lagrangian multipliers. The training of the SVM then
sums up to minimizing L(α) which can be proved to have the form of Eq. B.6. The relationship
betweenα and w is given in Eq. B.7.
L(α)=∑
u
αu − 1
2
∑
u,v
αuαv yu yvxu ·xv
subject to
∑
u
αu yu = 0
αu ≥ 0,∀u
(B.6)
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w=∑
u
αu yuxu (B.7)
The representation of the optimization problem via L(α) is called dual form and depends only
on the Lagrangian multipliers which act as weight coefﬁcients for the training samples. An
additional useful property of the dual form, as will be seen later, is that the training samples
never appear isolated, but always within an inner product with other training samples.
B.2 Support Vectors and Classiﬁcation
After the optimization procedure, only a small subset of αu will be non-zero. In particular,
only the samples for which yu(w ·xu +b)= 1 will have αu = 0. These are the samples which
lie exactly on the margin of the classiﬁer and are called support vectors. An SVM classiﬁer
is completely deﬁned by its support vectors and their Lagrangian coefﬁcients. If Eq. B.7 is
substituted in Eq. B.1, a test sample xi can be classiﬁed using the score obtained as in Eq. B.8.
f (x)=∑
u
αu yux ·xu +b (B.8)
B.3 Linearly Non-separable Data
When the data from the two classes is not linearly separable, a feasible solution to the opti-
mization problem in Eq. B.6 can not be found. Therefore, a slack variable ξu is incorporated
into the optimization problem. The slack variable allows for a violation of the constraint
yu(w ·xu +b)≥ 1 by a little amount and permits that some training samples are on the wrong
side of the hyperplane. The constraint in Eq. B.5 is then reformulated to yu(w ·xu +b)≥ 1−ξu .
At the same time, the objective function incorporates a cost parameter C to regularize the
values of ξu . LargeC increases the penalty on the misclassiﬁed samples, forcing a hyperplane
with as few misclassiﬁcations as possible. Small C restrains the impact of the misclassiﬁed
samples on the hyperplane. The classiﬁer obtained in this way is called soft-margin classiﬁer.
The training of the soft-margin classiﬁer sums up to optimizing L(α) as in Eq. B.6 with the
additional constrain αu ≤C .
B.4 Kernel Functions
Often, a linear boundary may not be enough to separate the two classes in the original feature
space X . A solution is to project the data into a high-dimensional feature space Φ where
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they may be linearly separable and then train a SVM. Considering the dual form of L(α), this
process is made easy by kernel functions which have the form given in Eq. B.9 and where
φ : X →Φ.
K (xi ,x j )=φ(xi ) ·φ(x j ) (B.9)
Kernel functions deﬁne an inner product of the samples in the high-dimensional feature space
Φ. By using kernel functions, the SVM can be trained in the high-dimensional feature space
without explicitly projecting the samples. This offers several advantages, like no impact of the
dimensionality ofΦ on the SVM training complexity and avoidance of the computational costs
associated with projecting the features [Cristianini and Shawe-Taylor, 2000]. The processes
of projection and SVM training can be merged together by substituting the inner product in
Eq. B.6 by the kernel function. The inner product in the classiﬁcation step can be substituted by
a kernel function as well, as in Eq. B.10. It is important to note that in many implementations,
a prerequisite for training a SVM using kernels is the computation of the kernel (Gram) matrix
Ku,v ≡K (xu ,xv ).
f (x)=∑
u
αu yuK (xi ,xu)+b (B.10)
Back in the original feature space and depending on the kernel, the boundary between the
two classes may be non-linear. In these cases, the parameter C is a trade-off between mis-
classiﬁcation of the training samples and smoothness of the boundary. Small values ofC will
contribute to a smooth boundary.
The most common types of kernels include:
• Linear: K (xu ,xv )= xu ·xv
• Radial Basis Function (RBF): K (xu ,xv )= exp(−γ‖xu −xv‖2)
• Polynomial: K (xu ,xv )= (γxu ·xv + r )d
• Histogram Intersection: K (xu ,xv )=∑i min{xu,i ,xv,i }
• χ2: K (xu ,xv )= exp
(
−γ∑i (xu,i−xv,i )2xu,i+xv,i
)
The parameter γ in the RBF, polynomial and χ2 kernel can be interpreted as the inverse of the
radius of inﬂuence of the support vectors. Small values of γmean large radius of inﬂuence,
which leads to smoother boundaries. On the other hand, large values of γ may mean a
boundary which is tightly adapted to the training samples.
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The most important parameter for the polynomial kernel is its degree d . The larger the degree,
the more ﬂexible the decision boundary. The parameter r can be understood as a trade-off
between the inﬂuence of higher-order versus lower-order terms in the polynomial.
Histogram Intersection kernel [Barla et al., 2003] and χ2 kernel [Puzicha et al., 1997] have been
speciﬁcally designed for classiﬁcation when the feature vectors represent histograms. They are
called additive kernels and are based on the corresponding metrics for similarities between
histograms [Vedaldi and Zisserman, 2012]. As they assume that the features are histograms,
they require that all the feature elements are non-negative and l1-normalized.
123

Bibliography
A. Adams and M. A. Sasse. Users are not the enemy. Communications of the ACM, 42(12):40–46,
December 1999. ISSN 0001-0782.
A. Adler and S. Schuckers. Encyclopedia of Biometrics, chapter Security and Liveness, Overview,
pages 1146–1152. Springer-Verlag, 2009.
G. Aggarwal, N.K. Ratha, and R.M. Bolle. Biometric veriﬁcation: Looking beyond raw similarity
scores. In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Workshop, pages 31–31, 2006.
Z. Akhtar, G. Fumera, G-L. Marcialis, and F. Roli. Robustness analysis of likelihood ratio
score fusion rule for multi-modal biometric systems under spoof attacks. In 45th IEEE
International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology, pages 237–244, 2011.
Z. Akhtar, G. Fumera, G-L. Marcialis, and F. Roli. Evaluation of serial and parallel multibio-
metric systems under spooﬁng attacks. In 5th IEEE International Conference on Biometrics:
Theory, Applications and Systems, 2012.
F. Alegre, R. Vipperla, N. Evans, and B. Fauve. On the vulnerability of automatic speaker
recognition to spooﬁng attacks with artiﬁcial signals. In Signal Processing Conference
(EUSIPCO), 2012 Proceedings of the 20th European, pages 36–40, 2012.
A. Ali, F. Deravi, and S. Hoque. Spooﬁng attempt detection using gaze colocation. In Biometrics
Special Interest Group (BIOSIG), 2013 International Conference of the, Sept 2013.
E. Angelopoulou. Understanding the color of human skin. volume 4299, pages 243–251, 2001.
A. Anjos and S. Marcel. Counter-measures to photo attacks in face recognition: a public
database and a baseline. In International Joint Conference on Biometrics (IJCB), 2011.
A. Anjos, L. El-Shafey, R. Wallace, M. Günther, C. McCool, and S. Marcel. Bob: a free signal
processing and machine learning toolbox for researchers. In 20th ACM Conference on
Multimedia Systems (ACMMM). ACM Press, October 2012.
A. Anjos, M. Mohan Chakka, and S. Marcel. Motion-based counter-measures to photo attacks
in face recognition. Institution of Engineering and Technology Journal on Biometrics, July
2013.
125
Bibliography
André Anjos, Ivana Chingovska, and Sébastien Marcel. Anti-spooﬁng: Face databases. In
Stan Z.Li and Anil Jain, editors, Encyclopedia of Biometrics. Springer US, second edition
edition, 2014. ISBN 978-3-642-27733-7. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-27733-7_9212-2. URL
http://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-3-642-27733-7_9067-2.
ANSI-X9.84-2010. Biometric information management and security for the ﬁnancial services
industry. ANSI X9.84-2010, American National Standards Institute (ANSI), 2010.
I. Armstrong. Passwords exposed: Users are the weakest link, 2003. URL http://www.
scmagazine.com/passwords-exposed-users-are-the-weakest-link/article/30394/.
R. Auckenthaler, M. J. Carey, and H. Lloyd-Thomas. Score normalization for text-independent
speaker veriﬁcation systems. Digital Signal Processing, 10(1-3):42–54, 2000.
J. Bai, T. Ng, X. Gao, and Y. Shi. Is physics-based liveness detection truly possible with a single
image? In IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), May 2010.
E. Bailly-Baillire, S. Bengio, F. Bimbot, M. Hamouz, J. Mariéthoz, J. Matas, F. Porée, B. Ruiz, and
J.-P. Thiran. The BANCA database and evaluation protocol. In In Proc. Int. Conf. on Audio-
and Video-Based Biometric Person Authentication (AVBPA03, 2003.
W. Bao, H. Li, N. Li, and W. Jiang. A liveness detection method for face recognition based on
optical ﬂow ﬁeld. 2009 International Conference on Image Analysis and Signal Processing,
2009a.
W. Bao, H. Li, N. Li, and W. Jiang. A liveness detection method for face recognition based on
optical ﬂow ﬁeld. 2009 International Conference on Image Analysis and Signal Processing,
pages 223–236, 2009b.
A. Barla, F. Odone, and A. Verri. Histogram intersection kernel for image classiﬁcation. In
Image Processing, 2003. ICIP 2003. Proceedings. 2003 International Conference on, volume 3,
pages III–513–16 vol.2, Sept 2003.
S. Ben-Yacoub, Y. Abdeljaoued, and E. Mayoraz. Fusion of face and speech data for person
identity veriﬁcation. IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks, 10:1065–1075, 1999.
S. Bengio, J. Mariéthoz, and M. Keller. The expected performance curve. In International
Conference on Machine Learning, ICML, Workshop on ROC Analysis in Machine Learning,
2005.
S. Bharadwaj, T.I. Dhamecha, M. Vatsa, and R. Singh. Computationally efﬁcient face spoof-
ing detection with motion magniﬁcation. In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
Workshops (CVPRW), 2013 IEEE Conference on, pages 105–110, June 2013.
C. M. Bishop. Pattern Recognition and Machine Learning. Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.,
Secaucus, NJ, USA, 2006.
126
Bibliography
J. Bonneau, C. Herley, P. C. van Oorschot, and F. Stajano. The quest to replace passwords: A
framework for comparative evaluation of web authentication schemes. In Proceedings of
the 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 553–567. IEEE Computer Society,
2012.
B. E. Boser, I. M. Guyon, and V. N. Vapnik. A training algorithm for optimal margin classiﬁers.
In Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Workshop on Computational Learning Theory, COLT ’92,
pages 144–152. ACM, 1992. ISBN 0-89791-497-X.
F. Cardinaux, C. Sanderson, and S. Marcel. Comparison of mlp and gmm classiﬁers for
face veriﬁcation on xm2vts. In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on AVBPA,
University of Surrey, Guildford, UK, 2003.
F. Cardinaux, C. Sanderson, and S. Bengio. User authentication via adapted statistical models
of face images. Signal Processing, IEEE Transactions on, 54(1):361–373, Jan 2006.
ChaosComputerClub. Chaos computer club breaks apple touchid, 2013. URL http://www.ccc.
de/updates/2013/ccc-breaks-apple-touchid.
G. Chetty and M. Wagner. Multi-level liveness veriﬁcation for face-voice biometric authentica-
tion. In In Biometrics symposium 2006, 2006a.
G. Chetty and M. Wagner. Audio-visual multimodal fusion for biometric person authentica-
tion and liveness veriﬁcation. In Proceedings of the 2005 NICTA-HCSNet Multimodal User
Interaction Workshop - Volume 57, pages 17–24. Australian Computer Society, Inc., 2006b.
I. Chingovska and A. Anjos. On the use of client identity information for face anti-spooﬁng.
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, Special Issue on Biometric Anti-
spooﬁng, 2015.
I. Chingovska, A. Anjos, and S. Marcel. On the effectiveness of local binary patterns in face
anti-spooﬁng. In International Conference of the Biometrics Special Interest Group (BIOSIG),
pages 1–7, Sept 2012.
I. Chingovska, A. Anjos, and S. Marcel. Anti-spooﬁng in action: joint operation with a veriﬁca-
tion system. In Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition,
Workshop on Biometrics, June 2013a.
I. Chingovska, J. Yang, Z. Lei, D. Yi, S. Z. Li, O. Kähm, N. Damer, C. Glaser, A. Kuijper, A. Nouak,
J. Komulainen, T. de Freitas Pereira, S. Gupta, S. Bansal, S. Khandelwal, A. Rai, T. Krishna,
D. Goyal, M.-A. Waris, H. Zhang, I. Ahmad, S. Kiranyaz, M. Gabbouj, R. Tronci, M. Pili,
N. Sirena, F. Roli, J. Galbally, J. Fierrez-Aguilar, A. Pinto, H. Pedrini, W. R. Schwartz, A. Rocha,
A. Anjos, and S. Marcel. The 2nd competition on counter measures to 2d face spooﬁng
attacks. In International Conference of Biometrics (ICB), 2013b.
I. Chingovska, A. Anjos, and S. Marcel. Biometrics evaluation under spooﬁng attacks. IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 9(12):2264–2276, December 2014a.
127
Bibliography
Ivana Chingovska, André Anjos, and Sébastien Marcel. Anti-spooﬁng: Evaluation methodolo-
gies. In Stan Z.Li and Anil Jain, editors, Encyclopedia of Biometrics. Springer US, 2nd edition
edition, 2014b. ISBN 978-3-642-27733-7. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-27733-7.
Ivana Chingovska, André Anjos, and Sébastien Marcel. Evaluation methodologies. In Sébastien
Marcel, Mark Nixon, and Stan Z.Li, editors, Handbook of Biometric Antispooﬁng. Springer,
2014c. ISBN 978-1-4471-6523-1.
Baris Coskun and Cormac Herley. Can “something you know” be saved? In T.-C. Wu, C.-L.
Lei, V. Rijmen, and D.-T. Lee, editors, Information Security, volume 5222 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 421–440. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008.
N. Cristianini and J. Shawe-Taylor. An Introduction to Support Vector Machines: And Other
Kernel-based Learning Methods. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, USA, 2000.
ISBN 0-521-78019-5.
Nguyen M. D. and Bui Q. M. Your face is not your password. Black Hat Conference, 2009.
A. da Silva Pinto, H. Pedrini, W. Robson Schwartz, and A. Rocha. Video-based face spooﬁng
detection through visual rhythm analysis. In 25th Conference on Graphics, Patterns and
Images, 2012.
N. Dalal and B. Triggs. Histograms of oriented gradients for human detection. In Computer
Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2005. CVPR 2005. IEEE Computer Society Conference on,
volume 1, pages 886–893 vol. 1, June 2005.
W. H. David and L. Stanley. Applied Logistic Regression. Wiley-Interscience Publication, 2000.
M. De Marsico, M. Nappi, D. Riccio, and J. Dugelay. Moving face spooﬁng detection via 3d
projective invariants. In Biometrics (ICB), 2012 5th IAPR International Conference on, March
2012.
A. P. Dempster, N. M. Laird, and D. B. Rubin. Maximum likelihood from incomplete data via
the em algorithm. JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL STATISTICAL SOCIETY, SERIES B, 39(1):1–38,
1977.
G. Doddington, W. Ligget, A. Martin, M. Przybocki, and D. Reynolds. SHEEP, GOATS, LAMBS
and WOLVES: A statistical analysis of speaker performance in the NIST 1998 speaker recog-
nition evaluation. In International Conference On Spoken Language Processing, 1998.
N. Erdogmus and S. Marcel. Spooﬁng attacks to 2d face recognition systems with 3d masks. In
International Conference of the Biometrics Special Interes Group, September 2013a.
N. Erdogmus and S. Marcel. Spooﬁng in 2d face recognition with 3d masks and anti-spooﬁng
with kinect. In Biometrics: Theory, Applications and Systems, September 2013b.
N. Erdogmus and S. Marcel. Spooﬁng face recognition with 3d masks. IEEE Transactions on
Information Forensics and Security, 9(7):1084–1097, July 2014a.
128
Bibliography
N. Erdogmus and S. Marcel. Introduction. In Handbook of Biometric Anti-Spooﬁng - Trusted
Biometrics under Spooﬁng Attacks, pages 1–11. 2014b.
J. Fierrez-Aguilar, J. Ortega-Garcia, D. Garcia-Romero, and J. Gonzalez-Rodriguez. A com-
parative evaluation of fusion strategies for multimodal biometric veriﬁcation. In Fourth
International Conference on Audio- and Video-based Biometric Person Authentication, pages
830–837, 2003.
J. Fierrez-Aguilar, D. Garcia-Romero, J. Ortega-Garcia, and J. Gonzalez-Rodriguez. Adapted
user-dependent multimodal biometric authentication exploiting general information. Pat-
tern Recognition Letters, 26(16):2628–2639, December 2005.
Y. Flink. Million dollar border security machines fooled
with ten cent tape, 2009. URL http://ﬁndbiometrics.com/
million-dollar-border-security-machines-fooled-with-ten-cent-tape/.
D. Florencio and C. Herley. A large-scale study of web password habits. In Proceedings of the
16th International Conference on World Wide Web, pages 657–666. ACM, 2007.
M. Fornoni. MathematicaSVM - a hands-on introduction to Support Vector Machines using
Mathematica ©. https://github.com/fornoni/MathematicaSVM, 2014.
R.W. Frischholz and A. Werner. Avoiding replay-attacks in a face recognition system using
head-pose estimation. In Analysis and Modeling of Faces and Gestures, 2003. AMFG 2003.
IEEE International Workshop on, Oct 2003.
J. Galbally, J. Fierrez-Aguilar, J. D. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, F. Alonso-Fernandez, Javier Ortega-
Garcia, and M. Tapiador. On the vulnerability of ﬁngerprint veriﬁcation systems to fake
ﬁngerprints attacks. In IEEE International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology,
pages 169–179, 2006.
J. Galbally, J. Fierrez-Aguilar, and J. Ortega-Garcia. Vulnerabilities in biometric systems: attacks
and recent advances in liveness detection. In Proc. Spanish Workshop on Biometrics, SWB,
June 2007.
J. Galbally, R. Cappellib, A. Luminib, G. Gonzalez de Rivera, D. Maltoni, J. Fierrez-Aguilar,
J. Ortega-Garcia, and D. Maio. An evaluation of direct attacks using fake ﬁngers generated
from ISO templates. Pattern Recognition Letters, 31(8):725–732, 2010.
J. Galbally, F. Alonso-Fernandez, J. Fierrez-Aguilar, and J. Ortega-Garcia. A high performance
ﬁngerprint liveness detection method based on quality related features. Future Gener.
Comput. Syst., 28(1):311–321, 2012.
J. Galbally, S. Marcel, and J. Fierrez-Aguilar. Image quality assessment for fake biometric
detection: Application to iris, ﬁngerprint and face recognition. IEEE Trans. on Image
Processing, 23(2):710–724, February 2014.
129
Bibliography
X. Gao, T.-T. Ng, Q. Bo, and S.-F. Chang. Single-view recaptured image detection based on
physics-based features. In IEEE International Conference on Multimedia & Expo (ICME),
July 2010.
J. Gauvain and C.-H. Lee. Maximum a posteriori estimation for multivariate gaussian mixture
observations of markov chains. Speech and Audio Processing, IEEE Transactions on, 2(2):
291–298, Apr 1994.
M. Günther, D. Haufe, and R. P. Würtz. Face recognition with disparity corrected Gabor phase
differences. In Artiﬁcial Neural Networks and Machine Learning, volume 7552 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 411–418. Springer Berlin, 2012.
M. Günther, R. Wallace, and S. Marcel. An open source framework for standardized compar-
isons of face recognition algorithms. In Andrea Fusiello, Vittorio Murino, and Rita Cucchiara,
editors, Computer Vision - ECCV 2012. Workshops and Demonstrations, volume 7585 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 547–556, October 2012.
T. Hastie, R. Tibshirani, and J. Friedman. The Elements of Statistical Learning. Springer New
York Inc., 2001.
ISO-30107-1. Biometric presentation attack detection – part 1: Framework. ISO 30107-1,
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), Geneva, Switzerland, 2014.
ISO/IEC 15408. Common Criteria (CC) for Information Technology Security Evaluation -
Evaluation Methodology, 2012. URL http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/.
A. K. Jain and A. Ross. Handbook of Biometrics, chapter Introduction to Biometrics. Springer-
Verlag, 2008.
A. K. Jain, P. Flynn, and A. Ross, editors. Handbook of Biometrics. Springer-Verlag, 2008.
A.K. Jain and A. Ross. Learning user-speciﬁc parameters in a multibiometric system. In Image
Processing. 2002. Proceedings. 2002 International Conference on, volume 1, pages I–57–I–60
vol.1, 2002. doi: 10.1109/ICIP.2002.1037958.
A.K. Jain, A. Ross, and S. Pankanti. Biometrics: a tool for information security. Information
Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on, 1(2):125–143, June 2006.
P. Johnson, R. Lazarick, E. Marasco, E. Newton, A. Ross, and S. Schuckers. Biometric liveness
detection: Framework and metrics. In International Biometric Performance Conference,
2012.
P. A. Johnson, B. Tan, and S. Schuckers. Multimodal fusion vulnerability to non-zero (spoof)
imposters. In IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security, 2010.
K. Jonsson, J. Kittler, Y. P. Li, and J. Matas. Support vector machines for face authentication. In
Image and Vision Computing, pages 543–553, 1999.
130
Bibliography
S. S. Kajarekar and A. Stolcke. NAP and WCCN: Comparison of approaches using MLLR-SVM
speaker veriﬁcation system. In ICASSP (4), pages 249–252, 2007.
S. Kim, S. Yu, K. Kim, Y. Ban, and S. Lee. Face liveness detection using variable focusing. In
Biometrics (ICB), 2013 International Conference on, June 2013.
Y. Kim, J. Na, S. Yoon, and J. Yi. Masked fake face detection using radiance measurements.
Journal of the Optical Society of America A, 26(4):760–766, Apr 2009.
J. Kittler, M. Hatef, R.P.W. Duin, and J. Matas. On combining classiﬁers. Pattern Analysis and
Machine Intelligence, IEEE Transactions on, 20(3):226–239, Mar 1998.
K. Kollreider, H. Fronthaler, and J. Bigun. Verifying liveness by multiple experts in face bio-
metrics. In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Workshops, 2008. CVPRW ’08. IEEE
Computer Society Conference on, pages 1–6, June 2008.
K. Kollreider, H. Fronthaler, and J. Bigun. Non-intrusive liveness detection by face images.
Image and Vision Computing, 27(3):233–244, 2009.
J. Komulainen, A. Hadid, and M. Pietikainen. Context based face anti-spooﬁng. In Biometrics:
Theory, Applications and Systems (BTAS), 2013 IEEE Sixth International Conference on, pages
1–8, Sept 2013a.
J. Komulainen, A. Hadid, M. Pietikainen, A. Anjos, and S. Marcel. Complementary countermea-
sures for detecting scenic face spooﬁng attacks. In International Conference on Biometrics,
June 2013b.
N. Kose and J.-L. Dugelay. Countermeasure for the protection of face recognition systems
against mask attacks. In International Conference and Workshops on Automatic Face and
Gesture Recognition (FG), pages 1–6. IEEE, 2013.
A. Krizhevsky, I. Sutskever, and G. E. Hinton. Imagenet classiﬁcation with deep convolutional
neural networks. In F. Pereira, C.J.C. Burges, L. Bottou, and K.Q. Weinberger, editors, Ad-
vances in Neural Information Processing Systems 25, pages 1097–1105. Curran Associates,
Inc., 2012.
W. Kruskal and W. A. Wallis. Use of ranks in one-criterion variance analysis. Journal of the
American Statistical Association, 47(260):1–1, 1952.
A. Kumar and D. Zhang. User authentication using fusion of face and palmprint. International
Journal of Image and Graphics, 09(02):251–270, 2009.
L. I. Kuncheva and C. J. Whitaker. Measures of diversity in classiﬁer ensembles and their
relationship with the ensemble accuracy. Machine Learning, 51(2):181–207, May 2003.
J. Li, Y. Wang, T. Tan, and A. K. Jain. Live face detection based on the analysis of fourier spectra.
Biometric Technology for Human Identiﬁcation, 2004.
131
Bibliography
Yan Li, K. Xu, Q. Yan, Y. Li, and R. H. Deng. Understanding OSN-based facial disclosure
against face authentication systems. In 9th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and
Communications Security, pages 413–424, 2014.
S. Lloyd. Least squares quantization in pcm. IEEE Trans. Inf. Theor., 28(2):129–137, 9 1982.
ISSN 0018-9448.
S. Lucey and T. Chen. A gmm parts based face representation for improved veriﬁcation
through relevance adaptation. In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2004. CVPR
2004. Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE Computer Society Conference on, volume 2, pages II–855–
II–861 Vol.2, June 2004.
Y. M. Lui, D. Bolme, P.J. Phillips, J.R. Beveridge, and B.A. Draper. Preliminary studies on the
Good, the Bad, and the Ugly face recognition challenge problem. In Computer Vision and
Pattern Recognition Workshops (CVPRW), 2012, pages 9–16, 2012.
J. Määttä, A. Hadid, and M. Pietikäinen. Face spooﬁng detection from single images using
micro-texture analysis. In International Joint Conference on Biometrics, pages 1–7, 2011.
J. Määttä, A. Hadid, and M. Pietikäinen. Face spooﬁng detection from single images using
texture and local shape analysis. IET Biometrics, 1:3–10, 2012.
J. Macqueen. Some methods for classiﬁcation and analysis of multivariate observations. In In
5-th Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability, pages 281–297, 1967.
A. J. Mansﬁeld, J. L. Wayman, D. Rayner, and J. L. Wayman. Best practices in testing and
reporting performance, 2002.
E. Marasco, P. Johnson, C. Sansone, and S. Schuckers. Increase the security of multibiometric
systems by incorporating a spooﬁng detection algorithm in the fusion mechanism. In
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Multiple classiﬁer systems, pages 309–
318, 2011.
E. Marasco, Y. Ding, and A. Ross. Combining match scores with liveness values in a ﬁngerprint
veriﬁcation system. In 5th IEEE International Conference on Biometrics: Theory, Applications
and Systems, 2012.
S. Marcel, Y. Rodriguez, and G. Heusch. On the recent use of local binary patterns for face
authentication. International Journal on Image and Video Processing, SI on Facial Image
Processing, 2007.
A. Martin and M. Przybocki. The NIST 1999 speaker recognition evaluation - an overview,
2000.
A. Martin, G. Doddington, T. Kamm, M. Ordowski, and M. Przybocki. The DET curve in
assessment of detection task performance. In Eurospeech, pages 1895–1898, 1997.
132
Bibliography
T. Matsumoto, H. Matsumoto, K. Yamada, and S. Hoshino. Impact of artiﬁcial "gummy" ﬁngers
on ﬁngerprint systems. volume 4677. SPIE, 2002.
Stephen M. Matyas Jr. and J. Stapleton. A biometric standard for information management
and security. Computers and Security, 19(5):428 – 441, 2000.
C. Matyszczyk. Doctors ’used fake ﬁngers’ to clock in for colleagues at ER, 2013. URL http:
//www.cnet.com/news/doctors-used-fake-ﬁngers-to-clock-in-for-colleagues-at-er/.
M. McLaren, R. Vogt, B. Baker, and S. Sridharan. Data-driven background dataset selection
for SVM-based speaker veriﬁcation. IEEE Transactions on Audio, Speech and Language
Processing, 18(6):1496 – 1507, 2010.
M. L. McLaren. Improving automatic speaker veriﬁcation using SVM techniques. PhD thesis,
Queensland University of Technology, 2009.
D. Menotti, G. Chiachia, A. Pinto, W. Schwartz, H. Pedrini, A. Falcao, and A. Rocha. Deep
representations for iris, face, and ﬁngerprint spooﬁng detection. Information Forensics and
Security, IEEE Transactions on, (99):1–1, 2015.
Radford M. N. and G. E. Hinton. A new view of the em algorithm that justiﬁes incremental
and other variants. In Learning in Graphical Models, pages 355–368. Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1993.
L. O’Gorman. Comparing passwords, tokens, and biometrics for user authentication. Proceed-
ings of the IEEE, 91(12):2021–2040, Dec 2003.
T. Ojala, M. Pietikäinen, and T. Maenpaa. Multiresolution gray-scale and rotation invariant
texture classiﬁcation with local binary patterns. IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and
Machine Intelligence, 24(7):971 –987, July 2002.
M. Oren and S. K. Nayar. Generalization of the lambertian model and implications for machine
vision. International Journal of Computer Vision, 14(3):227–251, 1995.
G. Pan, L. Sun, Z. Wu, and S. Lao. Eyeblink-based anti-spooﬁng in face recognition from a
generic webcamera. In ICCV. IEEE, 2007.
G. Pan, L. Sun, Z. Wu, and Y. Wang. Monocular camera-based face liveness detection by
combining eyeblink and scene context. Telecommunication Systems, 47(3-4):215–225, 2011.
G. Parziale, J. Dittman, and M. Tistarelli. Analysis and evaluation of alternatives and advanced
solutions for system elements. BioSecure D 9.1.2, 2005.
I. Pavlidis and P. Symosek. The imaging issue in an automatic face/disguise detection sys-
tem. In Computer Vision Beyond the Visible Spectrum: Methods and Applications, 2000.
Proceedings. IEEE Workshop on, pages 15–24, 2000.
133
Bibliography
F. Pedregosa, G. Varoquaux, A. Gramfort, V. Michel, B. Thirion, O. Grisel, M. Blondel, P. Pretten-
hofer, R. Weiss, V. Dubourg, J. Vanderplas, A. Passos, D. Cournapeau, M. Brucher, M. Perrot,
and E. Duchesnay. Scikit-learn: Machine learning in Python. Journal of Machine Learning
Research, 12:2825–2830, 2011.
T. De Freitas Pereira, A. Anjos, J. M. De Martino, and S. Marcel. Can face anti-spooﬁng
countermeasures work in a real world scenario? In International Conference on Biometrics,
2013.
T. De Freitas Pereira, J. Komulainen, A. Anjos, J.M. de Martino, A. Hadid, M. Pietikäinen, and
S. Marcel. Face liveness detection using dynamic texture. EURASIP Journal on Image and
Video Processing, 2014:2, 2014.
N. Poh and S. Bengio. Database, protocols and tools for evaluating score-level fusion algo-
rithms in biometric authentication. Pattern Recognition Journal, 39:223–233, 2006.
Norman Poh and Josef Kittler. On the use of log-likelihood ratio based model-speciﬁc score
normalisation in biometric authentication. In S.-W. Lee and S. Z. Li, editors, Advances in
Biometrics, volume 4642 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 614–624. 2007.
F. J. Prokoski. Disguise detection and identiﬁcation using infrared imagery. volume 0339,
pages 27–31, 1983.
M.A. Przybocki, A.F. Martin, and A.N. Le. NIST speaker recognition evaluation chronicles -
part 2. In Speaker and Language Recognition Workshop, 2006. IEEE Odyssey 2006: The, June
2006.
J. Puzicha, T. Hofmann, and J.M. Buhmann. Non-parametric similarity measures for unsuper-
vised texture segmentation and image retrieval. InComputer Vision and Pattern Recognition,
1997. Proceedings., 1997 IEEE Computer Society Conference on, pages 267–272, Jun 1997.
R. Raghavendra, K.B. Raja, and C. Busch. Presentation attack detection for face recognition
using light ﬁeld camera. Image Processing, IEEE Transactions on, (99):1–1, 2015.
NaliniK. Ratha, JonathanH. Connell, and RuudM. Bolle. An analysis of minutiae matching
strength. In J. Bigun and F. Smeraldi, editors, Audio- and Video-Based Biometric Person
Authentication, volume 2091 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 223–228. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, 2001.
A. Rattani and N. Poh. Biometric system design under zero and non-zero effort attacks. In
Biometrics (ICB), 2013 International Conference on, pages 1–8, June 2013.
A. Rattani, N. Poh, and A. Ross. Analysis of user-speciﬁc score characteristics for spoof
biometric attacks. In CVPR Workshops, pages 124–129. IEEE, 2012.
A. Rattani, N. Poh, and A. Ross. A bayesian approach for modeling sensor inﬂuence on quality,
liveness and match score values in ﬁngerprint veriﬁcation. In Information Forensics and
Security (WIFS), 2013 IEEE International Workshop on, pages 37–42, Nov 2013.
134
Bibliography
D. A. Reynolds. Speaker identiﬁcation and veriﬁcation using gaussian mixture speaker models.
Speech Communication, 17(1–2):91 – 108, 1995.
D. A. Reynolds and R. C. Rose. Robust text-independent speaker identiﬁcation using gaussian
mixture speaker models. IEEE Transactions on Speech and Audio Processing, 3(1):72–83,
1995.
D. A. Reynolds, T. F. Quatieri, and R. B. Dunn. Speaker veriﬁcation using adapted Gaussian
mixture models. In Digital Signal Processing, page 2000, 2000.
R. N. Rodrigues, L. L. Ling, and V. Govindaraju. Robustness of multimodal biometric fusion
methods against spooﬁng attacks. Journal of Visual Languages and Computing, 20(3):
169–179, 2009.
R.N. Rodrigues, N. Kamat, and V. Govindaraju. Evaluation of biometric spooﬁng in a multi-
modal system. In Biometrics: Theory Applications and Systems (BTAS), 2010 Fourth IEEE
International Conference on, 2010.
F. Roli, J. Kittler, G. Fumera, and D. Muntoni. An experimental comparison of classiﬁer fusion
rules for multimodal personal identity veriﬁcation systems. In Proceedings of the Third
International Workshop on Multiple Classiﬁer Systems, pages 325–336, 2002.
A.E. Rosenberg and S. Parthasarathy. Speaker backgroundmodels for connected digit password
speaker veriﬁcation. InAcoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, 1996. ICASSP-96. Conference
Proceedings., 1996 IEEE International Conference on, volume 1, pages 81–84 vol. 1, May
1996.
A. Ross and A. Jain. Information fusion in biometrics. Pattern Recognition Letters, 24, 2003.
A. Ross, K. Nandakumar, and A. K. Jain. Handbook of Biometrics, chapter Introduction to
multibiometrics. Springer-Verlag, 2008.
V. Ruiz-Albacete, P. Tome, F. Alonso-Fernandez, J. Galbally, J. Fierrez-Aguilar, and J. Ortega-
Garcia. Direct attacks using fake images in iris veriﬁcation. In Proc. COST 2101 Workshop
on Biometrics and Identity Management, BIOID, pages 181–190. Springer, May 2008.
C. Sanderson and K. K. Paliwal. Fast features for face authentication under illumination
direction changes. Pattern Recognition Letters, 24(14), 0 2003. doi: 10.1016/s0167-8655(03)
00070-9.
P. J. SCHMID. Dynamic mode decomposition of numerical and experimental data. Journal of
Fluid Mechanics, 656:5–28, 8 2010. ISSN 1469-7645.
Stephanie A. C. Schuckers. Spooﬁng and anti-spooﬁng measures. Information Security
Technical Report, 7:56–62, 2002.
W. R. Schwartz, A. Rocha, and H. Pedrini. Face Spooﬁng Detection through Partial Least
Squares and Low-Level Descriptors. In International Joint Conference on Biometrics, 2011.
135
Bibliography
D. Simon-Zorita, J. Ortega-Garcia, M. Sanchez-Asenjo, and J. Gonzalez-Rodriguez. Facing
position variability in minutiae-based ﬁngerprint veriﬁcation through multiple references
and score normalization techniques. In Audio- and Video-Based Biometric Person Authenti-
cation, volume 2688 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 214–223. 2003.
N. Swanner. Samsung galaxy s5 ﬁngerprint scanner foiled, de-
vice hacked, 2014. URL http://androidcommunity.com/
samsung-galaxy-s5-ﬁngerprint-scanner-foiled-device-hacked-20140415/.
X. Tan and B. Triggs. Enhanced local texture feature sets for face recognition under difﬁcult
lighting conditions. Image Processing, IEEE Transactions on, 19(6):1635–1650, June 2010.
X. Tan, Y. Li, J. Liu, and L. Jiang. Face liveness detection from a single image with sparse low
rank bilinear discriminative model. In ECCV (6), pages 504–517, 2010.
S. Tirunagari, N. Poh, D. Windridge, A. Iorliam, N. Suki, and A.T.S. Ho. Detection of face
spooﬁng using visual dynamics. Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on,
10(4):762–777, April 2015.
K.-A. Toh, X. Jiang, and W.-Y. Yau. Exploiting global and local decisions for multimodal
biometrics veriﬁcation. Signal Processing, IEEE Transactions on, 52(10):3059–3072, Oct
2004.
R. Tronci, D. Muntoni, G. Fadda, M. Pili, N. Sirena, G. Murgia, M. Ristori, and F. Roli. Fusion of
multiple clues for photo-attack detection in face recognition systems. In International Joint
Conference of Biometrics (IJCB), pages 1–6, 2011.
S. Tulyakov, Z. Zhang, and V. Govindaraju. Comparison of combination methods utilizing
t-normalization and second best score model. In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
Workshops, 2008. CVPRW ’08. IEEE Computer Society Conference on, pages 1–5, June 2008.
V. N. Vapnik. Statistical Learning Theory. Wiley-Interscience, 1998.
M. Vatsa, R. Singh, A. Noore, and A. Ross. On the dynamic selection of biometric fusion
algorithms. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 5(3):470–479, 2010.
A. Vedaldi and A. Zisserman. Efﬁcient additive kernels via explicit feature maps. Pattern
Analysis and Machine Intelligence, IEEE Transactions on, 34(3):480–492, March 2012.
J. Villalba and E. Lleida. Preventing replay attacks on speaker veriﬁcation systems. In Security
Technology (ICCST), 2011 IEEE International Carnahan Conference on, pages 1–8, 2011.
R. Wallace, M. McLaren, C. McCool, and S. Marcel. Inter-session variability modelling and
joint factor analysis for face authentication. In International Joint Conference on Biometrics,
2011.
L. Wang, X. Ding, and C. Fang. Face live detection method based on physiological motion
analysis. Tsinghua Science and Technology, 14(6):685–690, 2009.
136
Bibliography
T. Wang, J. Yang, Z. Lei, S. Liao, and S. Z. Li. Face liveness detection using 3D structure
recovered from a single camera. In Biometrics (ICB), 2013 International Conference on,
2013a.
Y. Wang, T. Tan, and A. Jain. Combining face and iris biometrics for identity veriﬁcation. In
Fourth International Conference onAudio- andVideo-based Biometric Person Authentication,
2003.
Y. Wang, X. Hao, Y. Hou, and C. Guo. A new multispectral method for face liveness detection.
In Pattern Recognition (ACPR), 2013 2nd IAPR Asian Conference on, pages 922–926, Nov
2013b.
D. Wen, H. Han, and A. K. Jain. Face spoof detection with image distortion analysis. IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, PP(99):1–1, 2015.
C. Williams and M. Seeger. Using the nyström method to speed up kernel machines. In
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 13, pages 682–688. MIT Press, 2001.
L. Wiskott, J.-M. Fellous, N. Krüger, and C. Von Der Malsburg. Face recognition by elastic
bunch graph matching. IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis And Machine Inteligence, 19:
775–779, 1997.
H.-Y. Wu, M. Rubinstein, E. Shih, J. Guttag, F. Durand, and W. T. Freeman. Eulerian video
magniﬁcation for revealing subtle changes in the world. ACM Trans. Graph. (Proceedings
SIGGRAPH 2012), 31(4), 2012.
J. Yan, Z. Zhang, Z. Lei, D. Yi, and S. Z. Li. Face liveness detection by exploring multiple scenic
clues. In 12th International Conference on Control, Automation, robotics and Vision (ICARCV
2012), China, December 2012.
J. Yang, Z. Lei, S. Liao, and S.Z. Li. Face liveness detection with component dependent
descriptor. In International Conference on Biometrics (ICB), pages 1–6, June 2013.
J. Yang, Z. Lei, and S. Z. Li. Learn convolutional neural network for face anti-spooﬁng. CoRR,
abs/1408.5601, 2014.
W. Zhang, S. Shan, and W. Gao ; X. Chen ; H. Zhang. Local gabor binary pattern histogram
sequence (lgbphs): A novel non-statistical model for face representation and recognition.
In Proceedings of the Tenth IEEE International Conference on Computer Vision (ICCV’05)
Volume 1 - Volume 01, ICCV ’05, pages 786–791. IEEE Computer Society, 2005.
Z. Zhang, D. Yi, Z. Lei, and S. Z. Li. Face liveness detection by learning multispectral reﬂectance
distributions. pages 436–441, 2011.
G. Zhao and M. Pietikäinen. Dynamic texture recognition using local binary patterns with
an application to facial expressions. IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine
Intelligence, 29(6):915–928, 2007.
137
Bibliography
Z. Zhiwei, J. Yan, S. Liu, Z. Lei, D. Yi, and S. Z. Li. A face antispooﬁng database with diverse
attacks. In 5th IAPR International Conference on Biometrics (ICB), pages 26–31, March 2012.
138
? ????????????????
???????????????????????
???????????????
??????? ???????
???????????
? ???????????????????????????????????????????
? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
? ?????????????? ????????????????????????????????? ???????
???????????????????????? ????????????????????????? ?????????????????????
????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?? ?????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????
?????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ? ???????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????
???????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????
?????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????
?????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ???????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
?????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????
??????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????? ????????????
?????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????
???????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????
???????????????????????
??????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????
??????????
???????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????
??????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????
???????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????? ??????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????
??????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????
?????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????
???????????? ????????????????? ?? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
??????????????? ?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????
????????????
?????????????????? ?? ????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
?????????????????? ?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????? ?????????????????? ?? ????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????
?????????????????? ?? ????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????? ?? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????
????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
